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 InTrODuCTIOn  1
Chapter 1
Introduction:  
the intimate life of dissent 
Harini Amarasuriya, Tobias Kelly, Sidharthan Maunaguru, 
Galina Oustinova-Stjepanovic and Jonathan Spencer
Natalya Gorbanevskaya, one of the participants in a Red Square protest 
against the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, did 
something surprising: she brought her baby son to the demonstra-
tion even though she anticipated arrest. She pushed a pram with her 
child to the demonstration in the centre of the Square and unfurled 
a home- made banner. She then left the baby in the lobby of the KGB 
headquarters while she underwent an extensive interrogation. When 
asked by a KGB officer to name the father of her child, Gorbanevskaya 
refused, declaring that family issues were irrelevant. Yet in many ways 
her act of political opposition had been forged and sustained by relations 
with lovers, friends, family and with other dissidents. Gorbanevskaya’s 
mother, for example, both supported and fretted over her daughter’s 
political engagements. When Gorbanevskaya was charged with anti- 
Soviet agitation, her actions were said by the prosecutor to amount not 
only to a betrayal of the Soviet state, but also to a betrayal of her own 
children. She was cast as both a bad Soviet citizen and a bad mother. 
The jury then punished Gorbanevskaya with a lengthy confinement in 
a psychiatric ward, resulting in separation from her family and friends 
(many of whom shared her hostility towards the Soviet state). In one fell 
swoop, Gorbanevskaya seemed to have both transgressed and reinstated 
the boundary between the intimate life of sex and family and the public 
life of political protest. Her story shows what is at stake, both politically 
and personally, in acts of dissent. 
The chapters in this edited collection examine those moments 
when people take a stand, acting in ways that go against the grain 
of social and political life, often at great personal risk. For Soviet 
dissidents, Kurdish activists, Sri Lankan leftists, Orthodox Jewish Israelis, 
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Indonesian students and prisoners, Tibetan exiles and British pacifists, 
acts of dissent are attempts to take a position of principle, to set oneself 
up against the status quo. We might view such acts of dissent within a 
range of possible interpretive frames, such as ‘resistance’, ‘refusal’ or 
‘protest’ (McGranahan 2016; Simpson 2014; Weiss 2016), but we are 
particularly interested here in those acts where people declare or act on 
their commitments. 
Dissidence implies not just strong dissatisfaction, but also 
determined and open opposition. Such acts of dissent are found not 
so much in forms of hidden and subtle resistance, but in the processes 
that Leela Gandhi has described as ‘actively renouncing, refusing and 
rejecting’ (2006, 5). In this collection we are trying to understand the 
conditions of possibility for such acts, and the culturally thick meanings 
and significance with which they are inscribed. We do not wish to 
romanticise  dissent –  conservatism and xenophobic nationalism can 
be dissenting principles, after  all –  but rather to put acts of protest and 
refusal back into the thick social and cultural relations out of which they 
emerge and take effect. 
The term ‘dissent’ has a very particular and freighted  history 
–  linked most obviously with the Protestant Reformation and, more 
recently, anti- authoritarian politics and Cold War human rights (Arendt 
1972; Havel 1989; Shelby 2018, 264). Underpinned by a specific view 
of personal freedom, dissent in this tradition is presumed to emanate 
from within the individual and has been strongly linked to ideas of 
‘conscience’, ‘interiority’ and ‘authenticity’ (Boym 2010; Laidlaw 2002). 
Dissent here is a form of political disruption born in the moral individual. 
To dissent is both to protest in the face of injustice and to be true to 
oneself: a combination that Václav Havel called ‘living in truth’ (1989). 
Indeed, acts of dissent are seen to represent a residual and radical 
humanity that cannot be crushed by authoritarianism, totalitarianism or 
political horror. 
Dissidents can be awkward in their commitment to freedom, even 
iconoclastic in the way they hold fast to their  principles –  but for them not 
to dissent would be somehow ethically corrupting. ‘Silence’, as Nadezdha 
Mandelstam put it, ‘would be the real crime against humanity’. The 
dissenting heroes of the liberal imagination are therefore people such 
as Mandelstam, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Václav Havel and Ken Saro- Wiwa. 
They may seem idiosyncratic and awkward, but their dissent is often seen 
as a positive  virtue –  one that not only allows the dissenter to be ‘true to 
oneself’, but also serves as a powerful social and political corrective to the 
injustice around them. 
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Although the term ‘dissent’ may resonate within the histories of 
liberal politics and Protestant Christianity, its meanings and implica-
tions are not constrained by those traditions. Ethnographic and historical 
evidence points instead to multiplicity:  dissent –  as an act of renouncing, 
refusing and  rejecting –  can assume many forms and is not limited to 
individual acts of moral protest. As Oustinova- Stjepanovic shows in 
chapter 2, for example, dissent in the late Soviet period was manifest 
not only in public demonstrations, but also sometimes in seemingly 
absurd forms of conceptual exile and artistic estrangement. Similarly, 
Erica Weiss has suggested in chapter 3 that the peace activism of liberal 
and ultra- Orthodox Jews may be defined by a common goal, but builds 
on radically different, even incompatible moral premises. If dissent is 
often associated with particular forms of freedom, individualism and 
aesthetics, these links are therefore not as self- evident as they might 
appear. Dissent, for example, can be thought of as a form of obligation 
or a duty as much as an expression of freedom. There often seems to be a 
sense (in Geertz’s (1968) formulation) that we are held by the convictions 
that ground our dissent, rather than that we hold them. Furthermore, 
even within the liberal tradition, not all forms of dissent are seen as 
equal. Individuals do not stand free and unencumbered, but are always 
marked by histories of inequality. Some people find it easier to enter 
the space of dissent than others. The sense that dissent somehow has its 
origins deep inside the individual can also cause unease, as a valorisation 
of sincerity produces anxieties about authenticity and dissenters can be 
viewed as degenerate trouble makers as much as moral saints. In short, 
there are many cultures of dissent. 
The central argument of this volume is that foregrounding intimacy 
can help us to parochialise liberal notions of dissent, and their associated 
forms of agency, personhood and change. Dissidents are not simply 
lone individuals with abstract ideals; they are also caught up in other, 
sometimes contradictory aspirations and relationships and forms of 
responsibility. Dissent does not just reverberate through public acts, but 
also in the most intimate of relations, and the social world of dissidents 
and activists is often a place of especially intense sociality. For liberal 
theorists such as John Rawls (1993), dissent is carried out by abstract 
individuals, seemingly devoid of personal ties. When Rawls writes of 
anti- war activists and their acts of civil disobedience during the Vietnam 
war, it is as if they have no social relations and act solely as moral 
individuals alone against the world, weighing up what is good and right 
to do in the face of violence, coercion and domination. Yet the memoirs 
of dissidents are full of descriptions both of how they gained support 
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and succour from loved ones and of the tragic consequences of their 
action for their own families (Yakir 1972). Acts of dissent can therefore 
involve the making and breaking of specific intimate attachments of 
kinship, friendship and solidarity, just as much as commitments to high 
principles. 
We understand intimacy here as being linked to the experience of 
familiarity within friendship, family and love, but as also going beyond 
 that –  opening up what Lauren Berlant has described as a ‘range of 
attachments’ that ‘links the instability of individual lives to the trajecto-
ries of the collective’ (1998, 283; see also Herzfeld 2005). Ties of family, 
friendship and sex are therefore not the only sources of intimacy, 
although they can be a very important part. Or, to put this another way, 
the intimate is exhausted neither by kinship ties nor the private realm. 
As Michael Herzfeld (2005) has argued, for example, the idea of the 
nation can be invoked through the register of intimacy too, creating 
shared frustrations, embarrassments and aspirations. Intimacy works 
across different scales, implying closeness but not necessarily proximity, 
gesturing to forms of broader mutual identification, at the levels of the 
family, but also of the nation, the religious community or other publics. 
In this process, and importantly for our argument, the very distinction 
between private ideas and public action begins to break down. Intimacy 
is also not an inherently positive experience or virtue: it can be fraught, 
claustrophobic and coercive, as well as caring and supportive.
Thinking of dissent as intimate helps us to move beyond the narrow 
notions of the individual by putting dissidence back in the histories of the 
dense social relations from which it emerges (Berlant 1998, 282; Berlant 
and Warner 1998, 553; see also Laurie and Stark 2017, 73). We might 
say that dissent is both enabled and contained by our intimate relations, 
and we can only understand the intensity of acts of dissent, and the risks 
they entail, if we also understand the intimate ties, tensions and contra-
dictions within which they are enmeshed. Intimate ties can exist in tragic 
tension with forms of political dissent, or they can provide the energy 
upon which dissent thrives. Either way, we cannot understand dissent 
unless we understand its often fraught relationship with intimacy.
At one level, putting intimacy and dissent into the same frame 
might seem an awkward move. In the popular imagination, dissidents 
are moved by a commitment to what is right or wrong that transcends 
their own narrow self- interest and personal ties. Bonhoeffer, Havel and 
Saro- Wiwa went to jail and Bonhoeffer and Saro- Wiwa were executed 
for standing firm by their ideals; they left behind lovers, children, family 
and friends, who could only watch in a tragic mixture of admiration and 
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despair. As the anthropology of ethics has tried to show, many people act 
out of a deep commitment to ideals of what is right, good and just, rather 
than the partiality of specific ties and interests (Laidlaw 2002; Schielke 
2015). These are ideals that, as Samuli Schielke argues, can appear 
distant, ‘external and superior to everyday experience’ (2015, 13). And 
as Alberto Toscano (2010) has similarly argued, people are often moved 
by abstract ideals in a way that makes political action both possible and 
imaginable. Ideas of class, nation and religion evoke much more than 
the here and now. That is precisely why they are such a powerful force in 
people’s lives, one that can compel them to act under the most difficult 
of circumstances. 
We should not though overplay the distinction between abstract 
commitments and intimate relations. If intimacy is not simply about 
known personal relations, but also about wider ties of familiarity 
(Herzfeld 2005), the lines between intimate relations and abstract 
principles blur. At one level, convictions are shaped and given meaning 
through the dense flux and flow of relations with friends, children, 
parents, siblings, lovers, comrades and others. Commitments are rarely 
just commitments to ideas, but also, as Michael Walzer (1970) has 
pointed out, obligations to people who we might know, love and respect. 
People tend to die, for example, not simply for country, God or class, but 
also for friends, comrades and lovers. As Veena Das (2007) has argued, 
ideals do not transcend the world of everyday relations and experiences: 
they rather emerge through and as part of them. Furthermore, as 
Mathijs Pelkmans has also argued, abstract commitments can have 
a deeply affective dimension; as he puts it, ‘we can be moved by our 
principles’ (2017). The commitments for which we might take a stand 
can be deeply personal in a profound sense. Foregrounding intimacy 
therefore helps us to move away from a stark contrast between abstract 
principles and dense social relationships. It is not that the ties that bind 
are simply put at risk by grand schemes and ideals, but rather that all 
schemes and ideas gain meaning and possibility through those ties in 
the first place.
We might be tempted to understand dissent as an issue of ‘politics’ 
or ‘ethics’ – a play of power and resistance, or a product of a commitment 
to ethical virtue and normative principles. The last 30 years of anthro-
pology have produced numerous important insights into ways in which 
people resist multiple forms of domination (Abu- Lughod 1990; Simpson 
2014). In partial contrast, some of the recent work in the anthropology 
of ethics has pushed back against an understanding of political action as 
linked to instrumental forms of action, in favour of an emphasis on the 
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cultivation of ethical selves and judgements (Laidlaw 2002; Mattingly 
2014). But using the frame of intimacy helps to show that both an ‘ethical 
virtue’ and ‘power and resistance’ approach to dissent can be too reduc-
tionist, failing to grasp the dense and often contradictory bonds within 
which people live alongside one another, the grounds upon which they 
protest and the implications of doing so. 
It is not that ‘ethics’ and ‘politics’, or even ‘kinship’, do not  matter – 
 they matter  intensely –  but rather that our hopes, fears and relationships 
cannot be neatly constrained within these frames. Our intimate ties cut 
across these domains, even as they might sometimes push them apart. 
The forms of dissent explored in this volume are not simply stories of 
great lives lived alone or family melodramas, nor are they simply lives 
of high principle or intense calculation, but all and neither at the same 
time. Commitments are lived and struggled with in a way that is not 
reducible to something called politics, ethics or kinship, but through a 
shifting, fraught and sometimes inspiring combination of multiple forms 
of always intimate obligation and attachment. 
Domains of dissent
In his monumental account of the early years of the Soviet Union, Yuri 
Slezkine (2017, 334–5) cites at some length an architectural vision 
of the proposed social relations of the new society that was coming 
into existence. The new men and women of the Soviet era would be 
housed in vast collective blocks. On entering the block, they would first 
pass through an area dedicated to personal hygiene and cleanliness 
before entering the zone of sociality and the collective ‘American- style’ 
cafeteria, where all were to eat. Finally, past all this, residents would 
have access to their strictly individual sleeping rooms. Sex, reproduction 
and the responsibilities of parenthood were all epiphenomenal to the 
vision of a new order. This would be a regime in which intimacy would to 
a great extent be rendered architecturally unthinkable. 
The story of Slezkine’s book, though, is of the Soviet failure 
to remake intimate relations on rational, socialist lines, as orthodox 
Marxist expectations about the imminent end of the bourgeois family 
came up against what we might, in retrospect, see as the intransigence 
of the intimate. ‘The Bolsheviks’ early attempts to reform the family,’ 
Slezkine concludes, ‘were soon abandoned in favour of an acceptance 
that remained untheorized and apparently irrelevant to the building of 
Communism’ (2017, 953).
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But intimacy can present an opportunity as well as a challenge 
for would- be revolutionaries. Alpa Shah (2013), for example, argues 
against attempts to explain local support for Indian Naxalites in terms of 
purely material factors (so- called ‘greed or grievance’), in favour of an 
explanation which attends more closely to the idioms of intimacy that 
draw in, and hold onto, the loyalties of the rural poor. Young recruits 
to the Maoists are at once attracted by the familiarity of the cadres they 
 join –  brothers, sisters,  cousins –  while also seeking to escape the impos-
sibility of their own domestic circumstances, the overbearing father, the 
threat of an unwanted marriage. Intimacy, this case reminds us, cuts two 
ways, promising warmth and solidarity, but as often delivering conflict 
and division. And the blurring of the boundary between the intimate and 
the political is, of course, one source of the peculiarly bitter dynamics 
of local- level civil wars. In such conflicts accusations of treachery and 
betrayal are most often hurled at those who would otherwise appear 
to be close, sometimes resulting in the most intense forms of violence 
(Kalyvas 2006; Thiranagama and Kelly 2010). 
These two examples, read together, show that the politics of 
intimacy are unlikely to be simple or straightforward. For would- be 
revolutionaries, captivated by top- down, totalising visions of social and 
political change, the intimate, as a bounded enclave in social life, 
threatens to undermine the integrity of the big vision. But, at the same 
time, the sentimental intimate, the promised warmth of comradeship, 
of brotherhood and sisterhood, offers the possibility of scaling up into 
bigger forms of solidarity. They also show that the intimate has been a 
source of potential dissonance for radical political projects well before 
the 1960s reminder that ‘the personal is political’. As Hanisch put it, 
in a classic second- wave feminist intervention, ‘Personal problems are 
political problems. There are no personal solutions at this time. There 
is only collective action for a collective solution’ (1970). There is a 
subtle difference in intent here, though, between second- wave feminism 
and the socialist revolutionary projects described above. The ‘political’ 
here is less a totalising project, but rather more a pervasive reality, 
an inescapable dimension of all social relations. This argument finds 
a familiar academic echo in Foucault’s 1960s and 1970s writings on 
power. But, as Heberle (2016) shows in a useful recent survey, it was 
much more widespread as a point of departure across a range of 1960s 
social  movements –  anti- war, anti- racist, anti- patriarchy. 
What follows from this, as the history of the last 50 years amply 
attests, is really not at all simple. The invocation of the ‘personal as 
political’ raises questions of scale, of strategy, of consistency and of 
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potential compromises and trade- offs. These have become as much 
practical questions for those who would act politically as they are 
theoretical questions for those who would simply analyse. In part this is 
because the intimate plays tricks on us all: intimacy is the zone in which 
individual lives should take their proper shape, yet intimacy is precisely 
the area where we seem to have least control over the shape our lives 
take (Berlant 1998). The expectation of stability in intimate relations is 
inseparable from the experience of instability. The desire to bound off 
the intimate from the unruliness of the wider world is at odds with the 
weakness of the boundary itself.
But boundaries matter,  even –  or  especially –  blurred boundaries. 
We should be careful lest we collapse intimacy, kinship and politics, or 
the public and the private for that matter, into one another too quickly. 
Rather we need to pay attention to their productive points of tension. 
At one level, intimacy within a family, even if chosen (Weston 1997), 
can be very different from intimacy within an orchestra or within a 
political demonstration. Not all intimacy is the same. At another level, 
intimacy does not exhaust all social relations, and there is more to life 
than feeling intimate. Intimacy has its own qualities too; it cannot be 
reduced simply to politics or the social. In the recent anthropology 
of activism, questions of class, sexuality and gender have been given 
important analytical weight (Dave 2012; Howe 2013), but activists have 
also sometimes been analysed as if they are political, and only political, 
all the way down. 
There is a lesson to be learned here from the anthropology of 
Islam and Christianity, which has also occasionally treated people as if 
a description of their self- consciously religious life projects can mean-
ingfully ignore their other cross- cutting and sometimes contradictory 
aspirations, obligations and commitments, as well as the inevitable 
tensions and failures involved in this process. As Schielke (2015; cf. 
Mahmood 2004) has reminded us, people are always caught between 
conflicting and contradictory political, ethical and social projects. In a 
similar vein, in the anthropology of politics, everything has sometimes 
been treated as political. As a result the idea of the political easily 
becomes conceptually, culturally and sociologically flat, with nothing to 
push off against (Candea 2011; Curtis and Spencer 2012).
The intimate dimensions of dissent therefore do not necessarily 
crowd out all others, but can exist in parallel, or in tension, with the 
possibility of changing both, folding and unfolding into one another 
(Das 2007). Unbounded intimacy, like the relentless politicisation of 
everything, can sound attractive as an abstract project, even if it is 
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impossible to achieve in practice. Indeed, it is often the very relationship 
between the intimate and the political that is at stake in acts of dissent. 
Rather than simply doing away with the distinction between 
kinship and politics, the public and the private or intimacy and its 
others, we need to understand how these distinctions are produced and 
contested, valorised and denigrated in particular contexts, and how 
these processes in turn give shape and meanings to both intimacy and 
dissent. The Intimate Life of Dissent therefore pays particular attention to 
the ways in which the meanings and implications of dissent are formed 
specifically through the contingent relationship between the ‘political’ 
and its counters. 
Many of the political projects described in this volume involve 
an attempt to collapse the distinctions between the intimate and the 
political, in the face of sometimes considerable resistance, in order to 
create the grounds of dissent. These are projects which try to produce a 
unitary life world, where the personal is the political, sometimes from the 
top down and sometimes from the bottom up. And it is here that many 
of the key tensions described in the volume can be found, as the ties that 
bind pull in different directions. The allure of consistency, from top to toe, 
rubs up against multiple responsibilities and relationships, both intimate 
and otherwise, within which people live their lives. The result is friction. 
Some forms of dissent are about expanding the intimate and some are 
about bounding it, but either way there is a sense of concomitant danger. 
In chapter 4 Serra Hakyemez describes how Kurdish activists, 
imprisoned and tortured by the Turkish state, develop forms of intimacy, 
caught as they are between class and kin and grounded in their shared 
experiences of suffering. The Turkish prison regime imposes a programme 
of violence, and the Kurdish movement’s prison organisation seeks to 
produce its own revolutionary subjects through a counter- programme 
of education and bodily discipline. The moment a person steps inside 
a prison, the Kurdish prison committee introduces him or her to the 
communal life of political prisoners designed to turn newcomers into a 
loyal heval (comrade), thereby eradicating any private sense of self. But 
the Kurdish term heval implies both comrade and friend. It is therefore a 
source of possible tension, at once speaking to the possibility of revolu-
tionary politics while also implicitly acknowledging its limits. 
Hakyemez describes the unease caused when one prisoner asked 
the court not to disclose the tapped private conversations he had with 
his ‘social friend’ in the presence of his ‘political friends’ – the implication 
being that he has an intimate relationship with the former that extends 
beyond the comradeship among the latter. In this seemingly small 
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gesture, the very relationship between the political and the social is at 
stake. 
The new men and women of revolutionary socialist politics, for 
whom private life is supposedly eradicated in the name of class solidar-
ity, provide numerous examples of the attempt to collapse the intimate 
and  the political. The early Soviet state’s attempted eradication of the 
nuclear family represents one of the greatest failures of the Soviet politi-
cal project (Slezkine 2017). In chapter 2 Galina Oustinova- Stjepanovic 
describes the Soviet regime’s persistent attempts to impose a regime of 
top- down intimacy: the singular intimacy of ‘we’, the Soviet people. The 
people and the state of the USSR were said to exist in a seamless, singular 
and unified whole, an inescapable oneness. 
Importantly, the language of totality was evoked both by the 
regime and its opponents. For critics, the totality of the Soviet state was 
the brutality of the totalitarian. But, as Oustinova- Stjepanovic explains, 
this created a conundrum for dissidents. If the Soviet state was a totality, 
there was no exterior space the dissidents could claim from which to resist 
and oppose. Their response was instead a form of estrangement from the 
state, an attempt to create a moral ‘outside’ that was most obviously 
found in non- instrumental forms of artistic expression and dense social 
relationships. In this case the meanings and possibilities of dissent are 
produced through struggles over the meanings of the intimate.
The intimate politics of dissent
How does intimacy shape the forms of dissent? In much political theory 
there has been a distinct analytical severing of the intimate from the 
political. Most obviously, Hannah Arendt sought to draw a sharp 
distinction between the personal and intimate ties of the household 
and the public life of politics (1958). Indeed, her definition of politics 
was expressly based on the very distinction between the intimate and 
the public. This is a distinction that also runs through much liberal 
politics, where intimate ties are often seen as somehow polluting political 
commitments and attempts are sometimes made to protect the private 
lives of politicians from public glare. 
More recent work has sought to examine the ways in which 
disruptive forms of politics might emerge out of intimate life. Giorgio 
Agamben, for example, has argued that intimate practices help to bring 
‘the political out of concealment’ (Bordeleau 2017, 482). For Agamben, 
acts of dissent bring an otherwise inchoate politics into view by putting 
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the self and its relations with others at stake (Bordeleau 2017, 490). 
Intimacy here provides the grounds and affective labour necessary 
for political action. As Saidiya Hartman argues, intimacy can be the 
‘insurgent ground that enables new possibilities’, rooted in the affective 
labour central to political action (2019, 227). Indeed, one of the greatest 
predictors of whether someone will participate in an act of dissent is 
whether they know someone closely who is already involved (McAdam 
1988). It is not simply that private and intimate convictions are taken 
out into the public realm, but that intimacy itself is generative of political 
positions and relationships. 
What is needed is a more nuanced sense of both intimacy and 
the possibilities of political disruption. As Serra Hakyemez describes in 
chapter 4, it is the intimacy created by the shared experience of torture 
by the Turkish state that creates the possibility of political solidarity 
within the prison. Hakyemez draws on another part of the work of 
Hannah Arendt in arguing that relationships formed through witnessing 
mutual suffering create the grounds for ‘being together’ and therefore 
acting politically. She develops Arendt’s analogy of oases, ‘those fields 
of life which exist independently, or largely so, from political conditions’ 
(Arendt 2005, 202). In this analogy the ‘political conditions’ are the 
desert of the totalitarian; the oasis represents a space that escapes such 
a totalising project, or escapes it just sufficiently to allow a flicker of 
passion and creativity to kindle and burn. As Arendt argues, we may 
act together ‘in the inherently worldless relationship between human 
beings as it exists in love and sometimes in  friendship –  when one 
heart reaches out directly to the others, as in friendship, or when the 
in- between, the world, goes up on flames, as in love’ (Arendt 2005, 202). 
These spaces, and the intimacy that animates them, are not the spaces 
of compulsory comradeship imposed by the movement’s programme of 
prison discipline. To tease out what they are, Hakyemez makes a detour 
into the etymology of local idioms of the intimate and the significance of 
the ‘private space’ and the ‘forbidden’ in creating the grounds for other 
 possibilities –  which in turn challenge the iron logic of the totalitarian 
version of the political. 
Not only can dissent grow out of intimate ties, but it can also 
produce its own new ties of intimacy. Elsewhere Dave, for example, has 
shown how queer activism in India forges new relationships (2012, 64). 
These ties are seldom simple, however. In chapter 5 Amarasuriya and 
Spencer’s account of the life of one Sri Lankan radical, Joe Seneviratne, 
starts with a father dramatically giving away his errant son’s dinner to 
the dog, with dramatic results: ‘I said, my house is not here, but the whole 
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world, and I left home’. First the party, then particular comrades pick Joe 
up and find him work, food and shelter. Intimacy is a constant theme 
in the account of his life that Joe composes in his conversations with 
Amarasuriya. In this he describes turning his back on home and family, 
placing his trust in comrades (and the bitter lessons of betrayal) and 
experiencing the impossible tug between obligations to wife and children 
and the demands of the party. 
Clearly, some forms of dissent can exist in tension with intimate 
ties. For Michel Foucault, for example, what he calls parrhesia (fearless 
speech) is not simply controversial speech for the sake of speech, but 
also involves the speaker knowing that it might put their relationships 
at risk (2001). Dissent is dissent here, precisely because it puts our 
most precious ties at stake. Not only do acts of dissent put intimate 
ties under strain, however. On the one hand, the burdens and implica-
tions of dissent are often borne most intensely by those to whom the 
dissenter is personally close. On the other hand, the very rupturing and 
severing of personal relations is the enabling condition of dissent; for 
those involved in forms of dissent, family and friends become neglected 
and barely visible. There is considerable evidence to suggest that people 
with fewer family ties (however those may be measured) are more likely 
to participate in more radical actions, and limiting obligation to people 
outside a movement is a key indicator of longevity within it (Whittier 
1995). But as Amarasuriya and Spencer point out, breaking ties is not 
confined to intimate relations: splits, ruptures and breaks are part of 
the long history of oppositional politics in all parts of the world. There is 
scope for thinking about the move from personal splits to bigger political 
splits and back again, and for considering what might happen to the 
affective consequences of breaks and ruptures with the shift in scale.
Dissent can also be straightforwardly socially corrosive, working 
against intimate relations. In chapter 6 Tobias Kelly describes how, in 
mid- twentieth century Britain, conscience was both valorised as an 
authentic ground of moral autonomy and at the same time suspected 
as a form of vanity and delusion. His chapter focuses on conscientious 
objectors to military service in the Second World War. He describes 
the resolute convictions of the tens of thousands of peace activists 
who refused conscription and the fight against fascism. As long as they 
were willing to do alternative forms of service, such as humanitarian 
work patching up the wounded, they were widely tolerated, often even 
respected, by the British public for sticking to their principles. A small 
minority refused to take any direction from the state, however, and many 
of these ended up in jail. 
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Although many conscientious objectors came to the decision not 
to fight as part of intense conversations and experiences with friends, 
comrades and lovers, the eventual decision to refuse to fight could also 
be very lonely and full of doubt. Certainly some conscientious objectors 
were accused of being anti- social, self- obsessed and self- indulgent. As 
Susan Sontag has argued elsewhere, the moral heroes of our ‘liberal 
civilization’ are often regarded with a ‘mixture of revulsion, pity and 
reverence’ (1963). The occlusion of kinship ties and disregard of intimate 
backgrounds is sometimes seen as a mythical source of ‘Western’ 
creativity in the sense of the capacity to move, explore, conquer and 
think freely (Bashkow 2006). But such freedom comes at a cost. Dissent, 
particularly in its most liberal forms, walks a tight line between moral 
virtue and arrogant pride.
Intimacy can also work across political lines: you are not only 
intimate with your political allies. An understanding of politics as rooted 
in the distinction between friends and enemies (Schmitt 2007) is upended 
by an examination of the dense relationships that can exist across political 
lines, where a combination of proximity and difference can transform 
social relations. As Leela Gandhi argues, friendships can produce dissident 
solidarities that cut through the exclusionary logics of many forms of 
politics (2006). There are numerous examples of how,  for  example, 
returnees from Soviet prison camps, rejected by families, then became 
friends and drinking buddies with the guards whom they had despised 
in their confinement. As Sidharthan Maunaguru describes in chapter 
7, political intimacy can traverse the institutional distinction between 
friends and foes (see also Klumbyte. 2011). Maunaguru asks whether it 
is possible to be a friend and a political rival, and explores the struggle to 
maintain friendship in the face of political violence. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the example of Ranjan, a Sri Lankan Tamil 
refugee and exile now living in the UK. Ranjan was an early member 
of PLOTE, a radical leftist Tamil group that emerged in the 1970s. 
However, he soon fell out with the leadership, which he denounced for 
its promotion of what he saw as an undemocratic cult of personality. 
The result was an assassination attempt and threats on Ranjan’s life, 
as he moved from a position of political affinity to one marked by 
accusations of treachery and eventually enmity. Ranjan finally made 
his way to the UK, where he worked as a street sweeper and cleaner and 
tried to support his fellow Sri Lankan exiles in whatever way he could. 
At one point he helped another former member of PLOTE, who had 
once followed the orders of the leadership and tried to kill him. Ranjan 
remained deeply critical of his friend’s political views, but believed that 
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an ethical commitment to democratic politics meant that, in the midst of 
the splintering violence of Sri Lankan and Tamil politics, he was obliged 
to maintain friendships across political lines. We are a world away here 
from the Schmittian definition of politics. If for Schmitt (2007) it is the 
distinction between friend and enemy that forms the basis of politics, for 
people such as Ranjan an ethical politics must work to erode that very 
distinction.
We should not inevitably associate either dissent or intimacy with 
positive virtues. As Berlant (1998, 286) drily observes, intimacy ‘only 
rarely makes sense of things’. For its part, intimacy may be disruptive 
or dissonant, but it can be coercive too (Sa’ar 2001; Strange 2018). 
The inequalities and forms of violence that mark intimate relations 
can also run through public acts of dissent, as the act of taking a stand 
can be inflected by the same hierarchies of gender, class and race that 
shape intimate ties. Intimacy can also be stifling or claustrophobic. It 
is not just a resource for dissent, but can also be the very thing people 
wish to dissent against, particularly in the context of gendered forms 
of inequality. Intimacy certainly has its ‘dark sides’ (Geschiere 1997; 
Jamieson 1998; Klein 1967), creating vulnerability, coercion and anxiety 
as much as care and support. Or, to put this another way, intimacy can be 
marked by fear and suspicion as much as trust and comfort.
Dissent itself can also be very conventional. As dissent draws 
people into particular and perhaps new forms of intimacy, it also creates 
its own norms and ties. Dissent is therefore not a simple synonym for 
subversion; it creates attachments of its own and can morph into loyalty 
and conformity to its own principles. Dissent can be deeply orthodox 
and conformist, a privilege even. At some point dissent stops being itself, 
giving way to other solidarities and alliances. Furthermore, importantly, 
dissent from one perspective can look like compliance from another. But 
if intimacy is associated with affinity and closeness, dissent might imply 
disagreement and discord. There is therefore a potential paradox at the 
heart of dissent, in that it both brings people together and pushes them 
apart. 
We are left with a set of questions about the ways in which acts of 
dissent might be disruptive of, or simply a way to reproduce, existing 
social relations. Is dissent a social anomaly, and a break from the ordinary 
flux and flow of life? Or is it rather something to be understood as itself 
forming social and political relations? How do intimate relations both 
work against and produce the conditions of dissent? Do particular types 
of intimacy encourage people to take a stand? Do they indeed shape such 
acts, and when do they act as a break or an impediment? 
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In chapter 8 Carole McGranahan shows how dissent both works 
within and against normative frames, subtly and not so subtly working 
along and against the grain of convention. Chapter 8 describes how 
over the course of the twentieth century the Pangdatsang family from 
eastern Tibet rose from being traders far away from the centres of power 
to intimates of the Dalai Lama. They achieved this through strategic 
acts of both subversion and loyalty, both playing by the rules and 
breaking them, in a situation where power was supposed to be reserved 
for the central Tibetan aristocracy. This is a family who included anti- 
colonial politicians, Buddhist loyalists and Communist Party officials. 
But the family’s very presence in Lhasa was itself a form of dissent from 
aristocratic hierarchy, enabled by submission and acquiescence. For 
McGranahan, the dissent of this family was always entangled within 
wider webs of obligation, and it is these entanglements that make 
dissent so dangerous. An act of opposition is also an act of loyalty and, 
perhaps most importantly, an act of loyalty can also be seen as an act of 
opposition.
Socialities of dissent
How do we know dissent when we see it? Dissent is always embedded 
in dense webs of cultural meaning and social relationships. Different 
types of sociality therefore produce different forms of both intimacy and 
dissent. Dissent does not always have to involve taking to the streets, 
but it always involves some attempt at communication, however small 
or unclear the intended audience. Dissent must therefore be located in 
relationships, rather than in individual moments of intentionality. It 
can be aimed at getting things done, to bring about change, or it can 
be understood as an end in itself. Even if it is only aimed at the self, 
however, it also involves making otherwise intangible commitments 
somehow more concrete. There are therefore important questions about 
the types of  claim –  and the types of  action –  that are seen as dissenting, 
both by dissenters themselves and by others, and about which claims and 
which actions are seen as legitimate and significant. Most significantly, 
how is dissent made tangible or visible? 
In chapter 3 Erica Weiss compares what she calls the liberal and 
secular dissent of conscientious objectors to military service as she 
explores the dissent of ultra- Orthodox Jewish women peace activists. 
For liberal peace activists, dissent is grounded in an individual will that 
stands above narrow calculation, and there is a wider public celebration 
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of such forms of disruption. As the saying goes, ‘We might not agree with 
what you are saying, but we respect your right to say it’. In contrast, for 
ultra- Orthodox Jewish peace activists, there are plenty of differences of 
opinion, but iconoclasm has little aesthetic or moral appeal and there is 
an emphasis on finding internal consensus, especially before speaking 
beyond the ultra- Orthodox community. Compromise here is not seen 
as morally corrosive but as morally virtuous; moral authority is not 
thought to lie in the individual, but is instead collective and hierarchi-
cally organised. 
There are very different moral grammars and aesthetic judgements 
at work in this comparison. As Weiss argues, we need to be careful not 
to fall into the trap where we analytically identify dissent with particular 
‘rhetorics, aesthetics and structures’ that reflect narrow ‘assumptions 
about moral decision- making’ and the ‘ethics of self- presentation’. For 
Weiss, the media and public discourse tend to celebrate liberal, secular 
forms of dissent, but often miss the subtler, backstage, community- 
focused forms of dissent found among ultra- Orthodox Jews. One of 
the key points to take from chapter 3 is that we need to pay attention 
to modes of dissent that are differentially recognised as appropriate 
in different contexts. Perhaps counter- intuitively, dissent has its own 
conventions. 
The mediums through which dissent is communicated and given 
meaning are central to the ways in which it is understood and given 
meaning. For Foucault (2001), for example, speech, in the form of par-
rhesia, is central to dissent: dissent is a linguistic activity that involves 
speaking truth. But texts can also have a particularly significant role to 
play here: the very acts of reading and writing can play a specific role in 
mediating dissent (Cody 2013). Dissidents are famous as much for what 
they write as for what they say, and writers have a particularly prominent 
role in the public imagination of dissent. If texts hold a privileged place 
in the communication of dissent, reading and writing are also about 
more than communication. They can also be central to the intimate 
grounds of dissent. At one level both reading and writing, in their dif-
ferent ways, are deeply personal experiences, potentially reproducing 
particular forms of interiority. Yet at another level reading and writing 
are also deeply shared experiences. Not only is writing, in most of its 
forms, about communicating with others, but reading and writing can 
play an important role in the imagination of collective forms of life. As 
Sidharthan Maunaguru and Tobias Kelly both describe, in chapters 7 and 
6 respectively, the acts of reading and writing play a central role in the 
sociality of political activists, be this in contemporary Sri Lanka or Britain 
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during the Second World War. Far from being a solitary act, reading 
and writing are intensely social, drawing people into dense political 
relationships. 
In chapter 9 Doreen Lee describes how political prisoners 
and  student dissidents in 1990s Indonesia engaged in the writing and 
circulation of texts, often with the help of their family, friends and 
strangers. She describes the joy of two former activists on meeting 
one another after many years, their memories focused less on shared 
ideals and commitments and more on the shared sensuous work of 
grappling with photocopies and duplicators to produce political leaflets 
and posters. While the production of such texts gave ideas a tangible 
material form in ink and paper, and the evidence of dissent was often to 
be found in such papers, the processes of production were as important 
for dissident students as the actual words on the page. 
As Lee argues, an analytical focus on the intimate world of paper 
can help us to understand those ties that bind political activists, away 
from ‘ideological propulsion’ or the ‘overwhelming force of protest’. 
For Lee, the apparently ordinary but intimate and shared labour of 
running the printing machine helped to conscript people into political 
activities that stretched across space and time. This production of the 
paper artefacts of dissent was a craft that revealed new political forms 
(Lee 2016, 30). Often read in secrecy, dissident texts changed hands, 
entering and transforming social, political and interpersonal relations. 
New publics and new political relationships were called into being 
through the production of words on the page.
Questions of recognition and misrecognition are central to the 
process of dissent. And recognition can itself be a form of privilege. In 
hierarchical settings the right to be heard is if anything more important 
than the right to speak (Burghart 1996). Not all forms of dissent are 
recognised as such, and not all forms of dissent are deemed politically 
legitimate. As McGranahan shows in chapter 8, the everyday details of a 
life can be read by the state as mundane or subversive, depending on the 
frame within which they are placed. If dissent is an issue of interpreta-
tion, rather than being an innate quality of an act, it is often therefore 
deeply ambiguous, containing both forms of protest and loyalty that can 
be read in different ways by different audiences. 
In what might be called the liberal imagination, dissent is founda-
tional for both a particular type of citizenship and for moral personhood 
(Kelly 2015). To dissent is to show the capacity for ethical reflection 
and autonomy: dissent is therefore both a moral and political virtue. As 
Erica Weiss reveals, for example, Israeli conscientious objectors work 
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with a moral vocabulary that valorises the capacity for ethical freedom. 
Yet at the same time firm boundaries are placed around how people 
can dissent and in what ways, and around what is said to ‘count’ as an 
authorised form of dissent. Not all issues are dealt with equally as issues 
of conscience, and not all people can equally persuade others that their 
conscience is genuine. As Kelly has described elsewhere, for example 
(2015), not all forms of opposition to war are given the same weight 
within liberal democracies. To be persuasive, conscience often has to 
be tempered and individual, and claims of conscience are often most 
persuasively made by those deemed to be loyal citizens.
We might see the recognition of dissent as diagnostic of particular 
social formations, in the sense that what is understood as an act of dissent 
can help us understand what aspects of social relations are understood as 
significant and important for social reproduction (Abu- Lughod 1990). 
Audiences for dissent can take many forms and, rather than being 
unified, should be understood as varied and hierarchical (Warner 2002). 
We might also ask who is watching, who is noticing and who cares? What 
happens when no one takes any notice? And what happens when an 
audience attributes meanings that were not intended by their authors? 
Seemingly innocent acts can be labelled as radical, and acts designed to 
be disruptive might be ignored. 
In chapter 2 Galina Oustinova- Stjepanovic describes how acts 
of seeming political dissidence were reframed by the Soviet state as 
evidence of mental health problems, as delusions and mental pathology 
that could be treated therapeutically. However, she also questions why 
the Soviet state seemed to care so much. Why did it go out of its way to 
respond to criticisms of the state that were commonplace, and even aired 
by people at the centre of the regime? Her answer is that it was not so 
much what was said that was at stake, but how it was said, and where. 
Dissidents tried to create an artistic and moral space that was somehow 
‘outside’ the Soviet state. Through their estrangement they challenged 
the state’s very claim to totality. Dissent matters here, precisely because 
it was so seemingly inconsequential.
Taken together, the chapters in The Intimate Life of Dissent – 
ranging across Israel, Turkey, Indonesia, Tibet, Britain, Sri Lanka and 
 Russia –  examine the conditions under which people take a stand on 
issues of principle, at great potential risk to themselves. British consci-
entious objectors refuse to take up arms, Indonesian students print 
political pamphlets, Kurdish prisoners maintain tight bonds of loyalty 
in the face of a deracinating prison environment, ultra- Orthodox Jewish 
Israelis meet with Palestinian Muslim women, Soviet dissidents struggle 
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to maintain a social and moral space outside the suffocating embrace 
of the Soviet state, Tibetan politicians work against aristocratic forms 
of hierarchy and Sri Lankan activists push against ethnic and political 
divisions. These acts are both small- scale and grand, but they involve 
a commitment to principles, however ambiguous, in the face of intense 
pressure and at great risk. And these are forms of dissent that reverberate 
through the most intimate aspects of their lives, running up against 
and through the ties that bind them to others. It is not simply that the 
ties are put at risk by a commitment to high ideals. Rather these ideals 
gain meaning and possibility through these most intimate relationships. 
Intimacy marks both the possibility and the limit of dissent.
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Chapter 2
One is the biggest number: 
estrangement, intimacy and 
totalitarianism in late Soviet Russia
Galina Oustinova-Stjepanovic
25 August 1968
At midday on 25 August 1968, eight people gathered in Moscow’s Red 
Square to protest against the military invasion of Czechoslovakia by 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops.1 According to a written account of one 
of the participants, Natalya Gorbanevskaya (2017 [1970]),2 the eight 
protesters barely had the time to unfurl home- made banners that  read 
–  among other things – ‘For your freedom and ours!’ when they were 
roughly apprehended. They were beaten, bundled into KGB vehicles 
and taken to the notorious Lubyanka prison, a scene of many politically 
motivated arrests. A predetermined closed trial ensued. Most protestors 
were sentenced to several years in labour camps, but two dissidents, 
Natalya Gorbanevskaya and Victor Faynberg, were taken to psychiatric 
hospitals and later exiled to France. 
During the trial of the Red Square protestors, Victor Faynberg 
was not put in the dock. Instead he was remanded in a hospital. During 
his interview with Dr Lunts and others, Faynberg allegedly displayed 
fascination with reformist ideas and came across as an arrogant person, 
convinced that he was right (Artemova, Rar and Slavinski 1971, 201). He 
was diagnosed with ‘psycho- other- thinking’ (shizoinakomysliye). Natalya 
Gorbanevskaya (who brought a newborn baby to the Red Square protest) 
was diagnosed with insanity, acquitted and placed under her mother’s 
care. Granted this reprieve, Gorbanevskaya compiled a collection of 
documents about the protest and the trial. She was re- arrested in 
December 1968 and, following an analysis of her poems for traces 
of mental health ‘pathologies’, was diagnosed with ‘sluggish schizo-
phrenia’ by Dr Lunts. He claimed that Gorbanevskaya’s schizophrenia 
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was so amorphous that it did not hinder her work and intellectual habits 
(Artemova, Rar and Slavinski 1971, 54–6). Nevertheless, during the 
trial Dr Lunts insisted that Gorbanevskaya was dangerous to the public 
because she was not fully aware of her mental condition (63). 
Legendary among dissidents, their historians and some Russian 
intellectuals, the protest had no transformative effect on Soviet politics 
(Komaromi 2012, 71).3 Nevertheless, for some human rights activists, 
constitutional rights defenders and civic activists, the event encapsulated 
a sustained effort to generate ‘a political otherwise’ through multiple 
conventional and experimental modes of dissent, including public truth 
speaking, embodied protest and ‘an exercise of oneself in the activity 
of thought’ (Povinelli 2012, 456). Nevertheless, the real significance of 
the protest was not its outcomes nor its critical content; the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia was and remained an ambivalent and troubling decision 
for many Soviet citizens and Party members. Rather the protest was 
subversive for its ability to materialise the repressive state as a felt, 
intimate presence (c.f. Ahmann 2018). Chloe Ahmann (2018) describes 
how protests can punctuate ‘sluggish temporalities of suffering’ (144), 
experienced as slow violence and attrition of political control in order 
to crystalise habitual, toxic environments into an event. Her argument 
strikes a chord with the post- Stalinist history of unspectacular state 
repression. 
Analytically, the event exposed a tension between the Soviet 
ideological imperative for unity and a value of outsideness, or vnye4 
(Yurchak 2005), as a space of intellectual, artistic and moral autonomy 
and critique. Outsideness was a common principle of living within the 
Soviet system (128). However, dissidents reified the alleged cohesion 
(splochennost) of the Soviet people to claim repeatedly an exclusive 
capacity to think differently, speak the truth and act in accord with 
their conscience (Boobbyer 2005), understood as a universal ethical 
beginning unsullied by party politics. Gorbanevskaya’s memoirs of the 
Red Square protest (2017) mention her friends’ intent to split away and 
stand apart (otmezhevatsa) from the dominant univocal opinion (10) 
and unanimous support of the Party’s decisions (23). 
Gorbanevskaya and others denied that sedition or even political 
motives had inspired their protest.5 Instead they reiterated a commitment 
to inakomysliye, or ‘other- thinking’ (thinking differently). In their defence 
speech, the protestors spoke about the right to express critical views 
that diverge from commonly acceptable opinions (221–4), while the 
prosecution accused them of trampling on the ‘norms’ of existence (240) 
and literally ‘sound thought’ (zdravii smysl) of the Soviet people (256). 
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Although the Soviet repressive apparatuses were probably more irked by 
public displays of dissent rather than criticism per se (Field 1995, 277), 
‘other- thinking’ was a proud self- attribute of dissidents then and now.
In contrast, for Soviet prosecution and psychiatrists, other- thinking 
was an instantiation of ‘oppositionism’ (Halfin 2001). Predictable within 
the Soviet conceptual premises of scientism, dissent and oppositionism 
were liable to be explained as ‘a mental predicament’ (Halfin 2001, 319), 
a temporary eclipse of reason and delusion that could be treated thera-
peutically. With Khrushchev’s formal notion that dissent was a mental 
illness (Brintlinger 2007, 4), the aetiology of madness was disengaged 
from social conditions; dissent was not a response to the state politics, 
but rather an anomaly that the state had a responsibility to eliminate. 
Thus there appeared a shift from politicising mental illness and dissent 
during the early days of the revolutionary state (Sirotkina 2007) to 
pathologising both. 
A notion of dissent as pathology does not fully explain why some 
dissidents were sent to prison and others hospitalised. The criteria 
for differentiating between political and intellectual dissidents and 
‘mad’ Soviet citizens remain obscure without documentary evidence 
of psychiatric deliberation, which might not have a written trace. For 
instance, both Gorbanevskaya and Faynberg had a prior history of 
referrals to psychiatrists which would feature on their files. These, taken 
into consideration with linear, deterministic theories of personality, 
served to prompt an interpretation of Gorbanevskaya’s participation in 
the 25 August protest as a medical condition rather than as a conscious 
political gesture. However, a possibility of casting political dissent as 
madness, even if hospitalisation was not the inevitable punishment, 
suggests that the Soviet state was interested both in diminishing the 
value of political dissent (and the status of its individual members) 
and in controlling the innermost recesses of human subjectivities. 
To do so it employed a variety of methods described by Halfin as ‘the 
hermeneutics of the soul’ (Halfin 2001, 316). At the same time, the 
treatment of dissent as madness implied a possibility of cure and reha-
bilitation, further complicating a narrative of ideological misuse of 
punitive psychiatry and imprisonment (c.f. Thomas 2014). Put simply, 
to pathologise dissent as madness was to deny its efficacy as a political 
gesture. 
In addition to understanding the logic of representation of political 
dissent as madness, my current research in Moscow seeks to comprehend 
the paradoxical ontology (as the fact of existence) of totalitarianism 
as intimacy with the many and dissent as a claim to ‘other- thinking’ 
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(inakomysliye) and estrangement from an abstract collectivity in late 
Soviet  Russia –  and, to some extent, today.6 
First, how did dissidents succeed in producing a political value 
other than the status quo (Gratton 2014, 117), given the conditions 
of totalitarianism that presume all- encompassing control and total 
identification with the party state? The paradox lies within dissidents’ 
claims to ‘other- thinking’ as a political statement rather than a mental 
predicament, together with their simultaneous affirmation of the 
existence of totalitarianism as actual and experiential workings of the 
state’s power. Claims of totalitarianism would have signalled defeat of 
oppositional activities because dissent and other- thinking (inakomysliye) 
were considered logical impossibilities under the conditions of ‘actually 
existing totalitarianism’ (Bergman 1998, 251). If the Soviet state had 
been ‘really’ totalitarian, and so had exerted control over all aspects of 
Soviet life, how could dissidents have ever distanced themselves from 
the dominance of a regime that had such crippling effects as loss of 
moral judgement and political apathy (Bergman 1998, 257)? How could 
dissidents justify their own exception? How did they cultivate political, 
intellectual and artistic spaces of personal autonomy (Komaromi 2012) 
within the state or following their flight abroad?
Second, why was a small- scale protest such as this so troubling 
for the Soviet authorities? One explanation is that dissent as estrange-
ment from the reified Soviet peoplehood contravened an ideological 
imperative of intimacy with the many. It posited the possibility of 
an alternative circle of intimacy with politically ‘like- minded’ (edino-
myshleniki) persons who frequently disseminated their views through 
networks of family, friends and colleagues. Dissident circles cultivated 
a sense of togetherness and detachment from others through shared 
commitment to ideas, engagement in samizdat activities and the 
collection and distribution of money and food for political prisoners 
and their families, as well as everyday socialising. Numerous memoirs 
and interviews point to a pervasive ‘fellow feeling’ (Hankins 2019, 170), 
defined by Joseph Hankins as a historical ‘connection through similar 
placements’ (185). I would like to argue that, in Soviet Russia, those 
placements of dissent were marked by two political modes of intimacy, 
namely closeness to other dissidents and detachment from the abstract 
‘we’ of the Soviet state. 
The rhetorical ‘circle of the We’ (Hollinger 1993) extended to all 
Soviet people, despite countervailing tendencies toward differentia-
tion and ethnic particularism, among other things (Slezkine 1994). As 
an overarching objective, the Soviet peoplehood was a communitarian 
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project premised on the notion of unity of all. Such a communitarian 
project presupposes a normative and psychological affinity or solidarity 
akin to claims of a prepolitical, affective ‘society’ or ‘nation’ (Levy 2017). 
Against the grain of the primacy of totality, dissent as estrangement 
openly challenged the premises of political unity of the workers, with 
its improbable commonality of ideas, values and practice. Thus the 
embodied intimacy of engagement with dissident activities and ideas 
posited a challenge to an abstract mode of intimacy with the Soviet ‘we’. 
In sum, the broadening and closing of intimate political circles allows 
us to reimagine dissent and totalitarianism as alternative forms of unity 
that shared a vocabulary of intimacy and estrangement but implied a 
difference in degree and scale.
Totalitarian intimacy
In extant scholarship, an effort to resolve the paradox of dissent under the 
conditions of totalitarianism is situated within a realist paradigm: either 
the Soviet party state was not totalitarian or dissidents were not free 
agents of other- thinking, as they saw themselves. For instance, Hannah 
Arendt defines ‘totalitarianism’ as absolute political control, including 
rectification of thought and effacement of socio- political antagonisms 
and contradictions (Arendt 1976 [1958], xxiii–xxiv). Totalitarianism 
signals the ‘enormity of the [state] power’ (Bergman 1998, 248) that 
subjugates any oppositional thought and activity. 
In addition, Hannah Arendt’s classic definition of Soviet and Nazi 
totalitarianism underscores loyalty to a leader and concrete historical 
conditions of mass mobilisation of atomised individuals (1976 [1958], 
324). For her, totalitarianism as a practical political action is successful in 
shaping an ideal- type character and concrete empirical product of totali-
tarian mechanisms of violent control of subjectivities: the ‘mass- man’ 
(Sigwart 2016). The mass, the mob, the crowd, the undifferentiated 
multitude constitute the subject of a totalitarian society and ‘the rebus of 
collective politics’ (Mazzarella 2015, 105–6). It vividly conjures an image 
of collective frenzy and fanaticism of ‘a swarm’ (Toscano 2010, xv). The 
pathos is menacing: totalitarianism and fanaticism are essentially the 
same because they cultivate a blind commitment to an abstract idea 
among the multitude of people (Toscano 2010, xix). The monotony of 
multitude is reiterated in spatial, architectural and design metaphors of 
flatness as invariance (Higman 2017), also conceptually associated with 
totalitarianism. 
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Guided by the above definitions, some historians look for historical 
evidence for or against the empirical reality of totalitarianism. A great 
deal of literature on totalitarianism enumerates traits and characteristics 
of a totalitarian society to ascertain what authoritarian orders fit such 
description (for example, Mirskii 2003). Conventionally fascist Italy, 
Nazi Germany, Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao’s China meet the criteria 
although, of necessity, the argument is circular: the key attributes of 
totalitarianism are deduced from a study of a totalitarian society which is 
re- affirmed as totalitarian ipso facto. 
Soviet scholarship denied that the term had any relevance to the 
politics of the Soviet Union. It used totalitarianism as a synonym of 
fascism (Bergman 1998, 252), although the subtle parallels were drawn 
by a few Soviet historians from the 1960s onwards. Slavoj Žižek (2001) 
finds the term ‘totalitarianism’ unhelpful because, for him, it defeats 
the Left (4) and ‘relieves us of a duty to think’ (138) about socialism 
as anything other than a Gulag ideology. For him, the term has been 
misused as a denunciation mechanism of any radical emancipatory 
project and its utopian or universal credentials. 
Žižek was not the only one to question the meanings, origins and 
implications of theories of totalitarianism in Soviet Russia, although 
others had their own, and different, purposes. Some dissidents, including 
a Russian writer with nationalist leanings, Solzhenitsin, believed ‘totali-
tarianism’ to be a Western imposition on authentic Russian culture. 
Others racialised totalitarianism as Russia’s ‘intrinsic’ inclinations 
towards barbarism, submissiveness, tyranny and denial of personal 
freedom (Bergman 1998, 255). 
Notwithstanding the term’s problematic theoretical character, 
many Soviet dissidents of the post- Stalinist period applied it to their 
own historical experiences to contextualise disturbing encounters with 
the party state. Instead of theorising ‘totalitarianism’, the notion was 
thus adopted specifically to identify a felt experience of the repressive 
mechanisms of the Soviet party state. As many Soviet people questioned 
the nature of Soviet totalitarianism, for Soviet dissidents it had appeared 
as an undeniable materiality of court rooms, prisons, psychiatric 
hospitals, KGB officers and so on.
A comparable line of reasoning, this time about the reality of 
dissent, informs Benjamin Nathans’ argument: that contrary to dissidents’ 
self- understanding, their protest did not occasion a dramatic confronta-
tion between ‘official’ and ‘nonconformist’ positions in the Soviet Union 
(Nathans 2012, 177). Serguei Oushakine (2001) suggests that political 
dissidents voiced objections to totalitarianism and unlawfulness of the 
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state practices that were identical to the critical discourses about glasnost 
among reformers within the Soviet government from the 1950s onwards. 
The same stock of questions worried Gorbachev- era politicians who had 
to explain their own capacity for critical thinking and prospects of socio- 
political restructuring. Some reformers doubted the empirical validity 
and scope of totalitarianism, seeking rather to qualify Soviet totalitari-
anism as partial and consensual (Bergman 1998, 265). Thus ‘totalitari-
anism’ was redefined as an aspiration rather than actuality. Nevertheless, 
it remained closely linked to nefarious socio- political and psychological 
effects of unlimited power, including the erosion of human autonomy 
and a lack of ethical judgement. 
It follows that ‘absolute ideological uniformity’ (Oushakine 2001, 
212) and the intimacy with the party state were an ideological projection, 
as political realities were inevitably diverse within and outside the 
Communist Party ranks. As a consequence, Oushakine contends, there 
was no ‘external’ position available to dissidents. What made dissident 
rhetoric an act of resistance was its ‘locus of enunciation’ rather than the 
message per se (204), as well as an intensification of the existing critical 
discourse and an appeal to universal truth and sincerity. In fact, the main 
demand among dissidents was a public acknowledgement of a simple 
fact of disagreement (212) and discrepancies between a designate and 
actuality. Dissidents thus demanded the recognition of the Soviet state 
as partocracy rather than democracy (211); this also resonated with 
a paradoxical call for greater realism and sincerity in literature and 
art dominated by heroic, embellished forms of so- called social realism 
(Kozlov 2013, 44).
Building on my own archival and ethnographic encounters, I 
agree with the above arguments: totalitarianism was not all inclusive, 
nor were dissidents unique in their critical capacities. Nevertheless, the 
stylistic ploy of ‘things are not what they seem’ is stifling. This means 
that the controversy over the empirical evidence for or against Soviet 
‘totalitarianism’ turns a blind eye to the ideational significance of a 
deeper political principle of the primacy of whole and the intimacy with 
the many that dominated the Soviet conceptual universe. I suggest that, 
despite being exploited during and after Cold War enmities (Geyer 
and Fitzpatrick 2009, 8), the notion of ‘totalitarianism’ points to the 
creation of an ethico- political value of totality and ‘wholeness’ that 
reverberated across pre- revolutionary and Soviet Russian utopian and 
folk theories, philosophy and ethics, as well as the administrative and 
economic practices of joint responsibility and collective ownerships 
(Stites 1989). Dissidents laboured not only against the state institutions, 
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but also against the ethico- political value of totality, to which they had 
juxtaposed estrangement as a way of life (Boym 1996).
For instance, the idea of the primacy of the whole underpins a 
constellation of notions of ‘freedom’ in Russian. The words svoboda, mir 
and volya all convey a sense of membership among one’s own people, 
but with subtle differences (Humphrey 2007). Svoboda, for example, 
is not centred on an individual. It is rather predicated on ‘an entry 
into a privileged political state of liberty, rather than a move out from 
captivity into an indefinite state called freedom’ (Humphrey 2007, 2). 
In contrast, mir is an expansive concept that refers to a particular life 
world and limitless universe. If svoboda demarcates a bounded world, 
mir presupposes outward existence. Last but not least, volya merges 
boundless freedom with an individual will and despotic power, both 
unstable as they ebb or intensify (Humphrey 2007, 6–7).
In sum, contrary to Žižek, I would like to take the term totalitari-
anism seriously, but to shy away from the polemical controversy about 
whether the Soviet state was or was not totalitarian. Instead, I approach 
‘totalitarianism’ as an imaginary or a conceptual topology of totalitari-
anism that mattered in the discursive fields of dissent regardless of its 
correspondence to reality or lack thereof.7 In addition, I aim to illuminate 
this conceptual topology as a philosophical problem of relating and prior-
itising parts and whole. Thus I suggest that the idea of the primacy of the 
whole and implicated notions of freedom through a privileged political 
membership permeated everyday thought, professional scholarship and 
political programmes of many participants in Soviet Russia. Wholeness 
and interconnected collectivity featured in post- Stalinist dissident 
writings (Komaromi 2015, 4), but as an alternative aggregate of friends 
and like- minded people (edinomyshlenniki), brought together by political 
and research activities and interests, as well as drinking, sexual relations, 
sleepovers, shared childcare and family holidays, underlaid with an 
exhilarating sense of conspiracy. Freedom was found in estrangement 
from the Soviet peoplehood and in intimate interactions within dissident 
circles, yet was imagined as a link with the rest of humanity and its 
alleged universal values. 
In sum, a shift from totalitarianism to totality as a value allows 
me to elicit a deeper relational order of dissent as a transgression of 
the idea of the primacy of the whole. To flesh out the value of totality 
empirically, I draw on archival materials and studies of the political 
abuse of psychiatry in Soviet Russia that exemplify a much broader intel-
lectual and socio- political history of fascination with totality in Soviet 
and European thought and practices. As we have seen, some dissidents in 
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post- Stalinist Russia were ‘punished with madness’ (Artemova, Rar and 
Slavinski 1971) – that is, sent to the psychiatric hospitals that flourished 
in the post- Stalinist period. 
From a pragmatic point of view, psychiatric hospitals embodied 
an excessive form of exclusion and isolation from the social. However, 
it is not entirely clear to me why and how the link between dissent and 
schizophrenia was justified in Soviet psychiatry and political settings. I 
would like tentatively to suggest that in Soviet psychiatry schizophrenia 
was broadly defined as withdrawal from reality and dissociation from 
a social collective, which in turn was a foundational concept of Soviet 
Marxist ethics. The diagnosis of schizophrenia was applied to dissidents 
who, according to their forensic psychiatry reports, failed to grasp the 
primacy of the whole. What we see is a reiteration of the logic of intimacy 
and estrangement from the many. 
Unity of thought
In August 1968 the Soviet newspapers described the Red Square 
protestors as ‘otschepentsi’, with a pejorative meaning of splintering 
away from the whole. In Soviet newspapers the protest was constructed 
as a violation of the unity of the Soviet people and a betrayal of 
intimacy (or complicity, in the dissidents’ terms) with the party state 
in the face of ideological enemies. Gorbanevskaya’s memoirs contain 
numerous newspaper clippings proclaiming unwavering support for the 
invasion among Soviet citizens. On behalf of the vast and heterogeneous 
Soviet population, the newspapers spoke of unity, shared understanding 
(obschaya positsiya), socialist commonwealth, unshakable solidarity and 
unanimous approval of the Soviet actions (Gorbanevskaya 2017, 22–4, 
30). In mainstream Soviet media the military intervention was construed 
as a moment of renewed ideological requirements for conformity 
with the state and with the Communist Party. Brezhnev’s doctrine of 
‘developed socialism’ (Nathans 2011, 180) announced the arrival of the 
era of ‘genuine collectivism’ (183) and, crucially, its conditionality on the 
state’s control. In sharp contrast informal accounts, diaries and memoirs 
of political and other dissidents and ordinary Soviet people referred 
to the invasion as the endpoint of a liberal period that had proffered 
hope for an alternative, perhaps more liberal pathway for Warsaw Pact 
socialism.
Fully aware of the consequences, the eight protestors in Red Square 
saw no political utility in their actions (Gorbanevskaya 2017, 10). 
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They did not expect to achieve anything concrete and some continue 
to describe their actions as an ‘apolitical gesture’ (interview with Pavel 
Litvinov, December 2017). Even eyewitnesses were unaffected because 
they found the flashpoint protest puzzling: some thought the participants 
were Czechs (Gorbanevskaya 2017, 40) or Jews (45) disrupting public 
order. For the participants, the protest was not a means to any specific 
political end, but a compulsory action, a moral dictate of universal 
human conscience.8 Somewhat akin to the relentless but inconsequen-
tial letter writing of many Soviet citizens to the Party leaders, the 1968 
protest was a well- considered gesture of dissociation (otmezhevatsa) 
from the presumed consensus (Boobbyer 2008, 134). 
The consensus was an ideological construct and a somewhat 
exaggerated (some say self- serving) claim to exception among some 
dissidents. Many more Soviet citizens, including reformists within the 
Communist Party leadership, disapproved of the military intervention. 
For example, a sociological survey of attitudes to the invasion carried out 
clandestinely in a small Russian town from September 1968 to March 
1969 revealed a profound ambivalence and intergenerational divide 
about the Soviet invasion (Zaslavsky and Z* 1981). The majority of 
younger people (between 18 and 30 years old) offered weak support, 
while about 47 per cent of the over 50s (who comprised ten people out of 
a sample of 352 respondents) approved of the Soviet- led invasion. 
Even among the highest- ranking Soviet leadership, presided 
over by Brezhnev, the use of power did not seem inevitable or wise 
(Bischof, Karner and Ruggenthaler 2010). The Soviet government was 
deeply divided. Some members of the Soviet leadership feared that 
a military intervention would undermine the conciliatory rhetoric of 
Nikita Khrushchev and Aleksei Kosygin, both of whom felt that the 
antagonism between the West and the Soviet Union had shifted from 
military to economic competition (Bischof, Karner and Ruggenthaler 
2010) that opened the door for socialist reforms and liberalisation. 
However, Leonid Brezhnev fanned public anxieties by emphasising 
the ideological differences between the West and the Soviet sphere. In 
Brezhnev’s rhetoric, Soviet socialism was perpetually threatened from 
outside and from  within –  by spies, dissenters, reformers and so on. Thus, 
despite initial equivocations about its goals and outcomes, the invasion 
became the crunch moment to silence the reformers within the Soviet 
Communist Party and dissidents among Soviet citizens. 
Clearly the unity of thought was a projection of homogeneity 
that did not correspond to historical reality. However, the trope had 
felt consequences. Specifically, following a brief but optimistic (as it 
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is remembered today) decade of de- Stalinisation, the late 1960s and 
1970s revived the persecution of ‘other- thinking’ (inakomysliye) in a 
multiplicity of its forms. The term was applied to activists for human 
rights, religious liberties, Jewish migration, nationalist and ethnic self- 
determination, civic rights, socialist Leninist reformists and defenders 
of constitutional rights (Nathans 2007), as well as Jewish, German 
and Chinese ‘otkazniki’, or refuseniks.9 It also encompassed writers, 
artists, actors, singers, philosophers, sociologists and others who did not 
necessarily oppose the socialist order, or even its partocratic structures, 
but simply engaged with experimental artistic genres, schools of thought 
and research methods. In the Soviet legal jargon, inakomysliye signalled 
anti- Soviet agitation and perfidious representations of Soviet reality. In 
a targeted campaign against inakomysliye, state institutions and agents 
would threaten, detain, interrogate, demote or dismiss from a job, exile 
internally or abroad and sentence people to labour camps, prisons and 
psychiatric hospitals that represented inakomysliye as a mental illness. 
Dissent and madness
After the Red Square protest, Natalya Gorbanevskaya and Victor 
Faynberg were sent to the psychiatric wards in Serbsky Psychiatric 
Hospital in Moscow (Faynberg was later transferred to Leningrad). 
Other protestors were sent to labour camps that remained a more 
likely destination for a political dissident. An avalanche of letters from 
dissidents, their families and friends brought to the attention of the 
Soviet government and international organisations that incarceration 
of healthy10 people in psychiatric wards constituted a blatant abuse of 
power and a betrayal of medical ethics. However, it has been argued that 
some Soviet psychiatrists may have genuinely believed that dissidents 
suffered from ‘a mental anomaly’ (Wilkinson 1986, 642). This later claim 
should not be misread as a justification of political abuse of psychiatry 
nor as a plea of innocence on behalf of Soviet psychiatrists. My question is 
rather what presuppositions and arguments made it possible to represent 
involvement in a seditious political activity as a mental problem? 
Gorbanevskaya and Faynberg were examined in one of the most 
notorious organs and locations of forensic or criminal psychiatry 
(sudebnaya psihiatriya), the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry 
in Moscow. The referral to a hospital did not need justification 
(neobosnovan), which in itself was seen by dissidents as an illegal, uncon-
stitutional practice. Dissidents did not know why some ‘healthy persons’ 
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(zdoroviye lyudi) were referred for psychiatric assessment as potentially 
‘schizophrenic’ or ‘insane’.11 Objections to the hospitalisation of mentally 
healthy people in psychiatric wards is recurrent in the handwritten and 
typewritten letters frequently sent to the Soviet Ministry of Health or 
the Government, with copies passed to dissidents and samizdat activists 
in the late Soviet period. Many letters are preserved in the Memorial 
Society in present- day Moscow and other archives. Such letters describe 
a moment of detention that could start with a casual knock on the door 
and a request to follow the police (militsiya) or a security officer (KGB) 
to a hospital. A superficial physical examination, including a temperature 
and blood pressure check- up, could prompt a medical worker to prescribe 
a course of psychotropic injections (psihotropiki); these, according to 
many patients, induced sleepiness, sickness, headaches and immobility. 
The whole process was condemned by dissidents and their supporters 
as an unlawful violation of the Soviet Constitution. Furthermore, most 
letters presumed that the reasons for being sectioned were accusations 
and fabricated charges of anti- Soviet activities of prisoners and/or their 
family members. One could be rapidly discharged only to face disability 
and socio- economic consequences such as unemployment.
However, the Serbsky Institute where Gorbanevskaya and Faynberg 
were assessed was already a prison- like institution. A former tsarist police 
detention unit, it became a centre for research and a psychiatric prison in 
1923. Its founder, Vladimir Serbsky, had championed the understanding 
of social conditions in mental illness (Bloch and Reddaway 1977, 36). 
By the 1970s the Institute was directed by Dr Lunts, a major authority 
in Soviet psychiatry. He is remembered as an ‘utter bastard’ by Moscow 
dissidents and their families and friends. 
Dr Daniil Lunts defined mental illness as a failure to represent 
reality and act upon it (1970, 8). Symptoms included hallucinations 
and false convictions, accompanied by disengagement from reality or its 
 inappropriate/wrong perception (nepravilnoe ponimaniye) (14) and their 
manifestations in anti- social behaviour (19). According to Lunts, Soviet 
forensic science was entrusted with a job of determining culpability, 
effective treatment and the reintegration of psychiatric patients into 
society, as well as safeguarding the public from dangerous people with 
mental health problems (19–20).
Some wards in the Serbsky Institute were classified as state secret 
‘specialised hospitals’ (‘spetsbolnitsi’), administered by the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs rather than the Soviet Ministry of Health. Dissidents wrote 
about doctors in white overalls with KGB shoulder marks underneath: 
the ‘psycho- fascists’ of Soviet medicine, according to some samizdat 
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letters. The image speaks volumes about a recurrent assumption about 
a dual reality that was genuine and deceptive. However, on a more 
immediate level of analysis, it also highlights the horror of psychiatric 
abuse with political aims and points to a fact that psychiatrists in Soviet 
Russia required political as well as medical qualifications (Bloch and 
Reddaway 1977, 44). 
It is important to keep in mind that, as an alternative to Stalin’s 
methods of mass repressions and executions, criminal psychiatric wards 
multiplied in the post- Stalin period. In 1978 Kosygin, by then Chairman 
of the Council of Ministers, ordered the construction of more than 80 
new hospitals (some of which were never completed). In a postscript 
to his study on punitive medicine,12 Alexander Podrabinek explained 
that not only political dissidents but any inconvenient person could 
be  sectioned –  including ordinary people who dared to criticise their 
management, exposed a violation of constitutional rights or administra-
tive irregularities or attempted ‘a flight abroad’ by making inquiries at a 
foreign embassy. Forcible psychiatric treatment of dissidents, refuseniks 
(otkazniki), public figures, musicians, poets and ordinary people 
continued until 1988, when Article 70 on ‘Anti- Soviet propaganda and 
agitation’ and defamation laws of the Soviet Russian (RSFSR) Criminal 
Code were repealed.
Most dissidents were held together with the criminally insane, drug 
addicts and other people suffering from ‘genuine’ mental health illness. 
In letters passed to samizdat, some dissidents conveyed their distress at 
sharing a room with convicted killers. Other dissidents were shocked to 
witness people collecting their own faeces, screaming obscenities and 
being restrained and beaten by nurses, many recruited from former 
convicts. Thus psychiatric wards were not a more ‘humane’ form of 
political  control –  a view voiced at a public lecture in May 2018 in lieu of 
an explanation of why Gorbanevskaya, a single mother of two, was not 
sentenced to prison.
In fact a stint in a psychiatric hospital was often a preliminary stage 
(etapirovaniye) on the way to a prison camp. Some people were moved 
from prisons into psychiatric wards after suicide attempts, for example 
swallowing nails in a political prison. In a samizdat letter Semyon 
Gluzman, a Soviet psychiatrist who systematically studied abuse and was 
sentenced for his research, explained that, within the punitive system 
of Soviet prisons, suicide was a sign of despair rather than of mental 
illness. But material conditions in labour camps and psychiatric hospitals 
were often comparable. Food lacked nutrition and diversity, and food 
parcels from friends and relatives were frequently stolen. Patients were 
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treated with cold shower therapies while they practically suffocated in 
hot wards with bolted windows and no ventilation or fresh air. Isolation 
was commonly mentioned in letters republished in samizdat literature. 
Access to the toilets was often denied. In short, even though straight-
jackets were not used, the general aim was to  immobilise –  that is, to 
restrict and slow down physical movement and intellectual activity.
As a result, for some dissidents, psychiatric hospitals were a harsher 
punishment than forced labour camps. Patients were medicalised into 
a vegetative- like state accompanied by headaches and nightmares. 
Neuroleptic drugs caused severe side- effects such as stomach ulcers, 
insomnia and depression. Most importantly, they halted dissidents’ 
intellectual labour. Arguably, even Stalin’s Gulag camps allowed some 
prisoners to be creative intellectually: some prisoners wrote poetry, 
studied literary texts and managed to draw in the most squalid conditions 
(Etkind 2013). In contrast, intellectual prisoners in psychiatric hospitals 
lived in a drug- induced stupor. They were frequently prevented from 
writing and reading, to the point that reading science fiction, for example, 
could be interpreted as a symptom of madness. 
For some, psychiatric hospitals were seen as an acceptable alternative 
to prison. Many Soviet hippies performed and celebrated madness to 
dodge army conscription and mock social norms, but they also feared an 
onset of real madness triggered by prescribed drugs (Fürst 2018). For the 
poet Joseph Brodsky, psychiatric detention was a balancing act between 
intellectual freedom and a total loss of creative consciousness, including 
incapacity to work (Reich 2013). Nevertheless many dissidents feared 
psychiatric hospitals more than labour camps because they stripped them 
of their  individuality –  a process described as loss of ‘distinctiveness’ of the 
self13 and of one’s political identity. For instance individuality, as a sense 
of one’s juridical and political ‘I’, was an important theoretical question 
that preoccupied defenders of human rights (Komaromi 2015, 76) and 
Orthodox religious dissidents (Ganson 2013). The former situated an 
individual within a legal framework of democratic rights distribution 
that could strengthen a position of an individual as a citizen in possession 
of individual rights. The latter pondered the problem of atomisation as 
a breakdown of community links that could be healed through renewal 
of religious solidarity (Ganson 97). For dissident priests, godless society 
resulted in an experience of isolation within a crowd (98) – a simul-
taneous loss of individuality and loneliness of isolation that haunted 
political dissidents in psychiatric prisons. Thus an alternative to the ‘total-
itarian’ unity of thought was, in the dissident Petro Grigorenko’s words, 
‘a community of  persons –  rational, proud, independent in everything 
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and tolerant of each other, voluntarily cooperating in the course of 
interaction’ (Reich 2014, 582) and/or a community of believers within 
the Russian Orthodox Church (Ganson 2013).
Similarly, in a letter to samizdat (dated 1971), one political 
prisoner agonised that the loss of all his rights entailed a concomitant 
loss of political subjecthood. Textbooks on criminal psychiatry distin-
guished between pravosposobnost and deesposobnost – a capacity to 
have rights and a capacity to acquire and exercise rights, and so to 
assume responsibilities and duties as a citizen, respectively (Morozova 
1977). Pravosposobnost was ascribed at birth while deesposobnost was 
predicated on purposeful intelligent activity (planomernaya rassuditel-
naya deyatelnost) (72). A diagnosis of madness thus not only made 
ordinary Soviet people squeamish (brezgliv) about dissidents. It also 
deprived a dissident of his or her rights and, crucially, of a legitimate 
voice in domestic political affairs by depoliticising their protest as 
psychotic behaviour (Field 1995, 278). 
Sluggish schizophrenia
Sluggish schizophrenia was a medical term coined by Soviet psychia-
trists in 1920–39 to describe mild borderline cases and the tempo of 
schizophrenia (Zajicek 2018). Because it was seen as an early stage of a 
progressive mental disorder, sluggish schizophrenia lacked a precise list 
of symptoms. This indeterminacy was a handy politicised tool of criminal 
psychiatry and the Soviet prosecution, as almost any behaviour, especially 
the strength of dissidents’ conviction and their self- righteousness,14 could 
be assessed as sluggish  schizophrenia –  a potentiality of a mental illness 
rather than its full- blown version. In other words, forensic psychiatry in 
the Soviet Union claimed to spot psychological ‘anomalies’ without any 
manifest symptoms, even if a patient contradicted medical experts and 
claimed that he or she was psychologically robust (Morozova 1977, 5). 
In many ways Soviet psychiatric manuals contained a self- authorisation. 
Nevertheless, Soviet psychiatric manuals did publish various 
definitions of schizophrenia and sluggish schizophrenia. Schizophrenia 
was described as an (anti-)social illness because the Marxist framework 
highlighted the role of social conditions in determining mental health. 
Consequently, it was said that schizophrenia entailed a withdrawal from 
social contract (Zajicek 2018, 3). For example, Dr Sukhareva, who was 
among the first to engage with sluggish schizophrenia, described it as a 
propensity for solitude and emotional flatness in the late 1930s. In the 
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Brezhnev era Dr Snezhnevski expanded the list (Field 1995, 287) of 
fuzzy symptoms to include perseverance, struggle for truth, manifesta-
tion of reformism and litigiousness (Reich 2014, 566). Occasionally 
sluggish schizophrenia was identified with ‘philosophical intoxication’, 
unconventional and experimental thought, interest in abstract ideas and 
a tendency to offer ‘bizarre’ interpretations and theories. 
A case study of a murder suspect profiled the defendant as 
somebody who, despite his emotional aloofness, entertained paranoid 
ideas about making an invention or discovery in biology and physics and 
claimed to have written ‘award- worthy’ manuscripts titled ‘Gnoseology’ 
and ‘Theoretical Mechanics’ (Morozova 1977, 65). The defendant, 
accused of beheading his manager, gave an impression of looking 
down on the investigators. For the Soviet experts, it was a textbook 
case of schizophrenia. Soviet forensic psychiatry pledged to carry out 
prophylactic measures against such socially harmful tendencies (7–8). 
Vehemently opposed to trendy philosophical teachings (modniye filosof-
skiye ucheniya), Morozova appeared scornful of Western psychiatry 
for treating psychological maladies (rasstroystva) as acts of personal 
rebellion against existing public order (8). For Morozova, any ‘odd’ 
behaviour, including ‘incorrect and inappropriate’ (nepravilnoye i neadik-
vatnoye) (11) conduct during an investigation, could be a justification for 
psychiatric evaluation. 
According to a KGB report on Zhores Medvedev,15 a prominent 
Leninist Marxist, his ‘mental illness’ comprised the following symptoms:
• A persistent mania for truth- seeking
• Having a beard
• Meticulous habits of thought
• A belief that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was an act of transgres-
sion of sovereign borders
• A conviction that he should devote his life to the ideals of communism
• Attempts to prove his point
• Inclinations to philosophising
• Scriptomania, or writing excessively
• Shouting out about his fight for democracy and truth
In his letter in defence of Zhores Medvedev,16 Solzhenitsyn noted that 
Medvedev was told that he was ‘abnormal’ because ‘normal people’ 
thought alike. 
Another dissident, Petro  Grigorenko –  admired as a Soviet general 
who joined dissidents to defend ethnic minorities in Crimea and speak 
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against the abuse of  psychiatry –  was given a similar diagnosis during 
one of his internments in the Serbsky Institute. He was described as a 
well- adjusted individual with excellent memory and concentration skills. 
However, his ‘pathology’ consisted of a conviction that he was within 
his right to seek reforms. In fact, it was said his ideas had an obstinate 
character and were so intense that they determined his conduct. His 
first psychiatric assessment mentioned Grigorenko’s tendency to argue, 
construct repetitive arguments, dominate in a conversation, interrupt 
and insist on the correctness of his views, but concluded that he was a 
mentally healthy, principled and politically active person (Artemova, Rar 
and Slavinski 1971, 99–103). 
Another subject, Ivan Yakhimovich, was a Latvian dissident and 
a member of the Initiative Group for the Defence of Human Rights. 
He demonstrated no signs of hallucinations, but was diagnosed with a 
paranoid psychopathic personality for his conviction that he fulfilled 
an important mission on behalf of the Soviet people. In fact, psychia-
trists and lawyers speculated whether conviction in the rightness of 
their position and in speaking the only available truth was a common 
or anomalous trait among politically active  people –  with a crucial 
difference that prosecution saw the dissidents’ critical statements about 
the Soviet Union as being slanderous of Soviet reality. 
Taking into consideration the fact that sincere speech, stubborn-
ness, irony, strategies to derail interrogation and many cultivated eccen-
tricities (van Voren 2009) were assiduously cultivated among dissidents, 
Semyon Gluzman published a manual for dissidents or ‘agents of other- 
thinking’ in 1975. A Soviet psychiatrist, Gluzman disagreed with a 
description of ‘other- thinking’ as a psychiatric anomaly, a belief for which 
he was later convicted. Gluzman argued that Soviet psychiatry operated 
with two sets of concepts and definitions of mental illnesses. One was 
‘truly’ scientific, backed by research. The other set was pseudo- concrete, 
rooted in fuzzy and abstract assumptions, frequently with a philosoph-
ical or political cast, about what counted as a ‘normal’ person. The norm, 
he explained, presumed a person of average intelligence, unwilling to 
take risk and mainly guided by an instinct of self- preservation and a 
desire for stable employment (Gluzman 2012, 33). During psychiatric 
evaluations, Gluzman recommended dissidents to project the image of 
an average, normal person, somebody with a normal childhood, well- 
integrated, keen on sports and comfortable in mass social settings such as 
festivals (44). It was important to demonstrate lack of interest in modern 
art, theoretical mathematics and philosophy (unless it was a profes-
sional occupation); failure to do so risked a diagnosis of ‘metaphysical 
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intoxication’ (44). A single person had to cite objective circumstances 
(unemployment, illness, etc.) rather than lack of interest in marital 
relations. 
Gluzman suggested that ‘sluggish schizophrenia’ was applied to 
dissidents because it was consistent with psychiatric theory and political 
imperatives of the totalitarian state that defined ‘other- thinking’ as 
an outcome of mental pathology. His engagement with psychiatric 
theory was an attempt to redefine the very idea of ‘pathology’ that 
other dissidents sought to invert and apply to the Soviet system of 
‘behavioural bilingualism’ (Reich 2014, 567) – a system that, for 
dissidents, engendered a schizophrenic break between truth and lies, 
reality and political illusion. 
‘Other-thinking’ and totality as the primacy of the whole
Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway explain that psychiatry and political 
ideology of Soviet Marxism were intertwined (1977, 43). In fact, the 
Soviet Marxist concept of the collective guided Soviet psychiatry: a 
group, a collective always had priority over an individual (42). As a 
result, the task of a psychiatrist was to reintegrate a person into the 
collective through a mediating power of labour and to eradicate noncon-
formist values. The above examples show how dissidents were cast as 
‘madmen’, incapable of understanding the principles of unity of thought. 
This brings me back to my initial question about the possibility of 
dissent as ‘other- thinking’ (inakomysliye) under the conditions of totali-
tarianism.17 I have indicated that this contradiction tends to be framed 
within a realist paradigm. If the unity of thought had had empirical basis, 
then a dissident activity was not what it seemed. 
Alternatively, to acknowledge the radical possibility of other- 
thinking undermines a claim to the existence of a monolithic totalitarian 
society, but somewhat tarnishes the dissidents’ claim to exception. In 
this chapter I have adopted a different tack by showing that the notion of 
‘totalitarianism’ is valuable not as a label of an actually- existing reality, 
but as an ideation that reveals certain philosophical foundations of the 
Soviet world. I have picked examples from case studies of political abuse 
of Soviet psychiatry because they crystallise the tension between the 
official Soviet premise of the primacy of the whole and the dissidents’ 
efforts to delineate a critical space outside ‘the whole’. At the same time 
loyal (for want of a better word) Soviet citizens and dissidents shared a 
cosmological perspective of the world divided into ‘inside’ and ‘outside’.
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The idea of the primacy of the whole has a long genealogy in 
European philosophy and has found traction in anthropology as a 
mereological problem of relating (and separating) parts and wholes. 
In philosophy the argument goes like this: are parts derived from their 
whole or is the whole an abstraction from its parts (Schaffer 2010, 31)? 
The question applies to ‘gunky’ worlds where things (including social 
worlds) are composite objects that can be subdivided or reassembled into 
infinitely complex worlds (Brzozowski 2016, 58–9). The tricky bit is not 
simply to ascertain that parts and wholes are relational, but to establish 
what is fundamental: parts or their entanglements. A pluralist solution is 
numerical; it quantifies and adds parts to create an essentially atomistic 
assembly marked by boundaries and ontological categories (Schaffer 
2010, 44). A monistic perspective sees the world as an integrated system 
where components supervene (or build) on the whole, rather than the 
other way around (56–7). This produces a world where heterogeneity 
does not presume a summation of isolated entities. 
If philosophical arguments seem too abstract, anthropological 
research tends to flesh out this basic philosophical problem by looking at 
many concrete ways to carve the world. For example, Marilyn Strathern’s 
seminal essay on the reconfiguration of social relations by constructing 
and dissolving wholes into parts resists a conventional understanding of 
personhood through a membership of an individual in a group (1994). 
I suggest that, in the realm of political agglomerations, the relation 
between parts and wholes is predicated on a kind of intimacy that does 
not correspond to kinship ties. 
To press the point, the value of the primacy of the whole specifies 
both intimacy and  dissent –  political, intellectual, artistic and so  on – 
 as an imperative to remain or an attempt to explore a potentiality of 
‘outsideness’. It instantiates a tension between intimacy and estrange-
ment and harbours a conceptual contradiction: there could be no ‘outside’ 
under the conditions of totalitarianism. Nevertheless, the state agents 
and dissidents (and many other people, overlooked by grand historical 
narratives) engaged in an infinite movement between inside and outside 
of the perimeters of the Soviet cosmos. Dissidents, refuseniks, intel-
lectuals, artists, religious people, hippies, creative Marxists and others 
looked for routes  outside –  literally abroad or retreating into the obscurity 
of basements, private flats, low- profile jobs, where autonomy could 
be affirmed. It was not a choice but a prerequisite for a compromised 
freedom of exile and loss (Boym 1996). Nevertheless, a plausible ‘outside’ 
location engendered a possibility of the political otherwise. State agents 
also explored the potentialities of ‘outside’ by deporting and exiling 
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people abroad or locking them in isolated, sometimes remote spaces 
outside the official domains of legitimate personhood. 
Contrary to the scholarship that gives the notion of ‘totalitari-
anism’ little empirical basis or conceptual traction, my objective has 
been to show that Soviet totalitarianism remains a productive category 
of analysis in Soviet studies because it embodies a distinct vision of a 
social order where primacy is given to the whole rather than its parts. My 
intention has been to rework this philosophical problem as an anthropo-
logical inquiry into a mode of value creation (Munn 1986, 3). For reasons 
of genealogical continuity and parallelism with the Soviet thought that I 
cannot elaborate here, ‘totalitarianism’ as a value of the primacy of the 
whole postulates an extreme intimacy of a thing to itself (Sider 2007, 
54), of one to its parts, a crucial problem for Soviet experiment and its 
deeper conceptual lineaments. 
To rephrase, even if ‘totalitarianism’ was empirically hyperbolic, 
the priority of the whole carried a high conceptual, ethical and political 
premium in the Soviet Marxist thought and praxis. To go beyond ‘mere 
facticity’ (Munn 1986, 4) of totalitarianism, I have described a topology 
of totalitarianism that confers equivalence to the whole and its parts, the 
way clay subsumes its fluid pieces (Martino 2010, 147). The topology 
of totalitarianism, with a propensity to subtend everything into one, 
conveys an idea that a systemic world of totalitarianism can be found not 
in fact, but in the effects of its fantasy (Meltzer 2013, 86).
Estrangement and intimacy
In interviews and memoirs, many dissidents recollect a sense of isolation 
from friends and family during their incarceration and a dependence on 
dissident networks upon their release. The intimate relations with other 
dissidents proved to be a lifeline for many. It was not unconditional, as 
one could be expelled for suspected cooperation with the Soviet security 
agents, but it was vital for many, especially as many dissidents managed 
to create unofficial systems of financial and psychological support. On 
the other hand dissidents were persecuted for their infidelity to the 
Soviet people; yet upon return from prisons and psychiatric hospitals, 
many dissidents encountered ostracism and unemployment. The letters 
they addressed to the Soviet functionaries suggest that, even if they 
wanted to, former dissidents could not fully reintegrate into the Soviet 
whole. Hence physical expulsion and immigration became the way out 
of this internal isolation. 
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To conclude, I have argued that Soviet totalitarianism was 
predicated on the value of one, as the primacy of the unity of the many. In 
this historical scheme of things dissent enacted estrangement and thereby 
subtracted from the whole, while the repressive mechanism reinstated 
the intimacy with the many as the primacy of the abstract whole. 
As a political coordinate, dissent demarcated an exclusive circle of 
friendships, kinship and political activists. At the same time the intimate 
connections among dissidents severed the links with the presumed Soviet 
peoplehood and concrete people who embraced the value of unity. As 
dissent engendered estrangement from the ideology and institutions of 
the Soviet government, it was punished with another kind of estrange-
ment, including a diagnosis of madness, imprisonment and exile. 
In the Soviet context, dissent engendered estrangement and 
intimacy, while political membership also necessitated estrangement 
and intimacy to a different abstract collectivity, to a different degree. The 
concurrence of estrangement and intimacy is not specific to Soviet history 
either; it represents just one  way –  a lamentably repressive and self- 
negating one – of reworking the problem of encompassing the diverse 
many within a totality of one. Thus the above historical narratives point 
not so much to a tension between estrangement and intimacy, but rather 
to their forms, scale and intercalations. We are left with a perpetually 
awkward question of how ‘radical estrangement is compatible with a 
shared duty’ (Levy 2017, 113) in its intimate political forms. 
Notes
 1 In writing this essay, I have used the archival materials kept in the Archive of Other- Thinking 
(inakomysliye) of the International Memorial in Moscow (f.163, op.1, d.3,6.9,10,22). It 
consists of letters of political prisoners and their family members that were passed into 
different collections of samizdat archives. All personal names have been omitted with the 
exception of well- known dissident figures such as Gorbanevskaya, Faynberg, Medvedev and 
Gluzman, among others. I would like to thank Boris Belenkin and Alexei Makarov in the 
International Memorial in Moscow for their support.
 2 Originally published and circulated through samizdat in 1970.
 3 This argument reflects dissidents’ own perceptions of their work as accumulation and 
dissemination of objective facts and historical information. Some recoiled at any suggestions 
of theorising their materials. However, many dissidents, especially those of a far- right and 
nationalist ilk, have transitioned well into contemporary politics and occupy prominent 
positions in the Russian Duma (c.f. Laruelle 2015). Some dissident strategies and ‘repertoires 
of contention’ have been recently adopted in street protests and critical analysis of current 
socio- political events in Russia (Horvath 2015, 582).
 4 Yurchak appropriately links his concept of vnye to M.M. Bakhtin’s formulation of outsideness, 
or vnyenakhodimost, in the latter’s Toward the Philosophy of the Act, written between 1919 and 
1921 and first published in the USSR in 1986, after the author’s death. The concept seems 
to have gained currency among Moscow intellectuals in their discussions of dissidents and 
today’s protest politics. 
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 5 Elsewhere I have discussed a complex genealogy of official and creative Soviet Marxism that 
was explicitly built on Baruch Spinoza’s ideas of the physicality of thought and evolved in 
parallel with Gilles Deleuze. 
 6 To give the past an anthropological reading, I engage with archival materials, collections of 
Soviet diaries, texts such as memoirs and compilations of archival documents, Russian and 
English- language secondary sources and conversations with ageing dissidents, as well as 
intellectuals and civic activists in Moscow who find dissident history interesting.
 7 For example, housing, clothing and other practices of centralisation and standardisation that 
had practical and ideational value.
 8 Similarly understood as a transcendental humanist principle above and outside the 
concreteness of a political action.
 9 People who were denied (otkaz) exit visas to migrate from the Soviet Union.
10 The impression is that multiple human rights organisations in Soviet Russia and then among 
Soviet expats protested against the use of psychiatry for political purposes rather than against 
its systematic abuse of all patients. 
11 It turned out that this is a sensitive question to raise with surviving dissidents. When I asked 
a wife of one of the members of a committee against psychiatric abuse in Moscow if she 
knew how and why KGB differentiated between political dissidents and psychiatric patients, 
she responded with a scornful ‘just because’. By contrast, at a public lecture on dissidents 
in Moscow in 2018 I joined a group of young professionals (translators, historians and 
administrative staff at an international organisation) who speculated that Gorbanevskaya 
was not imprisoned because she was a single mother and Faynberg was tucked away into a 
psychiatric hospital because he lost his front teeth during the scuffle with the KGB in Red 
Square. 
12 The complete study was disseminated through samizdat and sent to Amnesty International in 
1977.
13 Some dissidents were petrified to meet violently insane inmates. Rooms were shared with 
other patients. There was no attempt to protect them from each other. 
14 Most dissidents claimed that their perspective was the only correct way of interpreting the 
world.
15 GARF (State Archive, Moscow), f.10055, op.3, d.421.
16 For a personal account of Zhores Medvedev’s incarcerations and the efforts to release him, see 
Medvedev and Medvedev (1974).
17 The Soviet example is not unique and it would be unwise to indigenise ‘totalitarianism’ as a 
culture- specific perspective and to racialise it as a ‘Russian’ propensity. In fact the primacy of 
whole, and its political entailments, had precedents in Russian intellectual and folk theories 
and history has been an enduring philosophical theme in European, including Soviet, thought, 
discussed with reference to monism or to non- dualistic, one- world theories of complexity. My 
intention is to give the well- known empirical events of August 1968 and their broader political 
and ideational context an anthropological reading.
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Chapter 3
Dissent with/out resistance? Secular 
and ultra-Orthodox Israeli approaches 
to ethical and political disagreement
Erica Weiss
The Palestinian members of the Israeli Parliament were, as more often 
than not, hard up and desperate for allies. With the backing of his 
right- wing coalition, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had pushed 
forward a controversial bill that would limit the time of day and 
volume that mosques could use for the Muslim call to prayer. The law’s 
proponents argued that the bill was intended to curb noise pollution and 
prevent disturbance at quiet hours of the day. Although laws restricting 
the Muslim call to prayer exist in many countries, including Canada, 
Germany, and the UK, the topic is of particular sensitivity in Israel. The 
proposed law is widely opposed by Palestinian–Israelis and the political 
left, who see it as a blatant attempt to discriminate against Palestinian 
Arab citizens and curb their religious freedom. Representative Jamal 
Zahalka claimed ‘What disturbs the supporters of this legislation is 
not the noise, but rather that the sound of the muezzin reminds them 
of  the true identity of this land’ (Wootliff and Fulbright 2017). This 
reflects a widespread belief among Palestinian–Israelis that the law’s 
purpose is further to erase the Palestinian presence from the Israeli 
public sphere.1 
In January 2018 the bill had just cleared another hurdle towards its 
implementation in law. Seeing that Netanyahu had the votes to pass this 
bill into law, Palestinian representative Ahmed Tibi sought support from 
political parties in the ruling coalition. Two political parties answered his 
call and announced their defection. The dissenters were not fluctuating 
centrists nor ideological outliers, but Shas and United Torah  Judaism 
–  two ultra- Orthodox political parties considered solidly within the 
right wing. For emphasis, ultra- Orthodox representative Yitzhak Vaknin 
promised Tibi that he would rather have his hands cut off than vote for 
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the bill (Azulay 2018). Though their dissent from the coalition took some 
by surprise, it was by no means a sudden decision. 
A year and a half earlier, when the Muezzin Bill was little more 
than a rumour, I sat in a hotel conference room in Dayton, Ohio 
with ultra- Orthodox community leaders and leaders from the Islamic 
Movement in Israel. These groups, often stigmatised as the enemies of 
peace, were there under the auspices of the Citizens’ Accord Forum and 
the Kettering Institute to talk peace. The Islamic leaders requested that 
the ultra- Orthodox support them should there be any political moves 
against the Muslim call to prayer. The ultra- Orthodox conferred among 
themselves, discussing the requirements of Jewish law in relation to this 
issue. At the time they did not offer personal opinions and they made no 
commitments, merely assuring the Islamic leaders that they would raise 
the issue among the political representatives of their communities. 
Here we have the seeds and fruit of ultra- Orthodox dissent. The 
issue was debated behind the scenes and, in the end, the ultra- Orthodox 
parties defied their own coalition. In this chapter I would like to take up 
the case of dissent among Jewish ultra- Orthodox Israelis as a window 
into a version of dissent that I argue we often do not  see –  and sometimes 
fail to recognise when we do. Jewish Israeli society, both secular and 
religious, has moved to the far right in recent years. When we do hear 
about dissent in the media, it is often from the liberal, secular peace 
camp. When you speak with dissidents from the liberal left, they are 
often unaware of dissenters from other  demographics –  or are sometimes 
convinced that they do not exist. 
In this chapter I draw attention to the varieties of political and 
ethical dissent. I argue that the mainstream media, and academia, often 
celebrate secular liberal dissent while failing to recognise other forms. 
This is because such non- liberal forms of dissent look different. They 
are articulated in different ethical grammars to liberal dissent, have 
different aesthetic ideals and employ different techniques and rhetorics 
of persuasion. For this chapter I will draw on fieldwork I have conducted 
with secular liberal Jewish Israeli peace activists and ultra- Orthodox 
Jewish Israeli peace activists. I will demonstrate that dissent within each 
community looks and functions very differently, and attempt to explain 
some of the cultural roots of these differences. 
The comparison between secular liberal and ultra- Orthodox 
societies  in Israel serves to bring attention to the cultural nuances of 
dissent. One of these differences regards the tendency of liberal society 
to respect and even applaud the aesthetics of disruption. In this cultural 
context, expressions of dissent are made publicly and often in the 
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glamorised aesthetics of rebelliousness. Here the maverick and the revolu-
tionary are viewed as cultural heroes. This valorisation of resistance, based 
in liberal culture, has been shown to be a bias in anthropological research 
as well (Abu- Lughod 1990; Ortner 1995), a bias that also prevents anthro-
pology from highlighting other modes of agency (Mahmood 2004; Rouse 
2004). By contrast, ultra- Orthodox society does not idealise dissent. 
Though it does take differences of opinion seriously, it tends to deliberate 
on such matters more quietly, while adhering in public to the cultural 
ideals of consensus and continuity and the aesthetic of solidarity. 
This distinction does two things. The first is that following critiques 
of ‘resistance’ as an anthropological paradigm, my approach considers 
resistance not as an analytic lens, but rather as an empirical phenomenon. 
In other words, some interlocutors hold resistance as a romantic cultural 
trope and others do not. The second thing it accomplishes is to separate 
the existence of dissent from its cultural interpretation. In this case I 
resist a quantitative distinction that would suggest that secular and 
ultra- Orthodox Israeli society have different amounts of dissent, or that 
one society has more capacity for social change. Rather I argue that 
they interpret dissent differently and bring different cultural and social 
resources to bear in their performance of dissent.
‘Successful’ dissent
I seek to show that ultra- Orthodox Jewish dissent differs from its 
secular liberal counterpart in terms of ‘the cultural and social resources 
on which people draw to explain and  understand –  to themselves and 
 others –  the grounds and purpose of their dissent’ (see chapter 7, p.133). 
This case demonstrates that the performance of dissent is evaluated by 
the cultural standards of the community. For the purposes of this chapter 
only, I am using the term ‘successful dissent’ to refer to an expression of 
dissent that the cultural community recognises as appropriate, proper 
and conventional. One could reasonably read ‘successful dissent’ as 
implying that the act had indeed convinced people and had made an 
impact on society or public policy. In a comparative situation this is 
ultimately a quantitative question. Which is more effective: secular 
liberal or ultra- Orthodox dissent? In this chapter, however, I am more 
interested in whether an act or articulation of dissent is accepted by the 
community as proper or not.
In this particular understanding of success, I employ Webb Keane’s 
writing in the anthropology of ethics on the topics of recognition and 
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justifications (Keane 1997; 2010). Keane emphasises that while the 
individual may make ethical acts, it is the community that organises 
ethical life and defines any ethical situation as such. When individuals 
act, they are often called upon to explain themselves and their decision 
(Keane 2010, 78). Whether or not this explanation is accepted often 
depends on the cultural competence of the individual and whether he 
or she offers appropriate justifications (drawing on recognised sources 
of moral authority) in the proper semiotic modality (genre, aesthetics, 
disposition, etc.). In stating this, I am building on the assumption that 
dissidents share an ethical grammar with the community they are trying 
to persuade; my previous work demonstrates that even in their dissent we 
can see the values and ethical norms of the community writ large (Weiss 
2017). While dissent diverges from mainstream opinion, therefore, it 
does not in the process also jettison the ethical standards and beliefs of 
the community. On the contrary: dissent will present in different forms 
across cultural contexts, and dissidents often rely on commonly held 
ethical norms and semiotic modalities to make their case to the larger 
society. 
The result of this approach is to focus the research on the community 
from which dissidents emerge rather than on the dissidents themselves. 
In other words, we do not ask, as perhaps a moral philosopher might, 
‘What is it about these dissidents that caused them to break from society?’ 
Instead we ask the question, ‘What is it about this society that produces 
dissidents of this sort?’ As Keane writes:
Empirical observation bears out a classic theory: one does not 
develop morality all by oneself. Studies of children’s language 
socialization (Ochs 1988; Schieffelin 1990; see also Ochs and 
Kremer- Sadlik 2007) have shown that the habits and emotions that 
we can identify with moral virtues are shaped and given coherence 
in ongoing social interactions over the course of a lifetime. This 
process occurs across a range of interactions with distinct kinds of 
persons, giving it a socially distributed character. (2010, 74)
I am primarily examining how dissidents interact with their own cultural 
communities. I consider how secular liberal dissent is received by the 
secular liberal consensus and how ultra- Orthodox dissent is received by 
the ultra- Orthodox consensus. The grammar and performance of dissent 
uses the moral language and norms of the broader society. Thus, even as 
I describe the liberal approach as more ‘individualistic’, this refers to the 
semiotic ideology of the individual’s apologia and does not imply that 
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liberals are less dependent on the acceptance of their communities. This 
approach is in contrast to the liberal genealogy which would describe 
liberal social life as characterised by freedom and non- liberal life by 
constraint (Povinelli 2006). 
Dissent as resistance: conscientious objection
In the Israeli context conscientious objection is a classic example of 
dissent as resistance (Weiss 2014). While military service is mandatory in 
Israel for Jewish citizens, conscientious objectors refuse to perform their 
military service due to their ethical opposition to the Israeli occupation 
and Israel’s treatment of Palestinians. They do so in violation of Israeli 
law, often serving time in military prison as a result, and in opposition 
to widespread public opinion regarding the necessity of performing 
military service even when one has political objections (Weiss 2014). 
And yet this is a case of ‘successful dissent’. How can this be so? 
I argue that it is successful dissent first and foremost because 
it is recognised as dissent by the objectors’ cultural community. 
Conscientious objectors are drawn almost exclusively from a fairly 
narrow demographic: what Baruch Kimmerling referred to as Ahusalim, 
which stands for Ashkenazi (of European descent), secular, socialist and 
nationalist, culturally a variation on the American White Anglo- Saxon 
Protestant (WASP). In describing them here as liberal, I am referring less 
to their political orientation (be it left, right or other) and more to their 
basic, often unreflective beliefs about the nature of the public sphere, 
citizenship and their individual oriented subjectivities and values. 
Though many Ahusalim disagree with conscientious objection politically, 
they nevertheless recognise and often respect individual conscience as a 
legitimate reason for dissent. 
Although I often did not recognise the cultural specificity at the 
time, in  retrospect –  after subsequently working with ultra- Orthodox 
 dissenters –  I now realise that conscientious objectors’ understanding 
of dissent resonated with many of my own implicit assumptions about 
community, citizenship and the public sphere that should not in fact be 
assumed. Many of the tropes of liberal dissent were evident from the very 
beginning. In our very first introductory interview, Yotam told me:
For a long time, I tried to work within the system. I tried to change 
the system from the inside. Really, all the refusers I know tried 
this for some time. I thought I was a good influence on the other 
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soldiers in my unit and on my commanders, that they would behave 
themselves if I was there to make sure there wasn’t any abuse. But 
eventually I realized something that I had always known, that this 
doesn’t work. This is why we refused. We had to shock the system. 
We had to blow it up. And we did. This was the only way for us to 
really change things.
When Yotam talks about blowing things up, he is referring to the shock 
that reverberated through Israeli society and media at the news that its 
most revered combat soldiers had become conscientious objectors, as 
well as the swift and harsh punishment that was brought down on these 
refusers by the military. However, this harsh reaction does not imply that 
the act of dissent was unsuccessful. On the contrary, it had the desired 
effect; even those who did not agree with the refusals often respected 
the act itself (Weiss 2014). When I spoke with Amir, a senior figure in 
the military legal division responsible for punishing a number of these 
refusers, he told me: 
Look, they’ve broken the law, so we punish them, that is how it 
works. They knew this in advance. But personally I do respect them 
for their willingness to stand up for their beliefs, their conscience 
and accept the punishment. The truth is that if I felt the way they do 
about something, I like to think that I would do the same. Of course, 
I think they are completely crazy and naïve, and if we listen to them 
we’ll all be dead.
Above we see a rejection of the arguments of conscientious objectors 
combined with a respect for their willingness to act, and also for their 
moral autonomy. Such a reaction was very widespread among the 
 mainstream secular population, even among members of the military 
that I interviewed. This is directly related to the ways in which conscien-
tious objectors directly appealed to the fact that both their supporters 
and detractors in the liberal community hold dissent as a cultural 
value, regardless of content. At their public presentations, conscientious 
 objectors would recount their personal journeys, describing how they 
moved from true believers to dissenters. These included their experi-
ences in the occupied Palestinian territories, where they were soldier- 
witnesses to the abuses and injustices carried out by Israeli policy. 
At the end they invariably called upon their conscience, explicitly or 
implicitly, to authorise their acts. Here are some examples from personal 
testimonies.
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Alex: I finally decided to listen to my conscience and to do the right 
thing. 
Hanan: I realized that I had the obligation to refuse. Once I was 
willing to be honest with myself and let my conscience dictate 
what to do, everything became clear to me. That was my 
truth. I refused and I was sent to jail. But now it doesn’t matter 
what the price is. Even if they send me to jail for a hundred 
years, I cannot go against my conscience.
Ben: I knew what I had to do. I knew on the inside what the right 
thing was and that I didn’t really have a choice. Rather I had 
a choice, but only one was legitimate and only one I could 
be proud of. I realized that all around me was complacency, 
and that I needed to shake things up, to disturb people in a 
profound way.
The reliance on conscience is key to the recognition of refusal as an act 
of dissent and to give it legitimacy in the eyes of the broader community. 
Conscientious objectors would frequently give presentations in front of 
small and large groups in order to justify their controversial acts. In these 
presentations they would describe intense moments of moral epiphany, 
when their conscience was revealed to  them –  often after long periods 
of denial. On many occasions the decision to obey one’s conscience 
rather than a commander’s orders is presented as a gut- wrenching 
process. Nevertheless, it is clear from the testimonies that obeying one’s 
conscience was the right thing to do and the authentic decision. 
Hegel claims that conscience tries to establish for itself, and for 
others, that the deeds it requires are bound by duty in an unmediated 
fashion (Feldman 2006, 50). When I spoke with members of the audience 
at these presentations, conscience was clearly the most persuasive 
element. Often the audience was left relatively unswayed regarding their 
support for the Israeli military and the necessity of service, while many 
arrived already holding critical attitudes towards the occupation and 
Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians. In short, not many audience 
members had been newly convinced that conscientious objection was the 
right thing to do. However, people frequently expressed their approval 
of conscientious objectors’ refusal as an act of dissent and an authentic 
obedience to conscience. 
These interactions reveal a number of assumptions about dissent 
that do not necessarily hold true outside the secular liberal community. 
Specifically, I want to focus on three tropes that we hear repeated 
throughout the ethnographic details presented: the trope of ‘I’, which 
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suggests the individual nature of moral decision- making, the trope of 
‘conscience’, which shows the internal nature of moral decision-making, 
and the trope of ‘disruption’, which reveals the belief that change will 
occur through a dramatic intervention in the public sphere. 
The moral authority of dissent as resistance
One constituent element of liberal dissent is that the natural vessel of 
proper moral decision- making is the individual. Conscientious objectors 
constitute a group only in the coincidence of their  dissent –  that is, after 
the fact. It is not due to their belonging in a group that they refuse: rather 
they become a group because they are all refusers. Judgement takes place 
on an individual level. Dissent in this case is not done out of any kind of 
group solidarity, but out of loyalty only to one’s own conscience. The 
bind of conscience only applies to the owner of that conscience. Even 
when conscientious objectors speak as a group, they are careful not to 
speak for each other without consultation, and they do not demand 
ideological or moral conformity from each other. As a union of like- 
minded individuals, the basis of their association is instantly dissolvable 
the moment an individual moral stance falls out of alignment with that 
of the others in the group. 
This is, of course, related to the liberal assumption of moral 
autonomy, derived from Kant (2017). This is the idea that the individual 
is capable of moral deliberation and contains within him or herself the 
capacity for moral discernment. This idea has become essential to liberal 
ethics, and to modern ideas of conscience more specifically. For our 
purposes, the most important characteristic of this assumption of moral 
autonomy is that the source of moral authority is internal to the individual. 
Webb Keane has demonstrated the ways in which the inward moral 
focus, which found full expression in Protestant Christianity, has become 
essential to Western ideas of modernity and beliefs about proper ethical 
discernment (2007). Here, too, dissent such as conscientious objection 
acquires legitimacy if it can be shown to be based on internal reflection 
and moral sentiment, rather than political expediency or group- based 
solidarity. Because of this, conscientious objectors go to great lengths 
to demonstrate how their dissent is actually contrary to their rational 
interests, often describing how much more easily they could have simply 
avoided punishment and public attention.
The final assumption of liberal dissent as resistance that I would like 
to address is that of disruption. Conscientious objectors often described 
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their desire to deliver a shock to the system through their dissent. In fact 
a recent documentary on this group was entitled Disturbing the Peace in 
order to capture just exactly that sentiment (Apkon and Young 2016). 
The promotional materials for this film explain: 
They (the members of the conscientious objector organisation 
Combatants for Peace) stand in a long line of people, from Gandhi to 
MLK Jr., Rosa Parks and many others, who have been arrested and 
those today who continue to be willing to ‘disturb the peace’ in an 
effort to help all of us move toward a more just and peaceful world. 
Disruption and radical transformation are major themes of this 
documentary, and lie at the heart of conscientious objection as an act 
of dissent. As one of the participants in the film is quoted saying, ‘Each 
time we are creating this alternative to the reality, which is an Israeli and 
Palestinian communicating, taking an action together, it is a revolution, 
not less than that’. Their activities have been represented as ‘rehearsing 
the revolution’ (Disturbing the Peace, 2016). This documentary and other 
media representations of conscientious objectors play into the romantic 
idea of resistance and dissent. In liberal popular culture, dissent is ‘cool’; 
being a rebel, a maverick or standing against the mainstream has strong 
cultural appeal. 
This trope of disruption is foundational to the liberal world- view. 
The goal is to liberate the individual from the constraint of culture and 
society (Brown 2006). Thus social change is imagined as a breach with 
the present; the role of cultural heroes is to shatter the existing order and 
create a new world, free of any commitment to what happened before it 
(Mizrachi 2017, 98–9). This idea reflects a strong commitment to moral 
progressivism, the idea that society must always be in transformation or 
ideally revolution, moving away from an oppressive past and towards a 
more just future (Mizrachi 2017, 29). In this model, dissent is intended 
to undermine the past and the status quo. Such a model recalls the ideal 
of revolution and transformation in Christian theology. ‘You have heard 
it  said…  but I say unto you…’ (Matthew 5:17–48). Here dissent seeks to 
criticise and delegitimise the traditional hierarchies and to encourage a 
break with the past. 
Dissent without resistance: ultra-Orthodox Israelis
As part of my ongoing research with religious peace initiatives, I partici-
pated in a women’s group of ultra- Orthodox Jewish and Muslim social 
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workers that met under the auspices of the Citizens’ Accord Forum. The 
goal of this group was to explore areas of commonality between these 
two groups of women, both coming from highly religious, traditionalist, 
non- liberal societies. The idea was that, as two politically marginalised 
groups, they may have issues of overlapping concern that could be 
addressed through their joint efforts. It was left to the women to decide 
which issues they would like to take up. 
In contrast to the previous group, I describe these women as non- 
liberal because they come from a non- liberal community and enthusias-
tically share norms and values that emphasise the community, gender/
age/status based social hierarchies and religious authority over the 
individual. They cover their hair with wigs, headscarves and hats, 
and follow strict rules of modesty and gender segregation outside the 
immediate family. By and large these women tend not to consume 
television or the internet. They also privilege the consensus of the 
religious community and the Torah above the individual will in their 
approach to ethical dilemmas. While these divisions are not meant to 
be understood as hermetic, I believe they are useful to describe some 
deep cultural differences that exist between the groups. Furthermore, I 
reject liberal stereotypes about these groups that would claim that these 
women are oppressed, unreflective, uncritical or otherwise limited in 
their agency or thoughts.
The women discussed their experiences as social workers in their 
own communities, where much of their training and education seemed 
inapplicable. Many of the ‘developmentally normative behaviours’ they 
had learned about, such as teenage rebellion and dating, simply did 
not occur in their communities. But it was the issue of domestic abuse 
on which they decided to focus as a group. In particular Tsippy, a social 
worker in Jerusalem, introduced the concept of ‘spiritual violence’, which 
was greeted with instant recognition by the other participants. This idea 
refers to harassment and abuse on the part of a husband, specifically in 
a way that prevents a wife from fulfilling her religious obligations and 
damages her relationship with God (Siegel- Itzkovich 2009). Examples 
included interrupting a woman’s prayers or trying to force or trick her to 
violate religious prohibitions such as religious dietary rules. 
Israeli law as well as state social workers currently recognise 
several forms of violence against women beyond the  physical –  for 
example, emotional, verbal and financial violence. These ultra- Orthodox 
social workers felt that women in their communities were being exposed 
to a further form of abuse, spiritual violence, for which they received no 
protection in law. There was significant doubt that the criminal court 
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system, with their secular norms, would be interested in recognising this 
religiously informed concept, but the Orthodox Jewish women thought 
they might be able to influence the religious courts. 
In the Israeli context, this would be a significant intervention. 
Family law, including marriage and divorce, is under the jurisdiction of 
the religious courts, Jewish, Muslim and Christian. If the religious courts 
decided to recognise spiritual violence as a form of abuse, this could be 
legal grounds for women who were treated in this way to receive justice. 
One of the members of the group is a well- known figure in the ultra- 
Orthodox world, the daughter of a very important rabbi. She is married 
to a dayan, one of the religious judges in the Jewish courts. She told the 
other social workers that she would raise this issue of spiritual violence 
with her husband for consideration.
At their next meeting, about a month later, the social workers were 
anxious to hear the response.
Margalit: I raised the issue with my husband and he said absolutely 
not. His response was that it is absolute silliness and it has no 
standing in halacha (Jewish law). 
Tsippy: But did you explain him what it means?
Margalit: Yes, I told him and gave him all of the examples, but he 
said that none of them actually do spiritual damage to her. 
Tsippy: What about when he interrupts her prayers?
Margalit: He said women can pray at any time, the times are not set 
as they are for men. 
Karen: And when he whispers only to her that his blessing on the 
wine [Kiddush] doesn’t include her?
[Here she is referring to the Kiddush, a ritual blessing on the 
Sabbath. If this blessing is not performed, the woman cannot eat 
without violating religious law.]
Margalit: He said she is capable of saying all the blessings for 
herself.
Karen: With children and guests gathered around the table in her 
house?! Everyone will see her, she will be humiliated! She 
wouldn’t say the blessing for herself, she would say she has a 
stomach ache and not eat. 
Chavi: And when he forces her to violate the Sabbath? 
Margalit: He said if he tricks her into eating something then that 
does not count against her, but against him.
You could see the disappointment on many of the faces.
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Tsippy: So that is it?
Margalit: That means that it is not going to be recognised in the 
courts at this time. But that doesn’t mean that in your work 
you cannot use the concept and help women who are dealing 
with this type of abuse. There are also other ways that we 
can start to educate people about this idea. I know that you 
are all very disappointed, but I remind you that things in our 
community happen slowly. But they do happen. I am older 
than most of you and I have seen many significant changes in 
the status of women and their possibilities in life, under my 
father and since I was young.
The women nodded sombrely.
Dissent in the ultra- Orthodox society functions very differently 
than in secular liberal society. This dissent took place very quietly, and it 
did so on purpose, making use of back channels and avoiding publicity. 
Even when these efforts failed, the issue was dealt with quietly. Despite 
their frustration, no one at the meeting considered making a statement to 
the media or drawing public attention to the matter. They were certainly 
disappointed, but they accepted the verdict of the judge’s authority on 
the matter and decided to keep working on the issue in other social 
spheres. Moral authority is not found equally in each individual, but is 
distributed  hierarchically –  in this case with the religious judge whose 
decision people are duty bound to obey, just as refusers obey conscience. 
The consensus of the community is not seen as a target for iconoclastic 
rebellion, but as a social fact. 
I asked a few of the women why they were being so cautious not to 
upset the leadership. 
One woman explained: 
I don’t care if they are ‘upset’ or not, that is not the reason. But I do 
not want chaos in the community. Maybe we see something that 
the leadership doesn’t see yet, but maybe we are wrong. We rely on 
their guidance for a reason, and our solidarity is more important 
than any one issue.
Another woman emphasised the potential impact on personal relation-
ships of taking dissent beyond the accepted norms.
In our community, we don’t do things without permission. You 
know my sister became secular, so I am somewhat familiar with all 
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that. Where she lives, no one knows her, if she goes to a non- kosher 
café no one cares. When I leave the house, everyone knows me. If I 
did something everyone would know, and it would be hard for me, 
and that would make it hard for my husband, and hard for my kids. 
Other parents wouldn’t want their kids to be around mine, I could 
never do something like that to them.
She understood my question to be emerging from the anonymous inter-
actions of modern secular society. In order to correct my understanding, 
she wanted to impress on me the ways in which ultra- Orthodox women 
are embedded in thick relationships of kinship and community. As a 
result, their choices and public behaviours impact not only their own 
social wellbeing but also those of their families. This makes the stakes of 
‘disturbing the peace’ extremely high, to the point where such action may 
unethically cause harm to one’s loved ones. 
Dissent and moral authority in ultra-Orthodox 
Israeli society
In this world- view the individual is not intrinsically qualified to discern 
the moral good entirely on his or her own. The capacity for moral 
discernment is not inherent to the human condition, but is found in 
education, tradition and intersubjective deliberation. Thomas Hobbes 
said that what modern society calls conscience is in fact no more than 
private opinion, and should not be credited as bearing any more moral 
weight than that. The ultra- Orthodox dissidents with whom I have 
worked expressed similar suspicions, often referring to liberal dissidents 
as only operating on the basis of opinion. 
The following interaction demonstrates some of these issues. 
Yitzchak Vaknin, the ultra- Orthodox member of the Knesset who claimed 
to prefer to cut off his hands than vote for the Muezzin Bill, attended 
a J- Street conference in Washington DC. J- Street is a liberal American 
nonprofitable organisation working to solve the Arab–Israeli and Israeli–
Palestinian conflicts. Vaknin sat down for an interview with a sceptical 
interviewer who was surprised to see an ultra- Orthodox politician at 
a left- wing event. The following excerpt illustrates the difference in 
approach to questions of dissent (Magid 2013). 
Aaron Magid: You said that your party is supportive of peace, 
but why are you the only member of Shas here and the only 
AMARASURIYA 9781787357792 PRINT.indd   58 30/07/2020   13:31
 DISSEnT wITH/OuT rESISTAnCE?  59
Shas MK to attend the Israeli–Palestinian joint initiative in 
Jerusalem?
Yitzchak Vaknin: I am not the only one. At the end of the day, the 
Rabbis decide and the Council tells us how to act. The 
moment the Council says something in opposition to what I 
say, then I follow them. Many people believe in what I do that 
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict must end.
Vaknin does not just answer the question, but also corrects its false 
premise. The question asks why more individuals from Vaknin’s political 
party do not take a public stand in support of Palestinians and the peace 
process. Vaknin corrects the interviewer, explaining that he is not the 
only one involved in such activities. However, he also corrects the 
implication that he himself is taking a stand against the consensus of 
his party. He wants to take an initiative to end the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict, declaring that he is not the only one. However, he does not act 
alone; ultimately he will follow the consensus.
Consensus is central to the ultra- Orthodox world- view. The text 
from Exodus 23:2, which says ‘You shall neither side with the majority 
to do  wrong –  you shall not give perverse testimony in a dispute, incline 
after the many’, is interpreted as instructing Jews to follow the majority 
opinion. This is a general rule in deciding matters of Torah Law as 
elaborated by the Massekhet Sanhedrin in the Talmud (majority of legal 
judges; this does not imply universal democracy). Yet the rule to set aside 
one’s own opinion and defer to Jewish law as determined by the majority 
applies to both men and women in all contexts. 
However, this does not imply a radically different conception of 
personhood nor a dividuated subject, as found in other ethnographic 
contexts. As with liberal subjects, persons in Judaism are generally 
considered unique actors who are individually responsible for their 
actions. Yet in this case, because moral authority is removed from 
the individual and invested in the rabbinical judges, in the case of 
error the onus is on the judges rather than on the individual.2 This 
consensus is not unitary; there are several streams of ultra- Orthodox 
Judaism, many of which differ on issues of both politics and religion. 
Nevertheless, individuals are generally not left to figure out ethical 
issues on their own, as liberal subjects are. Instead they do so within the 
framework of their community and under the guidance of the rabbinical 
authorities.   
Like consensus, continuity has additional cultural significance 
here in contrast to liberal dissidents who revere disruption. While the 
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aesthetics of liberal dissent romanticise the individual standing alone 
against society to confront the oppressive past, no such romantic ideal 
exists here. Instead continuity with the past and harmony with society 
are idealised. Likewise, iconoclasm is generally not part of the aesthetic 
appeal of this type of dissent. The reverence for continuity is, in fact, 
quite a bit broader than the ultra- Orthodox community. Meir Buzaglo, 
in reference to traditionalist (masorti) Judaism, writes that demon-
strable loyalty to the past and to tradition is the necessary condition for 
revolution in the Jewish world. His work demonstrates that traditional 
populations do not want to see themselves as renegades, but rather as 
the latest link in the chain of their forebears (Buzaglo 2011). This by no 
means implies that such an approach is not open to change. Rather, it 
means that change and dissent take place within a framework of loyalty 
to tradition and a respect for continuity. 
The liberal orientation towards disruption and the non- liberal 
orientation towards continuity and consensus should not be perceived as 
an absolute binary. Elizabeth Povinelli writes that the liberal imagination 
defines itself by freedom and imagines the other as a genealogical 
society defined by constraint. Thus the liberal subject is legitimised 
through creativity and its other through continuity (2002). Here we see a 
situation in which notions of continuity are highly valued by a non- liberal 
society, yet we do not want to reify these positions or expect reality to 
conform fully to this binary opposition. In fact, I want to illustrate that 
in practice conscientious objectors often bend towards continuity, and 
sometimes the ultra- Orthodox have maverick moments. 
While the focus of conscientious objectors’ testimony is on their 
own moral process of rejecting military service and breaking away 
from mainstream society, at the same time we can find gestures to 
continuity. Often conscientious objectors describe their genealogical 
links to mainstream Jewish Israeli society at length, as well as describing 
their loyalty to civic values known to be within the Jewish consensus 
(Weiss 2011). Here, even to a liberal audience that explicitly values 
individual ideas of conscience, dissenters must still guard against the 
suspicions of nihilism that their non- liberal counterparts accuse them 
of. In addition, sometimes even secular liberals found military refusal to 
cross the line of acceptable dissent. Often the true price was found not in 
rhetorical condemnation of conscience as a value, but in the consequence 
to personal relationships. Some conscientious objectors were rejected by 
certain family members, while many lost friends who supported their 
freedom of conscience and respected their dissent from the mainstream 
only up until the point of refusal. 
AMARASURIYA 9781787357792 PRINT.indd   60 30/07/2020   13:31
 DISSEnT wITH/OuT rESISTAnCE?  61
By contrast, the ultra- Orthodox sometimes take actions that 
could be seen as disruptive, despite the social taboos. Margalit, the 
social activist who delivered the bad news to the ultra- Orthodox social 
workers, recalled at one meeting a time when she evaded the hierar-
chical moral authority of her community. In 2015, at the Gay Pride 
Parade in Jerusalem, 16- year old Shira Banki was stabbed to death by an 
ultra- Orthodox protestor. Margalit, despite the broad consensus against 
homosexuality in the ultra- Orthodox community, and believing that 
her husband would disapprove, went to console Banki’s family without 
discussing the matter with him first. (She did not, however, advertise this 
incident publicly until he told her that he did in fact approve and would 
have joined her had he known of her plans.) 
The analytic framework I draw regarding the ideals of dissent, 
contrasting disruption and consensus between the communities, should 
not therefore be seen as overly  rigid –  nor imply that values of continuity 
are never present in liberalism, or that disruption is never present in the 
non- liberal, ultra- Orthodox tradition. In a diverse society, these aesthetic 
ideals can also influence each other. 
In this chapter I am trying to correct for a bias that allows research-
ers from liberal contexts more easily to recognise the rhetoric, aesthet-
ics and structure of dissent as resistance. And in the wake of critiques 
of resistance as an analytic lens, I seek to provincialise resistance as a 
specific cultural approach to dissent. I believe it would be a mistake 
diametrically to oppose dissent and consensus, which reflect liberal 
assumptions about moral decision- making as well as the ethics of self- 
presentation. Through the lens of dissent as resistance, one must choose 
between dissent and consent. 
As we see above, this is not the only option. One can hold dissenting 
opinions until such point at which a consensus is reached, and then 
consent to the majority stance. The lens of resistance has a hard time 
processing this shift in positive ethical terms. Through this lens, one 
cannot change from a dissenter to someone who ‘genuinely’ consents 
to the popular consensus without undergoing a personal transforma-
tion. Obeying a demand for consent that does not originate with the 
individual would be seen as a compromise of one’s principles, if not 
as hypocrisy. This idea is reinforced by the Western assumption that 
associates secularism with critical thinking and religion with conformity 
(Asad et al. 2013). However, the ultra- Orthodox see this shift as being in 
line with their positively framed ethical principles, not a compromised 
act. For them, one has a duty to dissent, and then one has a duty to give 
consent to majority rule. These principles are not contradictory for them. 
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To a significant extent this opposition of dissent and consent is 
related to the liberal expectation for authenticity. Charles Taylor writes 
that modernity demands self- fulfilment, that individuals will create or 
discover their true selves and that this demand amounts to a moral calling 
(1991; 1992). In addition Andrew Weigert argues that authenticity is 
demonstrated in moments of moral dilemma, when the individual is 
called to feel and to act in accordance with their personal values (2009). 
Ori Schwartz defines the authenticity ethos in the following way: 
This emphatically modern  ethic …  demands that individuals find 
out their true nature, emotions and beliefs and stick to them; 
act spontaneously and uncalculatedly; and remain true to 
themselves despite external pressures to conform to social norms 
and temptations to ‘sell out’… Finally, authenticity turned into 
an axiological principle used to evaluate other people’s moral and 
social worth. (2016, 3)
On the one hand, we see that the discourse of self- discovery is central 
to conscientious objectors’ testimonies of moral discernment, and that 
self- fulfilment is key to their justifications of refusal. On the other hand, 
we see how the ultra- Orthodox fail the test of authenticity by their 
subordination of their individual opinions to the consensus. The ‘failure’ 
of this non- liberal population to demonstrate authenticity leads to their 
negative evaluation by liberal peers. It is common to hear the negative 
trope that the ultra- Orthodox do not engage in critical thought, but 
only obey the instructions of their rabbis. Such statements accuse the 
ultra- Orthodox community of improper ethical practice according to 
the liberal code of resistance.
Interestingly, both groups see their acts as being taken for the 
good of the community, casting this issue as one of ethical, and not 
solely political, life. Conscientious objectors understand themselves to 
be giving up their freedom in order to save Israeli society from its own 
destructive policies and political decisions. Ultra- Orthodox dissenters 
meanwhile sacrifice their personal stances for the unity and solidarity 
of the community. Here we see quite clearly the difference in emphasis 
between an individual versus a community- oriented social context. 
Thus I suggest that we can describe such ultra- Orthodox –  and 
potentially other non- liberal forms of  dissent –  as dissent without 
resistance. By dissent without resistance, I mean to pry apart the 
universal social phenomenon of dissent from the specific cultural mani-
festation that privileges the aesthetics of disruption and romanticises 
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rebellion. This echoes James Laidlaw’s move to detach the concept 
of freedom from  the fetishised idea of ‘Freedom’ that is central to the 
Western ethical and political project and which invokes an ‘atomistic 
social ontology’ (2002, 311). He does this in order to free the concept 
from its cultural baggage because he sees in the concept great potential 
for service in the anthropological toolkit, specifically as a foundational 
concept in the anthropology of ethics. Here I seek similarly to recover 
the concept of dissent as a foundational universal. Doing this will allow 
us not only to consider cases of dissent exercised outside the liberal 
framework, but also to identify cases when dissent is in fact manifested 
in the liberal grammar of resistance, such as in the case of conscientious 
objectors. 
Because ultra- Orthodox dissent is generally not brought to the 
mainstream media or articulated in the discourse of disruption, it often 
slides beneath the radar; such communities acquire stereotypes of being 
‘closed’ and ‘repressive’. This pattern is recognisable in other cases of non- 
liberal societies. For example, Hurst and McConnell found a substantial 
amount of internal divisions among the Amish regarding church doctrine, 
family life and educational choices, despite their outward and highly 
cultivated appearance of unity and homogeneity (2010). In a somewhat 
different vein, Saba Mahmood found that the women’s Islamic piety 
movement in Egypt was largely illegible to Western feminist discourse, 
in part because of its failure to conform to tropes of political liberation or 
what I refer to here as the politics of disruption (2004). 
Dissent in the public sphere
Liberal dissent as resistance assumes a deliberative public sphere, a 
central principle of liberal political philosophy (Rawls 2005; Habermas 
1991). Under this model, discernment and reflection about the just 
and the good takes place on an individual level. Once an individual 
understands their position, it is his or her right and duty to engage their 
fellow citizens in the public sphere, arguing for their position while 
simultaneously being open to persuasion by others (Rawls 2009 [1971]). 
For conscientious objectors, refusal is an intervention in the public 
 sphere –  not only because they do not want to continue performing 
military service on a personal level, but also because they think their 
actions will influence public opinion towards their position. This is 
the reason that they testify before audiences, accept invitations to be 
interviewed on television, on radio and in newspapers, speak in schools 
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and other venues. They see their act of dissent as contributing an 
argument to the ongoing conversation among the Jewish Israeli public 
regarding the occupation and the policies of the Israeli military. 
By contrast, the ultra- Orthodox process of handling dissent is quite 
different. Contrary to stereotypes, many hot button issues, religious 
and political, are debated among the ultra- Orthodox. However, often 
these debates do not primarily take place in the media nor in front of 
the broader public, but rather through back channels, as we saw in the 
cases presented here. On sensitive issues, the ultra- Orthodox often enter 
the broader Israeli public sphere only once consensus is reached. In 
this they differ from the liberal model of the deliberative public sphere, 
conforming more instead to the agonistic model of the public sphere. 
Individuals and groups following this agonistic model do not try 
to persuade each other under the assumption that the public sphere 
is a neutral space or that difference can be resolved through rational 
debate. Rather it recognises deep difference, often incommensurable 
difference, between perspectives. In an agonistic public sphere, opposing 
hegemonic projects struggle for power in an adversarial system (Mouffe 
2000; 2005). As such, we see that not only do the ultra- Orthodox differ 
from liberals in terms of their ethical subjectivities, but also in terms of 
their political models. 
Conclusion
Israeli conscientious objection takes place on a very public stage, both 
domestically and internationally. By contrast, dissent within the ultra- 
Orthodox Jewish community often garners far less attention. In this 
chapter I take a comparative perspective to try to explain this difference. 
I show that the conscientious objection bears a number of liberal 
assumptions and specific cultural expressions. This type of dissent lodges 
its moral authority in individual conscience, considered to be an inherent 
part of the human condition. Dissent in this context is also often roman-
ticised and aestheticised through resistance, in line with a cultural value 
privileging disruption in ethical life. By contrast, the ultra- Orthodox 
dissidents value the aesthetics of continuity and solidarity even as they 
see dissent as necessary and inevitable.
The comparison presented here reveals another important 
distinction related to the internal politics of legitimation. Often academic 
accounts focus on strategy and struggles of dissidents against the 
hegemonic political forces (Herzfeld 2016). While these dynamics are 
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of essential importance, they tend to sidestep the ways in which dissent 
movements are ethical in addition to being political. As ethical interven-
tions, it is not only a question of effective political manoeuvering, but 
also one that involves essential cultural issues, for example sources of 
moral authority and the relationship between the individual and the 
community. 
Attention to this level of legitimation allows us to discern between 
the cultural politics of dissent of individuals in secular liberal societies 
from those social movements that emerge from non- liberal, tradition-
alist social contexts. Typically these include dense networks of kinship 
and high expectations of fealty, and in them the ethical is invested 
communally. One can expect that the type of ethical legitimisation will 
also have implications for the relationships between the dissidents of any 
given movement. A movement based on individual conscience will likely 
be the voluntary association of strangers who come together because 
of their common dedication to a cause, such as the Black Lives Matter 
Movement or the Women’s March in the US. By contrast, a movement that 
is legitimised by communal and hierarchical moral authority will likely be 
based on close forms of association and an expectation of solidarity based 
on group belonging. One could expect to see this in different indigenous 
land movements among non- liberal communities around the world. 
Notes
1 From their home in Caesarea, Netanyahu and his family can hear the muezzin’s call to prayer 
from Jisr az- Zarqa and they do not like it. Netanyahu found time to complain about hearing the 
call to prayer during his cabinet meetings on several occasions (Times of Israel Staff 2016). 
2 One of my interlocutors explained to me that the reason for this rule was to standardise 
Judaism. If the laws were left to personal interpretation, everyone would follow their own 
opinion on every matter; in surrendering to their own individuality, there would be nothing 
holding people together in a shared religion. Deferring to majority opinion, it is claimed, allows 
Judaism to survive as a coherent religion throughout the world and to maintain continuity 
through time.
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Chapter 4
Friendship behind bars:  
Kurdish dissident politics in  
Turkey’s prisons
Serra Hakyemez
In December 2017 I paid a visit to Devrim, a Kurdish man in his early 
30s, finally to congratulate the newly- wed bridegroom who had been 
detained immediately after his wedding ceremony and kept in prison 
for six months. His wife was watching the film Arabesque on television, 
a cult work of the Turkish cinema produced in the aftermath of the 1980 
military junta. In the genre of melodrama, the film parodies the liberali-
sation of public space from the grip of the Turkish military. Here Şener 
the violinist and Müjde the singer face an endless series of unfortunate 
events that hinder their merry union. 
One of these events culminates in Şener’s imprisonment on the false 
charge of murder. As a newcomer to prison, he looks around the room, 
furnished by two dozen double- decker bunks and a large plastic table. 
A group of inmates smokes cigarettes and drinks tea around the table. 
Into this almost clichéd scene of killing time another group of inmates 
abruptly emerges from an underground tunnel, wearing yellow raincoats 
and carrying shovels. Not knowing who these men are, Şener asks a 
fellow inmate ‘Are these men miners?’ The fellow inmate corrects him. 
‘No, they are political. They will never receive amnesty. Therefore they 
are digging a tunnel.’ At that moment Devrim, his memories from prison 
still fresh, confirmed what had just been stated: a ‘political prisoner is the 
prisoner whom the state would never pardon’. A former political prisoner 
himself, Devrim repeated these words with the anticipation that his time 
released from prison would be shorter than the time he had already spent 
in it. 
This chapter examines the dissident politics of Kurdish prisoners 
in the face of the misfortune that befalls their relationships with 
intimate others outside prison. It focuses on the intimacies they form 
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through prison friendship. I use ‘friendship’ (in Kurdish hevaltî) as a 
general category, referring to two interconnected forms of relatedness 
entertained by prisoners: comradeship/political friendship and social/
non- political friendship. Rather than employ an a priori distinction 
between political and non- political, I study ethnographically what makes 
a friendship and what kind of labour is invested in relating to one another 
as a political or non- political friend. In the context of prison friendship 
the non- political is an outcome of continuous collective action, rather 
than a backdrop against which the political operates (see Candea 2011). 
Intimate publics and collectivised privacies are two sides of friendship 
among prisoners that exist in constant but productive tension.
The Kurdish movement lays out a set of rules about how prisoners 
should form relationships and how they should conduct themselves. 
The ultimate goal of this form of governmentality is to produce revolu-
tionary subjects, prepared to commit their lives to the Kurdish movement 
through the institution of comradeship.1 This institution requires that 
prisoners comply with the Kurdish movement’s strict organisational 
hierarchies and regimentation of everyday life in order to refract the 
repressive rule of prison administration and to achieve formal equality. 
At the outset the institution of comradeship may appear as another 
oppressive institution within the already oppressive regime of prison 
administration, unless due attention is paid to the multiple socialities 
to which it gives birth. Based upon an overview of how comradeship 
is structured in prisons, this chapter examines what my interlocutors 
call ‘social friendship’ – a relationship originating in, yet exceeding, 
political friendship. I argue that prisons remain the hub of dissident 
 politics –  not simply because the Kurdish movement commands this to 
be so, but also because the prisoners’ commitment to their friendship, 
which is irreducible to comradeship, becomes inseparable from their 
commitment to the Kurdish cause. 
In The Promise of Politics Hannah Arendt (2005) criticises the 
confusion of politics with domination and use of force. Drawing on its 
deployment in antiquity, Arendt defines politics in spatial terms as that 
which ‘arises between men and outside of man’ (2005, 95). Identifying 
politics with the ‘in- between space’ generated by the plural existence of 
human beings, she considers interdependency, rather than sovereignty, 
as a condition of possibility for political action (see Butler, Gambetti 
and Sabsay 2016; Çubukçu 2018). Political action imbued with world- 
making power does not occur in isolation; according to Arendt, it is an 
action in concert and requires one to act with friends and comrades as 
equals. The ‘in- between space’ of politics grants its participants freedom, 
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albeit  temporarily,  but it is neither atemporal nor bereft of structure, as 
Arendt argues. 
Each such space has its own structure that changes over time and 
reveals itself in a private context as custom, in a social context as 
convention and in a public context as laws, constitutions, statutes 
and the like. (2005, 106)
In Arendt’s reading of politics, it is only through passion and action that 
the withering away of such ‘in- between spaces’ can be resisted. If totali-
tarian movements are like storms in a desert world, in which everything 
between human beings is hollowed out, human beings need oases that 
exist somewhat independently from political conditions, but are never-
theless essential for the endurance of human faculties of passion and 
action. Creativity unfolds in this desert world in the singular: 
in the inherently wordless relationship between human beings as it 
exists in love and sometimes in  friendship –  when one heart reaches 
out directly to the other, as in friendship, or when the in- between, 
the world, goes up in flames, as in love. (Arendt 2005, 202)
Carrying this analogy further, I consider friendship behind bars to 
be a form of  relatedness –  one that is both structured by the rules of 
the institution of comradeship yet is also formative of oases, enabling 
prisoners to find creative ways to form non- political socialities. By taking 
friendship as the analytic to understand the endurance of dissident 
politics in prisons, this chapter shows the ethical, corporal and affective 
ties that friendship weaves between prisoners, thus sustaining their 
collective will for life and dissent.
Ethnographies of political prisoners in places as diverse as Northern 
Ireland, Turkey and Palestine illustrate how the collectivities formed by 
dissent move beyond the question of survival as they utilise their bodies 
as weapons against the biopolitical order of prison administrations 
(Aretxaga 1995; Bargu 2016; Feldman 1991; Nashif 2008). Departing 
from these ethnographies, which omit the role of the non- political in 
the formation of dissent, this chapter focuses on the spaces carved 
out by prisoners to form political as well as non- political friendships. I 
argue that friendship behind bars, constantly made and unmade by the 
prison administration and the Kurdish movement, creates an ‘in- between 
space’ between the self and the others. In this space not only daily life 
but also pain and fun are collectivised. The commitment to politics is a 
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commitment to the friendship that protects the self from giving in to the 
state’s coercive power, together with the help of oases they collectively 
create within prison walls. 
I have developed long- term friendships with former prisoners 
during the 30 months of ethnographic research that I conducted in 
Diyarbakır, Turkey between 2008 and 2014. In addition to more than 
100 interviews, I collected two dozen prison memoirs and engaged in 
less formal conversations with former prisoners. Friendship was not 
necessarily what the former prisoners preferred to talk about during 
these interviews, given the abundance of contentious issues to  discuss – 
 including the Kurdish struggle for national liberation, Turkish colonialism 
and the like. Nor did I initially think of or pay attention to friendship as 
an analytic to read prison stories interwoven with torture, resistance and 
death (Hakyemez 2017). Communicated to me with the sparest of signs 
and gestures, it was only when I stopped the tape recorder and put my 
notebook aside that our conversations turned to the relations that the 
former prisoners established with each other in prison. These were the 
moments when they claimed their prison experience in intimate terms, 
shared together with close friends. 
Antagonist politics
Unlike in the film Arabesque, Turkish prison administrations usually 
segregate Kurdish prisoners accused of terrorism from common criminals. 
This enables them to subject the former to a different regime of discipline 
and punishment and to prevent the latter from being influenced by 
potentially subversive ideas. The former group of Kurdish prisoners is 
further divided between those who align with the Kurdish movement 
spearheaded by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and others who 
either express repentance and side with the Turkish state or remain unaf-
filiated with either side. The political (siyasi) prisoners, on the one hand, 
and those who are repentant (itirafçı) and the unaffiliated (bağımsız) 
on the other: each stay in separate prison blocks and use disconnected 
recreation yards.2 
Notwithstanding the relative ease with which newcomers may 
identify themselves with one of these groups, the prison administra-
tion utilises violent and non- violent means to convert the prisoners in 
political wards into repentant or unaffiliated ones. Among the techniques 
employed is the promise that they will receive reduced prison sentences 
and live in less arduous prison conditions. Turning away from the 
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political community is one of the ways in which prisoners remake their 
normative world which has been crushed by their torturers (Cover 1986; 
Talebi 2011; Thiranagama and Kelly 2010). Since the 1980 military junta 
prison administrations have succeeded in recruiting political prisoners 
into the repentant and unaffiliated groups. Nonetheless political wards 
continue to outnumber the wards of repentant and unaffiliated prisoners. 
Political wards are distinguished from others on two registers: 
the prisoners’ external relation with the administration and their inner 
relation with each other. Devrim’s definition of the political prisoner 
as the one whom the state would never pardon speaks to the political 
prisoners’ feeling of enmity toward the state, embodied inside by the 
prison administration. Anthropologists have asserted that the state is 
neither a clearly bounded institution nor a unitary and autonomous 
actor; it rather consists of a multilayered, contradictory, trans- local 
ensemble of institutions, practices and people in a globalised context 
(Sharma and Gupta 2006). As Abrams (1988) famously argued, the 
state as an a priori conceptual and empirical object obscures the ordinary 
and often uncoordinated contestations of power between these actors. 
However, the intellectual work of deconstructing the state does not 
necessarily mean that our interlocutors do not reconstruct it, whether 
to assure sovereign protection or to contest sovereign oppression (Blom 
Hansen and Stepputat 2005; Navaro- Yashin 2002; Wedeen 1999). As 
recent anthropological studies argue, we need to suspend our own 
definitions of the state and politics in order to shed a light on what these 
notions come to mean for our interlocutors (Candea 2011; Curtis and 
Spencer 2012).3
As much as it obstructs the daily operation of power relations, the 
state as an ethnographic category is indispensable in the formation of 
dissident politics. Kurdish political prisoners operate with the Schmittian 
concept of politics when drawing the boundaries of enmity and friendship 
with prison administrations. Within this framework, the conflict that 
Kurdish guerrillas wage in the mountains is carried forward by the fight 
of Kurdish prisoners against prison administrations.4 Kurdish prisoners 
map the mutually constitutive antagonism between the Turkish state and 
the PKK onto what Carl Schmitt calls the ‘friend–enemy antithesis’. This 
provides a definition in the sense of a criterion and not as an 
exhaustive definition or one indicative of substantial content. […] 
The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of 
intensity of a union or separation, of an association or disassocia-
tion. (2007, 26) 
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Such an antithesis takes new forms when prison administrations impose 
new rules that prisoners do not accept (for example, all inmates must 
wear a uniform) or when prisoners push prison administrations to 
change the existing rules (for example, strip- search). Hunger strikes, in 
particular, escalate antagonism to the extent that the survival of pris-
oners becomes contingent upon the demise of prison administrations 
(Bargu 2016). Alternatively, in the words of a former prisoner, either 
prisoners defeat prison administrations and get out of prisons on foot or 
they are defeated and carried out in coffins. In Turkey the latter scenario 
is often the one with which prison uprisings have concluded.
In his articulation of the friend–enemy antithesis, Schmitt (2007) 
concedes that the antagonism between two groups does not necessarily 
prevent them from entertaining any transaction. Nor does it mean that 
individual members of each group necessarily hate each other. The 
enemy in us–them distinction refers to public enmity rather than private 
animosity. Former prisoners affirmed this distinction between public 
enmity and private animosity on the grounds that their problem was 
with prison administrations, not with individual prison guards. Instead, 
they saw the cruelty of their torturers as a sign of their abnormality. The 
prisoners speculated that most prison guards were addicted to drugs, 
consummated by abundant alcohol consumption and brainwashed by 
special training. Some prison guards were considered exceptional for 
bringing food to prisoners when the administrations banned all services, 
informing them ahead of time about the administrations’ incursion plans 
and refraining from torturing them. Although such instances of care 
extended by a few prison guards to Kurdish prisoners attest to the perme-
ability between two groupings at a personal level, it does not change the 
inherent public enmity between prisoners and prison administrations.
If refusal to collaborate with the state initiates Kurdish prisoners 
into the political prison wards, it is their friendships that keep them 
there. Antagonism between the Turkish state and the PKK, which 
makes  the political wards effectively another front of war, does not 
explain the texture of the relationship among prisoners. The ties that 
bind the members of a group in the friend–enemy antithesis might 
be as imaginative as those of a nation or as intimate as those of kin. 
The institution of comradeship is irreducible to neither the sociality of 
strangers, with which the public is associated in liberal democracies, nor 
to the intimate sociality of kin associated with the domestic. It is rather 
the homo- sociality of male prisoners who negotiate the boundaries 
between insiders and outsiders as they are inculcated into the ethics of 
comradeship. 
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The ethics of comradeship
Common criminals were respectful and measured toward us 
[political prisoners]. Among themselves, however, they were very 
manipulative. Their relations were built on self- interest. If their 
personal life was at stake, they could sell their best friends. Rather 
than a friendship [my emphasis], they seemed to have a forced 
union. I met some good people who remained tight- lipped and 
rejected to inform the administration on their friends no matter 
what. Yet their inner relations were fraught with contradictions. 
They did not have a collective life. They were divided into groups 
of three or four, each meeting their own ends. (Sezgin 2014, 125) 
The excerpt is from Sinop’ta İdam Geceleri (The Nights of Execution in 
Sinop) by Yılmaz Sezgin, who at the age of 18 was accused of seces-
sionism and sentenced to death, later commuted to 30 years’ imprison-
ment. Yılmaz entered prison in 1980 with little knowledge of the Kurdish 
movement, let alone its ideology. He was an illiterate shepherd who had 
befriended a few guerrilla fighters in the mountains while grazing his 
flock. When he left prison in 2010, however, he had not only learned 
how to read and write but had also become the author of a well- known 
prison memoir. 
In the aftermath of a prison uprising in Sinop, Yılmaz and his 
cellmates were placed in the ward of common criminals. In his prison 
memoir he noted a stark contrast between the relatedness of common 
criminals and that of political prisoners. If common criminals had 
a forced union, the political prisoners’ was a voluntary one. If the 
members of this forced union were manipulative and self- centered, 
Yılmaz believed political prisoners to be sincere and collective- minded. 
The moralising language Yılmaz deployed to describe common criminals 
does not presume that political prisoners are inherently better human 
 beings –  rather that they become so as they participate in the institution 
of comradeship. The excerpt attests to the felicitous subjectification of 
Yılmaz to the comradeship ideology even though, as will be evident in 
the last section, one should never assume this subjectification process to 
be complete. 
Prisons, in the words of Erving Goffman (1968), are total insti-
tutions which break down the spatial barriers between labour, work, 
leisure and action. Goffman argues that inmates subjected to the coercive 
authority of total institutions experience mortification and loss of 
selfhood. The reasons are varied and complex. 
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First, all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under 
the same single authority. Second, each phase of the member’s 
daily activity is carried on in the immediate company of a large 
batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do 
the same thing together. Third, all phases of the day’s activities are 
tightly scheduled with one activity leading at a prearranged time 
into the next, the whole sequence of activities being imposed from 
above by a system of explicit formal rulings and a body of officials. 
Finally, the various enforced activities are brought together into a 
single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims 
of the institution. (1968, 6)
The corporal imprints that the material structure of prisons leave on 
prisoners should be added to Goffman’s list of coercive practices that 
threaten one’s sense of self. Prison as a punitive institution produces 
bodily vulnerabilities even in the absence of torture; it deprives prisoners 
from contact with human and non- human beings except prison guards 
and fellow inmates. Prisoners are locked up in dimly lighted rooms; 
small barred windows restrain their field of vision. Their sense of touch 
with the outside world is reduced to their bodily contact with fully 
cemented floors of recreation yards, in which Kurdish prisoners are not 
even allowed to grow plants or feed pigeons. The bland diet of prison 
life deprives prisoners of necessary nutrients, to the extent that most of 
them develop digestive problems. Finally, prisoners’ bodily dispositions 
resemble each other over the years as they stay in the same enclosed 
space. It is therefore not uncommon for released prisoners to spot 
another former inmate from afar simply by recognising the particular 
way in which they carry their bodies on the street.
Notwithstanding these similarities, the political wards of Kurdish 
prisoners are different from other total institutions. This is because 
of the informal and somewhat discrete organisation they instituted 
to evade the administration’s authority over their lives. The prison 
writings of former prisoners provide insights into the organisational 
model they developed over time called ‘internal coordination’. Cafer 
Solgun (2018), another Kurdish writer who stayed in seven different 
prisons in the 1990s, describes the internal coordination as a highly 
hierarchical structure, similar to that established in camps by Kurdish 
guerrilla fighters.5 At the top of the hierarchy comes the coordination 
team, consisting of three members and three alternates who held senior 
positions within the Kurdish movement prior to their imprisonment. 
Its members act like a governing body, shaping how political prisoners 
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conduct themselves in the wards. Strategies developed by the coordina-
tion team are implemented by the central committees formed in every 
prison and again composed of three members and three alternates. Each 
central committee establishes an education and a commune committee 
to coordinate prisoners’ daily activities. Finally, each ward has a separate 
unit consisting of five members responsible for social, practical and 
administrative activities. However, as Solgun notes, this organisational 
model does not always work as designed: prisons differ from each other 
with regard to their population profile, ward size and level of oppression. 
In contrast to the administration’s written rules and sovereign 
decisions implemented through force, the Kurdish movement’s prison 
organisation is concerned with conducting the conduct of political 
prisoners within the institution of comradeship to produce revolutionary 
subjects. When a detained person enters prison, the central committee 
collects intelligence about the newcomer. Such intelligence includes 
where he comes from, what positions he held prior to his imprisonment 
and what information he disclosed when interrogated by the police, 
the public prosecutor and the judge. If there is any suspicion of his 
having collaborated with state officers, the newcomer is approached 
with caution and placed under close surveillance by his comrades to 
detect whether he leaks information to prison guards or not. 
The central committee pays special attention to the distribution 
of newcomers, ensuring that they share cells with senior prisoners 
responsible for initiating them into the institution of comradeship.6 Since 
the organisational ties take precedence over familial ones in such revolu-
tionary movements, even when two brothers are sent to the same prison 
it is up to the central committee to decide whether they would occupy the 
same ward or separate ones (see Thiranagama 2011). 
One of the main components of daily life in political wards are 
regular discussion sessions organised by the education committee. 
Committee members determine the list of books and newspapers that are 
admitted to political wards, avoiding those associated with a degenerate, 
bourgeois lifestyle. In the 1990s the education committee censored 
ostensibly apolitical materials by removing the magazine pages from 
daily newspapers and redacting the images they deemed obscene. Like 
many Marxist organisations, the education committee draws on Paulo 
Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed in connecting the written word to 
the goal of producing a rational and self- determining human subject 
(Cody 2013). In accord with the modernist idea of enlightenment, the 
education committee approaches reading and writing as a means toward 
the objectification of the world and the abstraction of the self. From this 
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emerges their strong emphasis on literacy in prisons where illiterate 
Kurds such as Yılmaz can learn how to read and write, while literate 
comrades learn how to see the world through an ‘objective’ lens and 
reflect on their ‘abstracted’ selves. 
Such reading and discussion sessions are held three times a day, 
proceeding from general to group- based to individual education. 
Political prisoners start the day at 6 a.m. with breakfast, followed 
by general education in which newspapers and journals are read by 
everyone in the ward for discussion. During the break prisoners are 
allowed out to the recreational yard to take a walk or play volleyball. 
After the break prisoners are divided into four groups, with upper levels 
being for those who have taken the oath to work as professional revolu-
tionaries and lower levels for sympathisers. The main material for group 
discussion includes the writings of Abdullah Öcalan, ranging from his 
party congress speeches to prison notebooks. Depending on the level 
of discussion, other texts by Marx, Lenin, Fanon, Wallerstein, Foucault, 
Bookchin and the like might be assigned. While everybody is invited to 
participate in group discussions, senior prisoners can intervene to steer 
the topic of discussion in what they consider the desired direction. Upon 
the completion of group sessions, prisoners come together for dinner 
and to watch the news on television. Finally evenings are reserved for 
individual education, with prisoners able to undertake the readings of 
their choice until the call for sleep at 10 p.m. 
Such prison activities regimenting the daily life of political prisoners 
produce cultural intimacies of which they themselves are sometimes 
unaware (Herzfeld 2005). Prison guards as the outside observers of 
the institution of comradeship may discern the manifestations of this 
cultural intimacy better than those within it. A former captive who 
stayed in prison for 20 years recounted to me a conversation he had with 
a prison guard whose observations compelled him to realise that the 
Kurdish political prisoners had inadvertently cultivated the same taste 
for leisure activities. The particular guard did a headcount to confirm 
the attendance of prisoners in the same block twice a day. One evening 
when on duty, the guard asked him with bafflement how it was that all 
political prisoners watched the same quiz show at the same time of day. 
The guard’s question caught him off guard: the central committee did 
not require that the political prisoners must watch the same television 
programmes. Yet there was perhaps no need for a requirement as such. 
The institution of comradeship had already garnered the prisoners’ 
preferences not only toward particular texts, but also toward particular 
leisure activities.
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Beside the production of knowledge and practice, discussion 
sessions run by senior prisoners exemplify how to address one another, 
share a space together and forge an egalitarian community of comrades. 
As a way of cultivating the ethics of comradeship, the central committee 
holds monthly meetings called ‘platform’. In these each prisoner is 
asked to make reflections on  himself –  more commonly known as self- 
criticism –  by disclosing his limitations and weaknesses in living up to the 
standards of ethical life. The platform is then opened for other prisoners 
to assess whether their comrade is able to put in practice the theory he 
endorses, abandoning any ‘backward’ or ‘superstitious’ beliefs, avoiding 
degenerate bourgeois behaviour and committing himself fully to the 
Kurdish movement. As is noted in the writings of former prisoners, these 
platform meetings are both a source of humour for the misunderstand-
ings that the notion of self- criticism generates and a source of stress for 
the punitive action that follows should the prisoner be found guilty by his 
comrades of breaking tacit rules of the political ward (Masdar 2007).7 
Political prisoners set up communes to redistribute equally 
whatever  resources they have in prison. The commune committee 
assigns a representative to each ward for the purchase, storage and usage 
of their needs. Some of these needs would be met by the prisoners’ family 
members who send clothes, cigarettes, food and money; others receive 
help from comrades outside prison. Not all families can afford to make 
a contribution to the commune budget given the wide range of income 
groups they come from: some are large landowners, businesspeople or 
civil servants, while others are peasants, manual workers or unemployed. 
A representative of the commune oversees the allocation of resources to 
ensure that the needs of those without any familial support be met. 
Pedagogical training and communal practices facilitate the 
cultivation of revolutionary subjectivity within the institution of 
comradeship as a regulatory mechanism that governs the space between 
the self and the others. Not everyone in the political wards would be 
as susceptible to subjectification as Yılmaz, however. If Yılmaz’s story 
bears witness to the institution’s success, the accounts of other political 
prisoners more resistant to the modernist ideals of the Kurdish movement 
illustrate its limits. 
Let me recount one of these stories, told to me by a former 
commune representative. Despite the efforts that he and other members 
of the education and the commune committee made, Mehemmed, an 
elderly Kurd, refused to share his belongings with the commune in the 
ward. On a family visit day Mehemmed returned to the ward once again 
with a large package of new items. Having been fed up by Mehemmed’s 
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uncompromising attitude, the commune representative approached 
the older man directly to clarify that commune rules were binding 
for everyone. The commune had expropriated personal belongings of 
everyone except his. Mehemmed finally gave up in exasperation and 
handed over his package with some reservation. If his then personal 
belongings now belonged to the commune, he wanted to have a say 
on how they would be redistributed. To the commune representative’s 
surprise, he then made a proposition. ‘I have two wives. If the commune 
is willing, you can take my older wife, but I am keeping the younger one 
to myself.’ 
During the interviews with former prisoners, I recorded several 
stories similar to that of Mehemmed, revolving around the figure of an 
elderly man depicted as the symbol of tribal and patriarchal culture. 
Narrated in a humorous tone, the former prisoners explained that they 
were responsible for dismantling this ‘counter- revolutionary’ culture to 
make sure that political prisoners would become the right subjects of 
revolutionary action; they should leave behind their ‘previous’ selves 
to be born into the egalitarian life of comrades. While the education 
committee teaches the why of this self- transformation, the commune 
committee shows the how. Such egalitarian life is possible only if political 
prisoners comply with the rules of comradeship; otherwise, they would 
either be the object of jokes such as Mehemmed or, worse, the subject 
of exclusion. It is through the lens of this institution that Yılmaz and his 
comrades can perceive the relationship among common criminals to 
be a forced union of self- centered and manipulative individuals, while 
defining theirs as egalitarian comradeship. 
Social friendship
At a court hearing held in 2012, the public prosecutor presented the 
Kurdish political prisoner Tolhildan with a tapped phone conversa-
tion as evidence of his membership in the armed branch of the Kurdish 
movement. Not only did the content of his conversation support this 
charge, the public prosecutor argued, but so did the form of address 
he used when talking to other people on the phone. ‘Heval (friend) is a 
term commonly used among the PKK members to address each other,’ 
he observed. The judge leaned toward Tolhildan’s file and began to 
read the transcript of that conversation. Shortly afterwards Tolhildan 
interrupted the judge on the grounds that including that conversation 
in his file violated his right to privacy. ‘That was a conversation between 
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me and my social friend.’8 The judge glanced over the conversation and 
agreed to skip it. Yet the awkward term ‘social friend’ raised eyebrows 
among other prisoners in the room. Who did he count as a social friend 
if not his comrades with whom he shared the same ward? How private is 
one’s privacy in a revolutionary movement where each member’s life is 
immersed in that of the other? 
The friendship developed by Kurdish political prisoners resembles 
the comradeship in other revolutionary organisations that disavow the 
private in order to form a public in which solidarity is established across 
urban–rural, peasant–worker and elite–subaltern populations (Gürbilek 
2016). This utopian ideal of dismantling the public–private divide can 
easily become a dystopia in the hands of totalitarian regimes controlling 
not only how one participates in public but also how one relates to 
another in private (Arendt 1968; Yurchak 2008). Although the prison 
life of Kurdish political prisoners where the personal is denounced in 
the name of the political does carry this dystopic potential, I propose 
to consider the distinction between public and private not in absolute 
terms, but rather in terms of degrees of privacy that prisoners may share. 
I do so by paying attention to the regions of intimacy that they develop 
from within the institution of comradeship.
In their oft- cited article ‘Sex in Public’, Lauren Berlant and Michael 
Warner argue that intimacy is mediated publicly as it constitutes the 
‘endlessly cited elsewhere of political public discourse’ (1998, 553). 
Reflecting on the Habermasian account of public sphere, Berlant (1998) 
notes that intimacy belongs to neither the public nor the private realm; 
it rather migrates between the two by generating collective intimacies in 
rationalised and institutionalised publics and intersubjective intimacies 
in affectively- constituted worlds. Intimacy, thus, has the potential both to 
stabilise and to disrupt particular forms of knowledge and practice. The 
institution of comradeship produces cultural intimacy among prisoners 
who participate in the same daily activities, hold regular reading and 
discussion sessions and form affectively- charged platforms to criticise 
oneself in the presence of others. Departing from this kind of intimacy 
shared in public, the ‘social friendship’ referred to in Tolhildan’s account 
takes us to another sphere of  intimacy –  one whose disclosure in public 
may produce shame. 
The Kurdish movement’s incorporation of heval, the Kurmanji word 
for friend, into its revolutionary vocabulary leaves some ambivalence 
with regard to the level of intimacy folded into the prisoners’ friendship. 
Heval, depending on the context in which it is used, denotes comrade, 
lover or confidant. When two prisoners call each other heval, instead of 
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using proper names, kinship terms or honorific titles, it incites the kind 
of formality and solidarity that is generally associated with ‘comrade’ 
and that creates both intimate equality and formal distance at the same 
time. As a form of address it enables prisoners to maintain verbal egali-
tarianism, establishing equality and solidarity between an addressee and 
addresser who might otherwise be in a superior–subordinate position 
(Keane 2016). With the erasure of all identifiers from conversation, 
heval also enables prisoners to establish formal enough interaction to 
give and receive commands. Despite this semiotic resemblance of heval 
to comrade, it still retains less formal aspects of friendship (love and 
intimacy) which may be evoked when talking about rather than talking 
to a friend, as was done by Tolhildan in the court. 
In a highly structured space such as political wards, I argue that 
heval hides within itself different modalities of mahremiyet (intimacy); 
this is achieved both despite and because of the rules of prison adminis-
tration and the institution of comradeship. Derived from the Arabic root 
h-r-m, mahrem (intimate), it is semiotically tied to other terms with the 
same root: harem (private space) and haram (forbidden). The degree 
of intimacy denoted by mahrem is contingent upon the demarcation of 
a private space which strangers are forbidden to enter. Mahremiyet is 
a regulatory mechanism that creates boundaries between spaces and 
individuals and within the body of the individual (Sehlikoğlu 2016, 
146).9 Neither the boundaries of this private space nor those forbidden 
from it are fixed; they depend on the ways in which the self is made to 
relate to an individual’s body and to the others. 
In contrast to my one- to- one interviews with former prisoners who 
narrated their prison experiences either in the melancholic genre of 
good old days or in the genre of tragedy, the stories that unfolded during 
my casual conversations with groups of two or more former prisoners 
revolved around the question of how they endured the everyday diffi-
culties of prison life. It was neither the spectacular prison uprisings nor 
the infamous prison operations that coloured such conversations. One 
particular conversation I had with Tolhildan, whose court trial I have 
been observing since 2009, and his former prison friend Kasım was 
striking in showing how the mundane practices of torture at once violated 
the prisoners’ sense of intimacy and yet facilitated intimate connections 
between the self and the others. If some of these violent events ended 
up breaking down prisoners and producing ‘traitors’, in opposition to 
which Kurdish prisoners draw the boundaries of their friendship, others 
resulted in the formation of a ‘we’ – part of but irreducible to the prisoner 
population called the political. 
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Tolhildan and Kasım had been apprehended around the same time 
and stayed in the same prison throughout the 1990s. Upon their release 
in the early 2000s, Tolhildan decided to continue working as a profes-
sional revolutionary while Kasım decided to complete his interrupted 
higher education in literature; he then found a job as a translator. In 
the winter of 2018 Tolhildan invited me and Kasım to his apartment for 
a lunch. While Tolhildan was preparing the meal, Kasım and I chatted 
about how they had first met. Kasım recalled that when Tolhildan was 
brought to prison in 1992 he still had open wounds and a few bullets 
in his  body –  yet was nonetheless taken directly to a torture chamber. 
With evident discomfort, Tolhildan corrected Kasım: he had not been the 
only one tortured and the entire prison had served as a torture chamber, 
especially from 1993 to 1994. ‘We saw the worst kind of torture,’ he 
added, emphasising that the pronoun of the tortured subject was not the 
first person singular ‘I’ but the first person plural ‘we’, and thus indexing 
himself and many others whose bodies were maimed in that prison.10
As the conversation took these two men back to the prison days, 
they confirmed with each other the names of other prisoners who 
had stayed in their ward, exchanging brief notes about their current 
whereabouts. The list was so long that I could not help but ask how 
they could still remember those who were no longer their ‘comrades’ in 
the literal  sense –  meaning that they no longer worked for the Kurdish 
movement. Kasım admitted that it was impossible for him not remember 
 them –  his memories of those friends were stuck to his skin. Tolhildan 
agreed with Kasım’s comment, then went on to explain in more detail. 
The friends with whom you were strip- searched and tortured have 
a qualitatively different place in your life. We had seen each other in 
a condition that no one else, neither our parents nor our wives, ever 
could. We saw each other’s utmost intimate selves (Birbirimizin en 
mahremini gördük).
What is it that is seen when one sees one’s friend stripped naked 
before the torturers? On the one hand, the tortured body attests to 
one’s existential vulnerability in the face of physical violence. Before 
and beyond the infliction of pain, torture puts the body at the risk of 
betrayal as the tortured subject loses sovereignty over his own body 
(Al- Mohammad 2007; Talebi 2011). This loss of sovereignty manifests 
itself in various ways, one of them being forced sexual intercourse 
between male prisoners in political wards. On the other hand, the one 
who is forced to be present at the torture of the other experiences the 
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act of seeing the other in pain as being in pain himself. Reflecting on 
this experience, Tolhildan recalled that once the prison guards burned 
the pubic hair of a prisoner in his ward. As he and other captives were 
watching that friend in pain, his hand inadvertently moved to his own 
pubic hair as if his was also on fire. What Tolhildan counts in this instance 
as torture is his body’s simultaneous susceptibility to pain and inability to 
act when the torturer acts on the other’s body. 
Ethnographic accounts of prisons from Northern Ireland to Turkey 
to Palestine show how the culmination of such instances of oppression 
incites large- scale prison uprisings (Aretxaga 1995; Bargu 2016; 
Feldman 1991; Nashif 2008). However, what they have not highlighted 
so well is that the comradeship between these prisoners may turn into 
social/non- political friendship (heval in its sense as confidant) when 
prisoners are made to witness their mutually constitutive bodily vulner-
abilities. Collective torture entails the forced inclusion of the others in 
the mahrem of the self. This entrance would constitute a grave violation, 
as it did regarding the perpetrators, if the other has not become a part of 
the self who could see and feel the vulnerability of his own body through 
that of the other. Instead of closing in on itself, pain under these circum-
stances extends by moving beyond the limits of one’s body (cf. Daniel 
1996; Scarry 1985). It produces new forms of intimacy.
The act of seeing and being tortured can be considered ‘a source of 
external embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with their 
assurance of common sociality’ (Herzfeld 2005, 3).11 The grammar of 
this sociality is the first person plural, but not because torture annihilates 
the self or renders personal experience generalisable. It is rather because 
the boundaries of the body are extended to embrace the other’s presence 
within the intimacy of the self. If formality is a constitutive aspect 
of solidarity among comrades in revolutionary movements, intimacy 
is its counterpart. Without this it would be hard to understand how 
these prisoners come to stand together against the violence of prison 
administrations. 
The forced violation of mahremiyet is not the only way of creating 
private spaces in which new layers of intimacy emerge from within the 
institution of comradeship. The space in between bodies of the self and of 
others is invested with the potential for intimate relations unconstrained 
by the ethics of comradeship. Political prisoners actively work on that 
space through collusion in order to experience the plurality of their 
existence as a source of mutual enjoyment (Kreil 2016). 
The collusion practised for fun is not the same as collusion with 
prison administrations for reducing prison sentences or for living in 
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better prison conditions. Far from serving as a means to an end, it is an 
end in itself: a temporary enjoyment of social friendship; an oasis in the 
desert which disappears as quickly as it appears. Equally importantly, it is 
not an individual act against the commune, like that of Mehemmed, but 
rather a collective act of the commune against itself. Former prisoners 
explained, with discernible excitement in their voices, that the yard, the 
cell and the breakfast table could all transfigure into a private space of 
social friendship when they loosened the formal ties of comrade ship. Let 
me elaborate on this point with the help of an account by a former pris-
oner, Farqin. It describes his collusion with his cellmates during a leisure 
activity. 
Prison guards open the wards’ doors for recreational activity on a 
daily basis. Prisoners spend this time in a square- shaped yard enclosed by 
prison walls 5 metres in length, preventing them from seeing other yards 
and the outside world. Except for weekly volleyball tournaments, the 
common activity undertaken at this time is ‘volta’ [Latin: voluta], which 
literally means ‘to revolve’. It involves walking on a straight line from 
one side to the other with high tempo and turning around approximately 
every ten steps. During this walk, prisoners take part in groups of two or 
three, pacing back and forth across the yard. 
As someone who has spent half of his life in prison, Farqin explained 
that he felt annoyed by revolving and repeating the same activity over 
and over again. One day he proposed to his comrades in the ward that 
they should change this routine. Instead of walking as if they were in 
military training, he wanted for once to walk with the others leisurely, 
while eating sunflower seeds that they had stored in the cabinets. His 
comrades agreed, with the proviso that no one would mention this 
break from the norm to anyone outside their ward. Farqin recalled that 
moment of change. ‘As we spit the shells of sunflower seeds on the yard 
floor, we felt like we were no longer in prison.’
Other examples of playful collusion include fermenting pome-
granate juice with bread yeast to make wine, making soil out of used tea 
leaves to grow plants and skipping reading sessions to sing songs across 
prison wards. One may wonder if these temporary acts of collusion 
have any political significance at all. Notwithstanding its ephemerality, 
the pleasure of cracking sunflower seeds in the yard opened a space 
for Farqin and other prisoners playfully to release their bodies from 
the constraints and regulations of prison life and to feel momentarily 
‘free’. The disclosure of this collusion to the central committee or to the 
internal coordination could have created trouble, based on the grounds 
that Farqin had pushed against the ethics of comradeship by carving 
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out a space for the non- political. In order to avoid criticism, he and his 
comrades had therefore collected all the seeds dispersed around the yards 
by the end of their break. With the removal of the seeds from the ground, 
the oasis was removed from the desert world of prison. Experienced in 
the intimacy of confidants, this freedom is not necessarily world- making 
in the Arendtian sense, but is rather conducive to sustaining the existent 
world in prison. 
The multiple boundaries drawn by different levels of intimacy 
entailed in comradeship and social friendship enable prisoners to share 
with confidants their differently distributed vulnerabilities without being 
purged from the institution of comradeship. Some endure separation from 
their loved ones, others suffer from severe health problems, yet others 
feel intimidated by the revolutionary hierarchy. The acknowledgement 
of vulnerability does not necessarily conflict with the masculine image 
of revolutionary subject standing against the prison  administration –  and 
by extension against the state. It rather enables the prisoners to keep 
that image intact on the stage of law by healing the wounds of each 
other in ‘private’ spaces where life is embraced in its messiness. Put 
differently, social friendship is interwoven with collective experiences of 
pain, collusion and fun whose disclosure to strangers would be a grave 
violation of mahrem. 
The wounds of the body may not always be healed by the creation 
of intimate social spaces. Upon his release from prison, Kasım could not 
continue to work as a professional revolutionary. The revolution has 
lasted too long, he said, for his body to sustain the passion for action. 
When I met Kasım, he was visiting Tolhildan merely as a social friend 
to discuss how to find a proper prosthetic limb to take the place of his 
lower leg; the amputation had been carried out in the mountains. If the 
amputated limb was a reminder of what he had sacrificed to the revolu-
tionary struggle, Tolhildan served for Kasım as the reminder of why he 
had engaged in that struggle in the first place. 
Conclusion: death of dissent? 
At the very end of The Nights of Execution in Sinop, Yılmaz Sezgin’s 
memoir takes an unexpected turn. He attempts to commit suicide by 
hanging himself in a prison cell after witnessing the suicide attempt of 
his comrade and confidant, the brother- like figure of Hamza. Yılmaz was 
introduced to the Kurdish movement by Hamza when the former was a 
shepherd and the latter a guerrilla fighter. They ended up in the same 
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prison in Sinop where Hamza took Yılmaz to his political ward to ‘protect’ 
and ‘educate’ the then young man, sentenced to death for helping him 
in the mountains. Despite the fear of execution that lingered over both 
their heads, Hamza convinced Yılmaz to fight against the daunting 
effect of the death sentence by immersing himself into the institution 
of comradeship. Indeed, until the last section Yılmaz’s entire memoir 
is a testimony of the will to life that he situates at the heart of dissident 
politics. If the state exercises necropower not only by killing but also by 
condemning political prisoners to an endless wait for death,  Yılmaz –  in 
concert with Hamza and other  prisoners –  chose to participate in the 
daily activities of comradeship as if they would never die. In contrast to 
his passion for life, derived from the space in between the self and the 
others, the last section of Yılmaz’s memoir, as I read it, defines the limits 
of dissident politics within the limits of friendship. 
Prior to his suicide attempt, Hamza talked to Yılmaz one last time. 
He wished to explain the reason behind his decision as a politically 
motivated one, protesting against the administration’s mistreatment of 
political prisoners. As a senior prisoner, he decided to take up the respon-
sibility to end the mistreatment by taking his life, while delegating to 
Yılmaz the responsibility to witness his death and tell his story to others. 
The contradictory feelings that occupied Yılmaz’s mind, which the author 
shares with the reader with an incisive tone, illustrate the impossibility 
of the political in isolation. Reflecting on his conversation with Hamza, 
Yılmaz writes, ‘In our prison cell we were no longer two individuals at 
that moment […]. Hamza has become me, or I have become Hamza. He 
was going to hang me together with himself’ (Sezgin 2014, 152). Yılmaz 
could no longer see the point in embracing life or fighting for the Kurdish 
cause when Hamza tightened the rope around his neck and kicked the 
chair underneath his feet. Would he be able to carry Hamza’s message 
forward? Pushed to the limits of madness, Yılmaz groaned with pain and 
finally hung himself too. His passion for dissident politics died out with 
the presumed death of Hamza. 
By the end of the memoir, we learn that the suicide attempts of 
neither comrade succeeded. Even though Yılmaz’s strong bonding with 
Hamza almost killed him, their friendship made the writing of The 
Nights of Execution in Sinop possible. Certainly Yılmaz would not have 
been able to write the memoir if he had not spent his prison life with 
comrades who taught him how to read and write, to develop a taste for 
literature and to constitute himself as a revolutionary subject. Yet the 
institution of comradeship that equips political prisoners with the faculty 
of reason needs other regions of intimacy, which Hamza offered to 
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Yılmaz, for the endurance of passion and political action. Comradeship 
and social friendship refer to the different regions of intimacy which 
cannot be subsumed under one or the other, although they are intimately 
connected. 
This chapter has examined the institutions established in prison 
to draw and maintain the boundaries of politics. In it I have argued that 
dissident politics are mobilised off stage in the space between the self 
and  others –  tied to each other by ethics, body and affect. It examined 
prison life through the lens of the ethics of comradeship that cultivates 
self- discipline while questioning what exceeds it, by paying attention 
to the private spaces produced through the acknowledgement of bodily 
vulnerabilities and need for mutual enjoyment. Instead of juxtaposing 
these two aspects of relatedness, this chapter has contended that political 
and non- political friendship weave the prisoners together to sustain and 
substantiate the friend–enemy distinction. Departing from the accounts 
of dissent that concentrate on the courage of individuals who in isolation 
from others choose to speak truth to power, this chapter showed that 
it is the ‘in-between spaces’ produced by friendship that not only make 
dissent possible in prisons, but also work against it. It argued that political 
prisoners commit to the Kurdish cause by committing themselves to their 
prison  friends –  who at times strengthen each other’s will to life and on 
other occasions carry one another to the edge of death. In relations of 
friendship, the revolutionary project is made both possible and remains 
necessarily incomplete.
Notes
 1 I consider comradeship a social institution with a series of norms shared and reproduced by 
political prisoners. 
 2 Prison wards are further separated based on gender. The central focus of this chapter is 
friendship among male political prisoners. A significant number of Kurdish female dissidents 
are incarcerated in political wards, but there are very few prison memoirs published by these 
dissidents. This is the topic of discussion of another paper. 
 3 Candea’s interlocutors, for example, accord with thinkers such as Oakeshott and Weber when 
delineating the boundaries of politics which they separate from the education system. Based 
on his ethnographic study of bilingual teaching in Corsica, Candea asserts that schoolteachers 
forge a productive dualism between the French education system and the Corsican nationalist 
politics. This enables them to translate one into the other and reconfigure the boundary 
between the two.
 4 The rift separating the two is so deep that any expression of sympathy toward the PKK is 
considered by the judiciary to be a sign of treason to the Turkish state. As each undermines the 
legitimacy of the other, what one calls an ‘anti- colonial struggle’ is identified by the other as 
‘terrorism’.
 5 Some state officers, such as the former directorate of the Police Intelligence Service Hanefi 
Avcı (2010), further claim that the Kurdish captives adhere to the rules of the PKK more strictly 
than the Kurdish guerrillas in mountains.
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 6 Seniority is not determined by age, but by status in the organisational hierarchy of the Kurdish 
movement.
 7 Depending on the issue of concern, such punishment ranges from a ban on recreational 
activities to expulsion from the ward.
 8 Note that the case files of this kind comprise numerous conversations tapped over a long 
period of time. The captives often dispute the inclusion of certain conversations in the file, 
arguing that some of them have nothing to do with the case. 
 9 In her work on Islamicate culture of mahremiyet, Sertaç Sehlikoğlu (2015; 2016) emphasises 
that the concept cannot be translated directly into English as it contains multiple meanings, 
among them privacy, secrecy and domesticity.
10 Counting the number of days when they were not on a hunger strike, both men refrained from 
describing the methods of torture the prison administration used in retaliation. As a way of 
making their experience commensurable, however, they compared their prison experience 
with those who had been held in the Diyarbakır Military Prison during the 1980s. This prison 
has come to be known as a powerful symbol of the Turkish state’s cruelty in the collective 
memory of the Kurds. They finetuned the comparison not by repeating what had happened in 
Diyarbakır, but by noting what had not happened in their prison: ‘The only difference was that 
we were not forced to eat excrement’.
11 In his influential work on nation- states, Michael Herzfeld offers the term ‘cultural intimacy’ as 
an antidote to the formalism of cultural nationalism (2005, 14).
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Chapter 5
Intimate commitments: 
friends, comrades and family in the 
life of one Sri Lankan activist
Harini Amarasuriya and Jonathan Spencer
Colombo, 24 February 2018
Round the open casket, family members hold open bibles, while a 
Catholic priest holds forth about today’s occasion.1 An elderly man 
stands stiffly upright close to the body, sobbing softly throughout. The 
man in the casket is Joe Seneviratne, veteran journalist and activist. The 
grieving family members are heavily outnumbered by a crowd of Joe’s 
old friends and comrades. Many of the comrades show signs of irritation 
as the priest makes one final, rather drawn out attempt to reclaim Joe 
for the mother Church. It is a humid afternoon and, despite the ceiling 
fans in the funeral home, it is uncomfortably hot. Across the room from 
the casket there is a growing hubbub of conversation as mourners take 
the opportunity to catch up on news and to swap stories of their dead 
comrade.
Eventually the priest closes his bible with a final, teeth- gleaming 
smile. The coffin is closed and lifted by a team of pall- bearers who 
carry it to a hearse. The hearse crosses the busy highway bordering the 
cemetery, followed by a long stream of mourners – bringing the Saturday 
afternoon traffic to a halt in both directions. We cross the cemetery and 
walk past the memorials to assassinated politicians and the graves of 
the war dead, finally arriving at the crematorium on the far side. Here 
the coffin is reopened for a final round of farewells. Family members 
cluster at one end with the priest. The comrades gather at the other 
end. A young woman and a slightly older man take charge of this part of 
the proceedings, introducing a sequence of speakers, but not speaking 
themselves. Remember them: they will return at the very end of this 
chapter. 
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The first person to speak holds up a letter from the President, 
Maithripala Sirisena. The letter speaks of Joe as a media personality, but 
also as a peace activist. It dwells briefly on his role as a founder member 
of the Movement for Inter- racial Justice and Equality (MIRJE) in the late 
1970s. Someone whispers ‘I’m sure the person reading this, rather than 
the President, actually wrote the  letter –  but he does know what he’s 
talking about’. The next speaker is a regional politician from Kandy and 
former politburo member of the Sri Lankan Communist Party. He too 
mentions MIRJE and praises Joe for his close relations to minorities, his 
peace work, his humanism and his commitment to revolution.
The next speaker is the first to do so in English. He is Varadaraja 
Perumal, former leader of the Tamil group Eelam People’s Revolutionary 
Liberation Front (EPRLF). For a brief period in the late 1980s Perumal 
was Chief Minister in the newly created North East Provincial Council, 
the devolved body set up in 1988 as part of the Indian imposed peace 
deal. Joe had been a minister in his administration, along with other 
Sinhala radicals looking for an opportunity to build an alliance with the 
more left- wing strains of the Tamil nationalist movement. In 1990, in a 
final gesture, Perumal declared independence in the North and East of 
the island, just as the Colombo government closed down his administra-
tion. Shortly afterwards 12 of his comrades in the EPRLF leadership were 
wiped out in a massacre by their rivals, the LTTE, in South India. Perumal 
talks softly and emotionally about Joe’s role as a minister, but he also 
brings a message from his own wider family, emphasising how close they 
were to Joe and how fond they were of him.
Next up is Ram Manikkalingam. The MIT- educated son of a 
former Ambassador, Manikkalingam is today wearing the white versti 
and cloth of a pious Tamil mourner. He starts by apologising for his 
broken Sinhala, then launches into a story which he will use to illustrate 
Joe’s qualities. It comes from a moment in the mid- 1980s when he was 
imprisoned with Joe under the draconian provisions of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act. Manikkalingam was one of three young men imprisoned 
together, all in their 20s; Joe, the fourth member of the group, was by 
then in his 40s. Every morning the prisoners were let out of their cells to 
face a difficult choice. If they turned in one direction they could line up 
for  food –  bread and pol sambol; if they turned the other way they could 
find water and bathe. There was never time to do both. Every day Joe 
would line up for food for all four of them, to allow the others a chance to 
bathe. He’d hand over the food before taking his turn to bathe. When he 
returned, every day, they would have eaten almost all the food without 
him. Joe would complain, but the next day he would line up in the food 
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queue and share everything with them just the same. That is the kind of 
man he was. 
Ram then turned to face Joe’s son, who had returned from his 
home in the US for the funeral. He explained that he wanted to thank 
Joe’s family for giving him to us. ‘I know Joe was not always able to be a 
good father or a good husband. But we had this great comrade, this great 
revolutionary, this great humanist. So we want to thank the family for 
this gift.’ 
Between the outside speakers, one of Joe’s brothers speaks briefly 
and emotionally. Then Dayapala Thiranagama, widower of the assassi-
nated Tamil human rights activist Rajani Thiranagama, speaks softly, and 
again emotionally, about his lost comrade. He stresses the violent years 
in which they had worked together, when their lives were constantly 
under threat. For long periods they had to live underground, sharing a 
room with three or four comrades. Whenever one of them had to leave 
the house, the others could not be sure if they would meet again. 
Then it is time to take the coffin into the crematorium proper, with 
close family in attendance. The crowd breaks up. 
All of the speeches on this day shared a set of key words. Joe was 
constantly spoken of as ‘Joe sahodaruyo’ (brother Joe); one speaker, in 
English (and apparently unaware of the history of the term in the anglo-
phone left outside Sri Lanka) called him ‘Uncle Joe’. He was described 
as kind, generous and committed. The speeches were peppered with 
references to ‘love’ (adaraya) – Joe’s love, others’ love of Joe. And one 
word stands out: again and again, Joe is described as a great manusiya, a 
Sinhala word most easily translated as ‘humanist’.
Histories of post-colonial dissent
We will return to Joe Seneviratne, and what we can learn from his life, 
shortly. In particular, we draw on Joe’s own account of his life to address 
one of the themes explored in chapter 1: how do intimate relations both 
work against and produce the conditions of dissent? First, however, 
we have to provide a bit of context for this chapter. Together with 
Sidharthan Maunaguru we have been working on a longer- term project, 
chronicling a history of dissent in Sri Lanka from the 1960s to the end of 
the civil war in 2009. We have concentrated especially on those leftists 
who challenged the state, while rejecting the rival ethnonationalisms, 
Sinhala and Tamil, which fuelled two insurrections in the South of the 
country and nearly three decades of civil war in the North and East. 
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Leftists such as Joe Seneviratne and his comrades, and such as the Tamil 
militants described in chapter 7.
Those speeches at Joe’s funeral allow us to sketch in a first round of 
context. Joe lived through some very violent times indeed. He was part 
of a generation which came of political age in the  1960s –  a decade in 
which the Old Left- wing parties in Sri Lanka, with their patrician leaders 
and proletarian bases, were steadily losing their political grip. The 
LSSP and CP joined Mrs Bandaranaike’s coalition government in 1964. 
The ostensibly Trotskyist LSSP split as a result, with the mainstream 
party expelled from the Fourth International for its apostasy in joining 
a bourgeois government. The CP also suffered its own split in the 
wake of the Sino–Soviet divide, with a rival Peking Wing party, led by 
Shanmugathasan, emerging in 1964. 
This was also a decade in which young people found their political 
voice, especially in and around the campuses of the country’s relatively 
young university system. Needless to say, faced with a choice between 
the ‘revisionist’ Old Left and the ‘revolutionary’ Peking Wing, young 
radicals gravitated to the latter. Their tactics and aspirations also 
changed. While the Old Left had combined trade union activism with 
parliamentary politics, the young were increasingly attracted by the 
example of the Cuban revolution. Here a political transformation was 
conceived as a great adventure, fuelled by a small band of young, 
would- be guerrillas who took to the hills to build a movement from the 
periphery. Capturing state power by violent force was not merely seen 
as a feasible strategy; for many of this generation it attained a certain 
self- evident quality.2 
The most important political figure to emerge from the rubble of the 
1960s splits was a man called Rohan Wijeweera. A lifelong militant, he saw 
his scholarship to Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow rescinded when 
he threw himself behind the Peking Wing after the 1964 split in the Ceylon 
Communist Party. By the late 1960s he was becoming more and more of a 
national political figure, leading a new group called the Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP) or People’s Liberation Front. In 1971, with Wijeweera 
and many of the central committee members already under detention, 
the JVP launched a sudden and quixotic attack on state power. Across 
the Sinhala South of the island, young rebels attacked police stations and 
attempted bank robberies in an attempt to get the resources and matériel 
they needed for their revolutionary struggle. The state responded with a 
wave of measured brutality. Wijeweera and the party leadership were put 
on trial and sentenced to long periods of hard labour.3
Wijeweera was a charismatic speaker and carefully cultivated his 
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own image; his long hair and latterly beard were modelled, it seems, 
on Che Guevara. But new tensions accompanied the emergence of the 
JVP. One of Wijeweera’s key messages was a warning against ‘Indian 
expansionism’ – a line ostensibly derived from the Indo- China War of 
1962, which happened to mesh seamlessly with the dominant majori-
tarian nationalism of the Sinhalese Buddhist community that provided 
his popular base. Some of Wijeweera’s political allies in and around the 
Peking Wing detected an undercurrent of nationalist racism as early as 
the mid- 1960s, and kept their distance from his JVP. That undercurrent 
was to grow into a central part of the JVP platform in the late 1970s, 
when the leaders were released from prison and the JVP relaunched itself 
as a more conventional party with parliamentary aspirations. 
In 1983 the JVP was one of three left- wing groups falsely blamed 
for organising the anti- Tamil riots which precipitated the country’s 
descent into full civil war. The leadership went underground and in the 
second half of the 1980s orchestrated a second ferocious assault on state 
power. This time of insurgency and counter- insurgency is still simply 
remembered as bheeshanaya – ‘the Terror’ – in Sinhala: thousands of 
insurgents were killed and thousands more detained. The stimulus for 
this was the 1987 peace deal that India had forced on the government 
and the LTTE. While the LTTE fought Indian troops in the North and 
the East, the JVP attacked government politicians, police and army, as 
well as those on the left deemed insufficiently patriotic because of their 
support for Tamil rights and their support for the Indian peace deal. 
People, in short, like Joe and his comrades at the cemetery.4
In the Tamil- speaking North and East of the island, a symmetrical 
story unfolded. Here young radicals aligned with the Peking Wing were 
heavily involved in challenges to high caste dominance. In the 1970s 
this kind of radical energy was increasingly diverted into the cause 
of Tamil separatism. From the mid- 1970s a range of small militant 
groups emerged. All shared a vision of Tamil self- determination, to be 
achieved by a violent assault on the state and its representatives, but 
they differed in the extent to which the nationalist vision was subordi-
nated to other more conventional leftist goals.5 The group that was to 
achieve domination by the mid- 1980s, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE), were only peripherally concerned with Old Left issues, in 
comparison to their whole- hearted attachment to the cause of separatism 
and their symbolically dense use of tactics such as suicide bombing to 
achieve it. Unlike Wijeweera, the LTTE’s charismatic leader Prabhakaran 
had no roots in the Old Left; his early fame was based on daring assas-
sinations and a carefully cultivated aura of total command.6 
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The political context for our project is thus a paradoxical mixture 
of freedom and constraint. The early 1960s splits in the Old Left had 
opened space for a new generation of radicals with visions of imminent 
revolution. Their political experiments were of a piece with other 
experiments in film, music, drama and art. The campuses in Colombo, 
Peradeniya and, from the early 1970s, Moratuwa and Jaffna became sites 
of freedom for the first generation of students to leave home for higher 
education. But the attraction of violence was also a source of constraint. 
By the mid- 1980s new movements such as the LTTE and the JVP often 
seemed to favour violence as an end in itself, thereby losing sight of 
other ideas of social transformation. Meanwhile rival ethnonationalisms, 
both Sinhala and Tamil, steadily closed down the political possibilities 
for would- be radicals. The condemnation of ‘traitors’ was invoked by 
both the LTTE and the JVP to excuse the silencing of alternative  voices – 
 especially those, like Joe’s, which rejected ethnic division as the basis for 
a sane radical politics (cf. Thiranagama 2010).
In setting out this context for our project we have emphasised 
the story of the left and its splits in the 1960s because that is the most 
relevant context for Joe’s story. In our broader project we are also 
charting the impact of feminism from the 1970s to the 1990s (and its 
limited presence in the micropolitics of personal relations on the left), 
and also the important contribution of radical Christians, operating in 
the space opened up by Vatican II and the arguments of Latin American 
and Asian liberation theologians. In all three cases a kind of social syntax 
of breaks and solidarities operates as the condition of possibility for 
new kinds of activism and for attempts at creating new kinds of people. 
So, while one point of our project is simply to document and preserve 
a record of remarkable lives lived under extreme political conditions, 
we are also concerned to explore what these very particular, knotty, 
entangled tales can tell us about broader political and ethical questions. 
We return to the question of what that bigger set of questions might be at 
the end of this chapter. 
Caught as we are in a disciplinary space between history and 
anthropology, we are also trying to balance different audience expec-
tations. Joe’s funeral itself, and the testimony given there, were pre- 
eminently public events. As will become apparent, Joe was very keen to 
have his stories recorded and made permanently available as a record, 
not least because of the political lessons that might still be gleaned from 
them. Standard ethnographic rules of anonymisation thus make little 
sense in this context. In what follows we draw on a series of interviews 
and conversations, conducted predominantly in Sinhala, with Harini 
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Amarasuriya. Joe’s interviews were spread across a number of sessions 
in 2017, not least because after the first session he would call Harini up 
to tell her about some missing detail or to ask for another meeting to 
continue his thread. We were just planning a further joint interview with 
him when we learned of his death. 
Joe Seneviratne: early life and political formation
Joe Seneviratne was born in June 1943, four years before Sri Lanka 
gained independence in February 1948. He is one of that generation 
of activists, as Jayadeva Uyangoda pointed out in a celebrated essay 20 
years ago, whose personal biography is coeval with the unruly biography 
of the independent nation- state known as Ceylon until 1972 and subse-
quently as Sri Lanka (Uyangoda 1997). Joe’s political roots extend into 
the left politics of the early and mid- 1960s.
I was aware of injustice from my school days, injustice about 
finance, student organisations, protests, beating, questioning 
religion, big problem. It was an urban school with children of all 
religions. We got punished, but that gave us courage. I was taken 
to Dematagoda police for trying to strike in school. I didn’t tell 
my father about the police. I was 15 or 16 years old. I read Soviet 
and Chinese literature; I read about Latin American experiences. 
These were inspirations: Che, Mao, their life stories. I read Maxim 
Gorky and Dostoevsky. I was influenced by literature, but was 
not exposed to Western literature because there were no transla-
tions.7 
As an A- level student at another school, he joined a Communist youth 
movement, participating in a Marxist Study Circle and testing the limits 
of his father’s domestic regime. There were splits in the home and splits 
in the Party.
There were all kinds of people from different levels. The classes 
went on till late. So there were conflicts with my family for not 
being at home. Once when I came home, my father had given my 
plate of rice to the dog, saying this dog is better than you. Then I 
challenged him. I said, my house is not here, but the whole world, 
and I left home. By then the CP had split. The party said they could 
train me and then they put me to work with trade unions. I went 
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with the Peking Wing, which was more revolutionary. The Soviet 
Wing was reformist.
Joe was by no means an uncritical member of his wing of the movement, 
working with other comrades on an internal critique of the party and 
its strategy. That critique was not well received, but in the process Joe 
learned an important lesson about his erstwhile comrade, the future JVP 
leader Rohan Wijeweera.
We started discussing against the policies of the party. People 
came from far away to discuss these issues. What is the basis for 
revolution in Sri Lanka? There was no basis. We were not going to 
abandon the workers, but the party had no idea to mobilise other 
classes. They had no critique of state power. They were talking 
about reforms. 
 72 Malwatta Road, Dehiwela. This was where some of us 
lived. We used to meet there and discuss till the early hours of 
the morning, and we prepared a document to hand over to the 
party’s central committee, an analysis of class etc. For the party 
to rethink its class strategy. Wijeweera was part of all this, but he 
refused to sign the document. Mayadunne, Nihal Dias, Senaka 
Bandara, Colin de Silva all signed. He said I don’t have to sign. 
We didn’t understand at that time. We were so foolish. We didn’t 
understand that kind of [in English] political manoeuvring. We saw 
the world in a very flat way, the relationships between people. We 
were sensitive. If I don’t trust you how can I do politics with you? 
Those friendships were very strong. How can we mistrust one of 
our comrades? Someone who had made so many sacrifices for the 
party? 
 The politburo rejected our document and the politburo filed 
a case against us… We were labelled as an anti- party faction. We 
became very vulnerable. This document is an anti- party document. 
Are you still standing by this document? We all said yes. Because 
this was a document we all had contributed to with our heart. [But 
Wijeweera said] I have nothing to do with this document. I have an 
entirely different contradiction with party policies. I remember that 
to this day. His words.
The authors of the critical document were duly expelled from the party. 
Joe lost the small income he received for party work with the trade 
union. Life was hard. On one occasion Wijeweera came to visit, with 
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enough money to buy them a modest meal. But what he said caused 
further disturbance.
Wijeweera once came. He asked, have you eaten? I said no. He 
pulled out everything from his pocket, collected all the money. We 
could eat a meal of thosai and string hoppers. Five stringhoppers 
for each person. That was huge for us. 
 On the walls were photographs of George V, the Queen, Subhas 
Chandra Bose, D.S.8 Wijeweera  said –  can you see? They are still 
more attached to India. They come here and exploit us and take 
everything to India. He showed his true colours. I was shocked. I 
wondered why he talked like that. We were all migrants. My father 
was also a migrant. My father came here with his brothers and 
joined the police. I have a Keralite connection. There are still people 
here who don’t talk about these connections. I may be foolish to say 
this openly.
Joe’s complicated ethnic origins were a source of pride to him. His older 
siblings took a Tamil Christian surname, his younger ones the Sinhala 
Seneviratne. Many years later, when Joe was drafted in as a key member 
of the Sudu Nelum movement, President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s 
grassroots peace campaign, in the mid- 1990s, he was accused by a hyper- 
nationalist MP of ‘ethnic impersonation’. ‘His real name is “Karatara 
Thomas George” and he is from Kerala, India’, his accuser declared.9 
Shortly after their meal Wijeweera was spotted at a rally protesting 
against proposed language rights for Tamils. This confirmed Joe’s 
suspicions: ‘Within him we saw that racist animal’.
Meanwhile, however, Joe was  stuck –  kicked out of the party with 
no work and nowhere to live, yet feeling unable to go home to his family. 
Disillusioned for a time with traditional left parties, he and his comrades 
concentrated on their studies. For a time Joe worked as a journalist, 
noting the reluctance of rising figures such as Rohan Wijeweera to join 
forces in support of Tamil rights. For a time he was homeless and nearly 
destitute, until he found work labouring in a quarry. 
After I was kicked out of the party, I did not know where to go. I 
could not go home because when I came I challenged my father, 
so I just could not go. So I walked to the Fort station. There I met a 
trade union friend of mine. I told him what happened to me, and he 
took me to his place, which was located in the slums. When I stayed 
there for a couple of days I realized that I was a burden on the 
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family. So I went in search of work after seeing an advertisement at 
the Chandrika Lake. I tried hard to find, but could not. Then I came 
across a job where I had to work at a quarry in Udawalawa.
At the quarry a sympathetic overseer saw how quickly Joe’s hands, 
unused to physical labour, broke up and moved him to a driving job. 
His story then moves between a succession of jobs, with stints of work 
as a trade union organiser with the railway workers and glimpses of the 
deteriorating political environment. In 1976 the independent union for 
which he was working led a successful strike on the railways.
They couldn’t find the  leaders –  we were underground. That was 
really successful. Because the left had gone into government 
coalition, people left those unions. So people joined our 
independent union. Everything was affected. That struggle went 
on for a month. They tried to take the railway drivers by force. We 
threatened to blow up the railway lines. That was the first time 
we contemplated a terrorist act! They were very  committed –  they 
were not Marxists. There was a guy  Ponnaperuma –  he would say 
I was his  hand –  he was the brain. He would say something and I 
would immediately write it  down –  that’s how I entered the trade 
union field.
Around this time Joe also met a new generation of activists, including 
the student leader Daya Pathirana, who would become the first victim 
of the JVP’s second insurrection in late 1986, and the complex figure of 
Dayan Jayatilleka (‘DJ’ at times in what follows). Son of the editor of the 
Daily News and would- be major Marxist theoretician, he was later acolyte 
and apologist for a series of authoritarian politicians from Ranasinghe 
Premadasa to Mahinda Rajapaksa.
I feel very sad when I think of Daya Pathirana. That was a real 
tragedy. They can’t be forgiven for that. How many JVPers lives 
have I saved? We didn’t want to take revenge. We had a value for 
human life. That is what I can’t  imagine –  what little value they 
had for human life. Wijeweera did  that –  his philosophy took him 
there. We couldn’t do  that –  we loved human life. That was the big 
difference between us. We didn’t want power at any cost. It was 
because of this attitude that among our comrades I was considered 
a  softie –  not suitable for revolution. Dayan Jayatilleka also had 
said that about me.
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These young activists broadened Joe’s political repertoire. He described 
a picaresque adventure in which contact was made with a group of anti- 
Khomeini rebels from Iran. The idea was to bring a ship from Galle in the 
far South of Sri Lanka to the Philippines. There it was to be filled with 
arms for the Sri Lankans and hashish for the Iranians.
Jayatilleka was the theoretician, I was the negotiator. We talked 
within our group. I said we came into this because of our love for 
 people –  not because we are bloodthirsty. Where is this stuff going? 
To destroy lives? How do we know that this Iranian Revolution 
would happen properly? From then on, they didn’t discuss 
revolution with me. I went to India and while I was away they 
planned a robbery. They got caught.
In these tales, Joe differentiates himself from some of his former comrades 
on two related axes. One is his reluctance to embrace violence without 
regard for the  consequences –  a position that put him at odds with younger 
rebels, who by this point were increasingly fascinated by armed struggle 
as an end in itself. The other was his attitude to discipline and conformity 
within any group to which he was attached. One of his favoured analogies 
was with organised religion. Of the early split within the Peking Wing, 
he comments laconically that the leader Shan [Shanmugathasan] ‘was 
in Albania at that  time –  that was our pilgrimage site at that time. First 
it was Peking. Then it was Albania. We always needed a pilgrimage site’. 
He also gave an account of the Vikalpa group of the early 1980s, in which 
Jayatilleka was again the dominant intellectual force.
Then I got involved in the Vikalpa group. That became a church for 
Stalin. Then there are preachers. I could see that. I wanted to build 
a people’s movement, not build churches. So I started questioning. 
Then I was called middle- class petty bourgeois. My brother had 
given me a pair of bell bottoms. I was scared to wear them because 
the comrades would have questioned me.
In Joe’s interviews, he moved back and forth between these tensions 
within the movement and the tensions in his domestic life. His comment 
on the problem of the petty bourgeois trousers segues straight into the 
financial problems he faced at this time; it was a struggle simply to buy 
milk powder for his young children. Joe also told the story of a point 
when his baby son had fallen seriously ill, just as he was desperately 
preparing a document to be submitted to the wage reform commission.
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[My son] was admitted to hospital. On the day of him being 
admitted, my comrades came and said, your son has become more 
important, where is the document? I said it’s all ready, just get it 
typed. They said, you have to do it. I typed, got copies. All that had 
to be done was to hand it over to the commission. My wife was in 
hospital with my son. My mother- in- law was very angry with me. 
He was a baby son. Despite all that, I had to do this work. I was very 
disappointed and angry. The next day I went to the hospital. Do 
you think my wife would even look at me? I listened to everything 
she had to say. I had to, I was in the wrong, no? I checked in the 
afternoon whether the document had been handed over to the 
commission. They hadn’t taken it. I lied to my wife and came to our 
office. They said there was no one to take it to the commission. I 
was so upset. I got so angry. They are talking big about socialism. 
I kept fighting them. Then our discussions came to a breaking 
point. So I said, you better do the revolution. I gave my letter of 
resignation and left.
Building cross-ethnic alliances: MIRJE and the NEPC
For a brief period Joe worked as a teacher, initially on a temporary 
contract, at his brother- in- law’s suggestion. The new job went well 
and the Principal offered him a permanent position. But politically 
things were changing in the country. The embattled government of Mrs 
Bandaranaike, which had initially incorporated the leaders of the Old 
Left parties, the CP and the LSSP, was swept away in a landslide victory 
for J.R. Jayawardene’s United National Party (UNP) in the 1977 election. 
Jayawardene promised liberalisation of the economy (‘let the robber 
barons come in’), but his election was immediately followed by a serious 
outbreak of anti- Tamil violence. 
The South was swept by the UNP. Racism also swept the country. 
No party had a plan how to work on these issues. S Balakrishnan 
came to meet me and said Paul Caspersz was working in the 
plantation sector. Now he is starting an organisation to bring all 
parties together against racism, at a time when nobody was doing 
anything.
Paul Caspersz was a radical Catholic priest. The new organisation was 
the Movement for Inter- Racial Justice and Equality (MIRJE).
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We had heard [Caspersz] was a CIA agent. I said that, if that is 
CIA that is  good –  if that is what they are doing. I went for the 
first meeting [in 1979] at the Islamic Cultural centre. VK, AB 
[Vijaya Kumaratunga and Anura Bandaranaike], Lionel Bopage, 
all the leftists were there. Bala Tampoe. Very important ideological 
contribution they made. Lionel Cooray  also –  who introduced 
Kumi [Samuel]. There was no one to take this forward. Father 
Paul wanted to meet me so I met him. He said, ‘We need someone 
with your experience. Can you join us? We will give you the same 
salary.’ I had by now received the forms for a pension [in his 
teaching job]. My wife scolded me for giving that up. But I felt this 
was more important than the pension. So I left that job and joined 
MIRJE.
MIRJE was a path- breaking initiative, cutting across conventional 
political boundaries and deliberately bringing together radical Christians, 
academics and feminists, as well as dissident activists on the fringes of 
both Old and New Left groups. It published regularly in Sinhala, Tamil 
and English, contesting full- on the increasing polarisation between 
dominant Sinhala nationalism and violent Tamil counter- nationalism.
As national coordinator Joe was able to work with dramatists such 
as Parakrama Niriella and Richard de Zoysa (who was to become another 
victim of the country’s violence in 1990), as well as writing regularly 
for MIRJE’s newspaper, Yukthiya [Justice]. With hindsight we can see 
MIRJE as the first of the wave of peace- related NGOs that were to spring 
up during the course of the  war –  many of them highly dependent on 
funding from outside Sri Lanka and all of them eventually burdened by 
the ‘projectification’ of their original mission as a result of this funding. 
But when Joe signed up in 1979, that trajectory was far from obvious. 
Another founder member, Rajan Philips, recently described 
MIRJE’s position.
Those of us in the MIRJE and similar organisations were not at the 
margins of Sri Lankan politics, but were purposefully active in its 
interstitial spaces.10 
Philips’ characterisation bears further reflection. If Joe’s political activ-
ity in the 1960s and 1970s was mostly conducted on the very margins 
of national affairs, his interstitial position from 1979 onwards involved 
dizzying shifts of political and social register: sometimes even more mar-
ginal than before, underground and on the run from both the authorities 
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and erstwhile comrades, and sometimes apparently completely central, 
as a minister in the first devolved administration for the Tamil areas in 
the country, and later as an adviser close to the new President during the 
doomed peace initiatives of the 1990s. If we usually think of the slide into 
civil war in the 1980s as a closing down of political space in Sri Lanka, 
for Joe and his associates the interstices between rival Sinhala and Tamil 
nationalisms sometimes seemed to offer opportunities for quite new 
and creative political improvisations. Significantly these often involved 
radical departures from the mould set by the Old Left in the 1940s and 
1950s.
Joe was by no means a linear raconteur and disentangling some 
of the more colourful stories from this period of his life is often a 
challenge. In parallel with the first stirrings of a critical civil society in 
MIRJE, Joe and his comrades sought to connect with the more radical 
elements in the new Tamil militant groups in the North. A North–South 
radical alliance was a particular nightmare for the government, so their 
activities, not surprisingly, quickly attracted the attention of the security 
forces. In the early 1980s Joe was sent to Jaffna where he met key figures 
from the LTTE. 
I went to Jaffna. They gave me an ID, but they said that it was 
obvious that ID was fake and they advised me to go without one. 
I was put on a motor cycle… Just as we were nearing the station, 
we were stopped, and the Tigers scolded that guy with filth… They 
made me sit on a bench. A boy went and spoke to [LTTE leader] 
Kittu. And he had summoned me. He was wearing a chain. Short 
man. Moustache. He spoke nicely to me. He knew I was somebody 
at MIRJE. They gave me food to eat… He said not to worry, train 
won’t leave without you. He gave instructions to a boy not to let 
the train go. I couldn’t  understand –  that they could stop a train. 
He asked me about the strength of the different political parties, 
trade unions in the South. He spoke about  politics –  not about the 
military. What do people say? People in the rural areas? We had a 
good political discussion. Then I was released and I was allowed to 
go on the train. People were wondering why the train was delayed. 
Guard is also there. I got on the train. And the train left! Such an 
 experience –  so dangerous.
At this point Joe was brokering a meeting between Vijaya Kumaratunga 
(VK), the charismatic film star and husband of future President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga (CBK), and the LTTE. But when he returned from Jaffna, 
AMARASURIYA 9781787357792 PRINT.indd   103 30/07/2020   13:31
104 THE InTIMATE L IFE OF DISSEnT
he discovered that in his absence the planned bank robbery had gone 
badly awry.
When I came to Fort station, DJ and Pulsara were there and they 
took me. They said we are in trouble now. Someone has to tell the 
others the message. DJ said he can’t go. I had to go. But I had to give 
the message to VK first. Kynsey Road. We couldn’t walk freely. Ram 
said we should hire a car and Ram would be my driver. This degree 
holder from America was my driver! We got DJ from somewhere in 
Mount [Lavinia] and we went to VK’s house. The watcher said, VK 
had just come home after several weeks and he is trying to sleep. 
I said just tell him that Dayan, Joe and Ram have come. We were 
seated in the garage. I remember CBK walking into the  house –  and 
she said, ‘I can’t make tea’. VK said, no no don’t worry, we will be 
fine. I explained everything to VK. They need to speak to a Sinhala 
 leader –  an honest man. You are their honest man. What do you 
say? VK said he was ready to talk. I said I will send a message for 
them to contact you. This was after midnight. We went about at 
night. We couldn’t get about in the daytime. Then the CID was 
hunting for us. An informant got into one of our cells. They created 
a trap for me. At Kocchikade. I had to give messages to everybody 
to go back home and go underground.
He continued, ‘Only later I understood that DJ was trying to be a hero; 
[then in English] adventurous politics’. And thus it was that Ram and Joe 
ended up in jail, where Joe dutifully lined up every morning to collect 
breakfast for everyone, while his young comrades had their baths.
Two years later Joe and Dayan were both cabinet members in 
Varadaraja Perumal’s North East Provincial Council (NEPC). This body 
was set up under the terms of the 1987 Indo–Sri Lanka Accord, which 
brought Indian troops to the island and plunged them into direct conflict 
with the LTTE, even as the South was consumed by the fury of the 
second JVP rising. Vijaya Kumaratunga was one of the earliest victims 
of that rising, one of many leftist leaders targeted for their ‘unpatriotic’ 
support for the Indian deal. Dayan’s tenure with the NEPC was brief and 
inglorious, but Joe remained in position throughout.
At the time of Joe’s death, a picture circulated on social media.11 
It was of Joe with the EPRLF leader Padmanabha and the Tamil 
activist Ketesh Loganathan. Three young, or youngish, handsome men, 
confronting the camera, apparently ready for action. Within a few years 
Padmanabha would be dead, killed by the LTTE. Ketesh suffered the 
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same fate, gunned down at his Colombo home in the dying days of the 
war. Only Joe was to survive.
When the North East Provincial Council collapsed, Joe fled to 
India. Here he met Rajiv Gandhi, who thanked him for his support for 
the ill- fated Indian intervention. While he was in India, the LTTE assas-
sinated most of the leadership of EPRLF, the group that formed the 
core of the NEPC. By this time Joe’s wife had been pleading with him 
to come home, but he had heard that he was now in  danger –  not least 
because his adventurous comrade Jayatilleka had re- emerged, this time 
as a prominent adviser to the new President, Ranasinghe Premadasa. 
Eventually Joe decided to return.
I didn’t have any travel documents. I got an emergency travel 
document and I came back to SL. I came back and got back silently 
to my old life. I travelled by bus and train. I had an official vehicle 
[from his role on the NEPC]. I sold that and I used that for my 
children’s education. For the suffering I underwent, two years in 
jail, I used that money for my children’s education. I got nothing else 
personally. I gave everything and got nothing. So I don’t feel sad.
Or, as Ram said to family members at the funeral, ‘You gave us Joe’. 
Conclusion 
This is where Joe left his story, returning to Sri Lanka as the JVP rising is 
crushed, Premadasa re- establishes authoritarian rule from Colombo, the 
Indian Army leaves and war breaks out again between the government 
and the LTTE. But Joe was to return to the centre of political events 
soon enough, when Chandrika Kumaratunga was elected President in 
1994. She was elected on a promise to find a political settlement for 
the Tamil problem. Alongside a detailed set of constitutional proposals, 
her government launched a cultural campaign to promote peace and 
inter- ethnic harmony. This was called the Sudu Nelum (White Lotus) 
movement and Joe was brought in as its national coordinator. That 
initiative eventually foundered in the mire of party political divisions in 
the South and LTTE hostility in the North. However, Joe remained active 
in the years that followed as a journalist and television personality.
So what can we make of Joe Seneviratne’s life? What makes it 
worth sharing all these stories of half- forgotten political moves in the 
shadows of a bitter and, it now seems, pointless civil war?
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Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, people such as Joe are 
extraordinarily interesting figures: complex, flinty personalities that 
demand our attention. There is so much of this man himself in the 
speeches made at his funeral, as in the stories he shared with Harini, 
that our first duties as listeners is perhaps simply to acknowledge what 
a remarkable life he crafted for himself, rather than rush into a blur of 
academic interpretation and commentary. In her Afterword to Anand 
Pandian’s moving memoir of his grandfather, Veena Das reinforces the 
point. 
The importance of looking at a single life, a singularity, is that it can 
show how forces contingent and structural, from pasts known and 
unknown, can come together to define a  life –  not lives in general 
but life in its singularity. (Das 2014, 200) 
In reflecting on this passage, the words ‘show’ and ‘singularity’ stand out. 
In the closing paragraphs of Life and Words, Das explores the distinction 
between ‘saying’ and ‘showing’. The survivors of collective violence, 
whose presence haunts the pages of that book, above all employ the act 
of ‘showing’. 
What the women were able to ‘show’ was not a standardised 
narrative of loss and suffering, but a project that can be understood 
only in the singular through the image of reinhabiting the space of 
devastation again. (Das 2007, 217)
So it is that, although Joe is highly articulate about his life and his actions, 
and quick to acknowledge the relationships in which he was embedded, 
our first response is to acknowledge the singularity of his achievement 
through his attempts to reinhabit the spaces of his own past. 
In his own version of himself, Joe reveals many things. His 
achievement, through all that showing, is first and foremost an 
achievement of self- making, as explained by Alexander Nehamas in his 
Art of Living.
To create a self is to succeed in becoming someone, in becoming 
a character, that is, someone unusual and distinctive. It is to 
become an individual, but again not in the strict sense in which 
an individual is anything we can point out and reidentify. To 
become an individual is to acquire an uncommon and idiosyncratic 
character, a set of features and a mode of life that set one apart from 
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the rest of the world and make one memorable not only for what 
one said or did but also for who one was. (Nehamas 1998, 5)
So we start with a responsibility to identify Joe for who he was, for the 
making of himself as an ‘uncommon and idiosyncratic character’.
We can do a bit more than that, albeit nervously and with caution, 
as we come to terms with the hours of material we have accumulated. 
Minimally the stories and achievements we have been collecting disrupt 
the bleak claims of rival nationalisms, in which the history of a country 
such as Sri Lanka is entirely framed and contained within the teleology 
of what we have all learned to call ‘the Conflict’. When we started, we 
thought of our task as a variant on E.P. Thompson’s memorable call to 
rescue the history of the marginal from the ‘enormous condescension of 
posterity’ (Thompson 1968, 13). Now we are not so sure. The reason for 
our hesitation is one of which Thompson himself would have approved: 
there were times when Joe’s actions, and the actions of others like him, 
were anything but marginal, and we need to reflect a lot more on what 
those times were and what was it that folded the margins back into the 
centre of events, however briefly.
In a 1979 essay the political scientist James Manor argued that 
the biggest structural problem in Sri Lankan politics was the distance 
between the political elite and the masses. Other cleavages, notably 
the Sinhala–Tamil split, could be argued to derive from this originary 
divide (Manor 1979). Forty years on, Manor’s essay seems unusually 
prescient. Recent events, such as the failure of the 2015 government to 
address popular dissatisfaction with the criminal activity of its predeces-
sors or the bizarre implosion of that government in late 2018, can be 
interpreted in Manor’s terms, as the Sri Lankan political class remains 
surprisingly closed, self- protecting and self- reproducing. But in this 
context the events of the 1980s, and to some extent the 1990s, acquire 
their importance. In the 1980s young people in both the North and South 
directly challenged this pattern of closed elite dominance. The LTTE 
faced down, and effectively silenced, the lawyers and professionals of 
the ‘moderate’ Tamil parties. The JVP very nearly succeeded in a similar 
attack on the Sinhala political class in the South. 
Although we think of both these organisations as intent on closing 
down the space for dissent on the left of their own nationalist project, 
not least because of the many political rivals they eliminated, we can 
perhaps start to recover a more expansive understanding of the political 
possibilities of those years. This was the time when a veteran leftist 
such as Joe could find himself at one moment jailed alongside a bunch 
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of over- adventurous younger comrades and then, just a year or two 
later, being driven around in an official vehicle as a minister in a newly 
devolved political authority. He may have had to flee to India, but when 
there he gets an audience with the recent Prime Minister. In a moment 
of desperation, Joe may throw himself at the mercy of a left- wing film 
star and his politically ambitious wife. A decade later, when that wife 
has ascended to the position of President, he finds himself invited into 
the heart of the political process, commanding state resources to make 
a popular case for peace. As we continue to work on this material, we 
will probe further to see what it was about this political period that, 
however temporarily, opened up such a vastly expanded set of political 
possibilities.
We should also be wary of telling a story such as Joe’s as a story of 
political ‘failure’. One legacy of the political experiments of the 1960s 
and 1970s was, of course, a long and vicious civil war. But this was 
accompanied by many important countercurrents: over the years, many 
of Joe’s former comrades have made important contributions to human 
rights activism, to the creation of new forms of women’s organisation 
and, of course, to public culture more generally through dramas, novels 
and film. (An obvious parallel is with the later lives of Kelly’s Second 
World War conscientious objectors in Britain, see chapter 6.) MIRJE may 
have died in the transition to becoming a mainstream NGO, but it has left 
its mark across a broad range of cultural and political practice. In doing 
so, it has irreversibly transformed our sense of what we might think 
politically possible. 
But there are other more modest but equally telling themes running 
through Joe’s story. One is age and the responsibilities that this brings. 
Joe was considerably older than many of his comrades in the heady 
days of the 1980s and acutely aware of the expectations of his wife and 
children. Again and again, he records his sense of being torn between 
the demands of the comrades and needs at home. This intimate tension 
connects to the more pervasive relational grammar of solidarity and 
splits, which enabled some of his most remarkable moves. The 1960s 
splits in the left movement in Sri Lanka are the first condition of political 
possibility for Joe’s political life. His scepticism towards the cheap 
glamour of the violent politics of gesture gives him the option of a 
necessary distance in the times of greatest danger. He also had to learn 
the hard way that political intimacy is not always reliable. 
‘We saw the world in a very flat way, the relationships between 
people… If I don’t trust you how can I do politics with you?’ 
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If Joe was sometimes inconstant as a husband and father, he was also 
uncomfortable with the totalising demands of the party. His laconic use 
of religious analogies identifies the recurrent danger of authoritarian 
claims to solidarity, and the need to leave some space to make one’s 
own judgements. Again, as we go forward with other interlocutors and 
other stories, we will be probing further into this relational grammar. 
In so doing we will ask whether the intense friendships and equally 
dramatic ruptures in people’s intimate lives are continuous with the 
bigger political splits and solidarities of their time.
But a story like this will never be closed to further interpretation. 
Remember the two mystery figures at the funeral, whose task was to 
introduce the other speakers, but not to say anything themselves? In 
his last years, without losing sight of his political commitments, Joe 
devoted much of his time to the movement founded by the Indian guru 
Bhagwan Shri  Rajneesh –  or Osho, as he was latterly known. If you look 
Joe up on the internet, much of what you will find consists of references 
to the writings of Osho that he translated into Sinhala in his last years. 
The two figures at the funeral were members of his Osho circle, a circle 
equally baffling to Joe’s family and to his many comrades on the left. 
Joe died before we could ask him about this late enthusiasm for an 
unlikely spiritual hero. We leave our readers with their mute presence as 
a reminder of the many things left unexplained, and thus of the impos-
sibility of containing a remarkable life like Joe’s within any over- neat 
interpretive framework.
Notes
 1 This chapter was made possible through the support of an ERC Horizon 2020 Consolidator 
Grant (648477 AnCon ERC- 2014- CoG). Earlier versions were presented at the Asian Research 
Institute, National University of Singapore, the University of Edinburgh, the University of 
Leiden and Johns Hopkins University. Many thanks to all involved in organising those events, 
especially Nira Wickramasinghe and Naveeda Khan.
 2 Lovell’s (2019) history of Maoism as a global political force provides a fuller account of the 
turn to armed struggle by similarly located young people across the world in the 1960s and 
1970s. She also draws out the symbiotic relationship between Maoism and nationalism in the 
history that followed.
 3 Early accounts of the 1971 insurrection can be found in Dumont (1972) and Blackburn 
(1975), and more measured reflection in the memoirs of founding members of the JVP such 
as Lionel Bopage (Cooke 2011).
 4 Moore (1993) remains the essential analysis of the second JVP insurrection. Dewasiri (2010) 
and Venugopal (2010) bring the JVP story up to the early 2000s. Hughes (2013) provides a 
moving and powerful account of the still bitter memories of the bheeshanaya.
 5 Maunaguru explores this world in more depth in chapter 7.
 6 We are in the midst of a flood of new publications on the LTTE and their political style. The 
publications of University Teachers for Human Rights (Hoole et al. 1990; Hoole 2001; Hoole 
2015) remain the essential point of departure for this phase of Sri Lankan Tamil history. On 
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the experience of members of the militant movements see Mantovan (2015) and Thiranagama 
(2011).
 7 Joe’s literary education reflects the availability of cheap translations of Russian classics from 
Progress Publishers in Moscow. As a result Joe’s generation of leftists was shaped by its reading 
of radical kitsch classics such as Maxim Gorky’s Mother (Amma in Sinhala). Assessing the 
impact of these translations into Sinhala, and dozens of other Asian languages, is an important 
research project still waiting for its researchers.
 8 D.S. presumably refers to Dudley Senanayake, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka in the late 1960s. 
Bose was the nationalist leader of the Indian National Army, an organisation formed to fight 
for Indian independence alongside the Japanese in the Second World War.
 9 Speech of Sarath Kongahage, ‘Unfulfilled promises and suppression of media under PA’, 
The Sunday Times, 15 September 1996, http://www.sundaytimes.lk/961215/news3.html, 
accessed 1 March 2018. 
10 Rajan Philips, ‘Silan Kadirgamir (1934–2015) – Reflections on his Life and Politics’, Colombo 
Telegraph, 2 August 2015, https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/silan- kadirgamar- 
1934- 2015- reflections- on- his- life- politics/, accessed 1 March 2018.
11 This, and other images from Joe Seneviratne’s life, can be viewed on our project website: 
https://anthropology- of- conscience.sps.ed.ac.uk/. 
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Hoole, Rajan. 2001. Sri Lanka: The Arrogance of Power: Myths, Decadence and Murder. Colombo: 
University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna).
Hoole, Rajan. 2015. Palmyra Fallen: From Rajani to War’s End. Colombo: University Teachers for 
Human Rights (Jaffna).
Hoole, Rajan, K. Sritharan, Daya Somasundera and Rajani Thiranagama. 1990. The Broken 
Palmyra: The Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka: An Inside Account. Claremont, CA: Sri Lanka Studies 
Institute.
Hughes, Dhana. 2013. Violence, Torture and Memory in Sri Lanka: Life after Terror. London: 
Routledge.
Lovell, Julia. 2019. Maoism: A Global History. London: Bodley Head.
Manor, James. 1979. ‘The Failure of Political Integration in Sri Lanka (Ceylon)’, Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 17 (1): 21–46.
Mantovan, Giacomo. 2015. ‘Combattants et victimes en temps de guerre et d’exil: Violence, 
mémoire et subjectivité dans les récits de vie de Tamouls sri lankais en France’. PhD thesis, 
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Chapter 6
Dissenting conscience:  
the intimate politics of objection in 
Second World War Britain
Tobias Kelly
There is a contested tradition that runs through the Protestant 
Reformation, liberal constitutionalism and certain forms of human rights 
activism which makes conscience an archetypal and valorised form of 
dissent.1 Dissent here is understood as a vital  good –  a powerful way 
of fostering both public reason and an individual’s capacity for self- 
realisation. And conscience is widely seen as supplying the grounds for 
such acts of virtuous opposition, speaking from beyond narrow self- 
interest or instrumental calculation. In this vision, conscience should 
be protected because it is at the heart of a person’s most deeply felt 
sense of self (Maclure and Taylor 2011). In popular culture, those who 
seem to make a stand on issues of  conscience –  people such as Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, Václav Havel, Martin Luther King and (until recently at 
least, and instructively so) Aung San Suu Kyi, are held up as heroic moral 
exemplars. From such a perspective, the dissenting conscience represents 
not only the basis of individual freedom, but also the last residue of the 
ability to do good in the world in the face of otherwise overwhelming 
pressure and wrongdoing. 
To talk about conscience is usually to talk the language of high 
principle. But, as we argued in the introduction to this book, those who 
dissent are not simply people of public ideals; they are also enmeshed in 
other intimate aspirations and ties. Commitments are never just abstrac-
tions, but are also produced and take shape through personal ties marked 
by reflection and obligation. We can only understand the commitments 
people  make –  as well as the intensities, tensions and meanings of 
these  commitments –  if we view them from the perspective of the thick 
social relations in which they take place. People of conscience are also 
husbands, wives, sons, daughters, friends and neighbours. Public acts 
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and private beliefs cannot be easily separated. We might therefore ask, 
in line with the introduction to this book, what is the intimate life of 
dissent? 
This chapter explores what happens when a very particular under-
standing of conscience is woven through dense social relations. The point 
here is not to define conscience nor to treat it as a transcendent or universal 
form of moral agency. Rather, it is to bracket off such questions in order to 
examine a contingent and historically embedded way of understanding 
and valuing conscience. This involves exploring the specific cultural life 
of an ethical category that claims universal valence; focusing on the ways 
in which it gains meaning, significance and purchase within the context 
of particular  relationships –  and the commitments, attachments and 
conflicts that are produced along the way. 
The chapter focuses on the experiences of British conscientious 
objectors (COs) to military service in the Second World War. If conscience 
is an archetypal form of dissent, the British conscientious objectors of this 
period represent a particularly acute angle through which to explore the 
social and cultural life of conscience. In 1916 Britain became the first 
state to grant the right to conscientious objection during wartime, and 
to do so on formally secular grounds. During the Second World War over 
60,000 people were granted exemption from fighting on these grounds. 
Those who opposed the First World War in Britain, and later the Vietnam 
War in the US, are sometimes held up as heroes, at least on the broadly 
liberal left. They are viewed as principled and insightful individuals 
who saw through the fog of war and manufactured patriotism to talk of 
the waste and injustice of the trenches and jungle warfare, and made 
great sacrifices in doing so (see, for example, Brock and Young 1999). 
In contrast, the conscientious objectors of the 1930s and 1940s have 
a much more ambiguous position in popular memory for refusing to 
take up arms against fascism. It is for this reason that they have perhaps 
largely slipped from popular memory, presenting an awkward reminder 
of where following our conscience may take us. British conscientious 
objectors of the middle of the twentieth century therefore speak to the 
limits, potentials and conflicts of conscience as grounds for dissent.
If other chapters in this collection examine forms of dissent under 
various types of socialism or post- colonial nationalism, this chapter seeks 
to contribute to debates about the limits of dissent under liberal regimes. 
The category of conscience has played a key role in the history of liberalism. 
The philosopher John Rawls went to so far as to observe that liberty of 
conscience is at the historical and normative core of ‘political liberalism’, 
providing the grounds for moral autonomy and particular forms of dissent 
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(1993, 154). The conscientious objectors described in this chapter held 
commitments to a range of political and religious traditions, but they all 
sought to participate in a public debate about conviction, sacrifice and 
exemption dominated by broadly liberal assumptions. This chapter can 
therefore be understood as part of the anthropology of actually existing 
liberalism. Liberalism is treated here as a varied and historically contingent 
set of discourses and practices, rather than a defined set of philosophical 
abstractions or analytical straw man. Numerous scholars have pointed 
to the ways in which liberal political regimes can tightly circumscribe 
the forms of dissent that are acknowledged as legitimate (Mahmood 
2012; Povinelli 2002). What counted as a persuasive conscience certainly 
reproduced narrowly masculine, bourgeois and Protestant ways of being 
in the world. What I am also interested in here, however, is not just the 
outer limit of liberal dissent, but its anxious and uncertain core (Walzer 
1970; Weiss 2012). Hesitations about claims of conscience are not only 
produced at the edges of liberal cultures, but at their very heart. The issue 
is not so much the exclusion of liberalism at its edges, but the anxieties, 
reversals and instabilities that lie at its heart.
The central argument of this chapter is that claims of conscience 
are Janus- faced –  both valorised and mistrusted, the grounds for sociality 
yet also socially corrosive. As McGranahan and others have argued, acts 
of dissent and refusal can not only sever ties, but also create new ties, 
affiliations and obligations (2016). At one level, throughout large parts 
of the liberal tradition, conscience is one of the ways in which individuals 
contribute positively to public life. However, at the same time conscience 
can also appear egotistical and self- indulgent –  perhaps even antisocial. 
The philosopher Susan Wolf has argued more broadly that a morally 
pure life seems to lack a human quality (1982; see also MacFarquhar 
2015). For Wolf, ‘moral saints’ have no friends, family, lovers, comrades 
or even acquaintances. They are unappealing to others, as they are not 
driven by affection and joy, but by a stark devotion. The point here is not 
simply that forms of conscientious dissent are not all  equal –  although 
that is the case  too –  but also that all claims of conscience can themselves 
create unease. 
Perhaps no one captured this ambiguity better than Susan Sontag, 
in her review of Simone Weil’s collected essays (1963). 
The culture- heroes of our liberal bourgeois civilization are anti- 
liberal and anti- bourgeois; … of exemplary lives, there are those 
which invite us to imitate them, and those which we regard from 
a distance with a mixture of revulsion, pity, and reverence…. No 
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one who loves life would wish to imitate [Weil’s] dedication to 
martyrdom, nor would wish it for his children nor for anyone else 
whom he loves. Yet so far as we love seriousness, as well as life, we 
are moved by it, nourished by it. 
Here Sontag explores the ways in which people can be both attracted 
to claims of absolute moral virtue and feel repulsed by them. Such 
absolute virtue can seem both necessary for the world we want to live 
in yet somehow antithetical to the richness and diversity of that world. 
In this light we can see conscientious objectors in Second World War 
Britain as the source of anxiety, not simply because they refused to fight 
fascism or to take up arms when others were preparing to sacrifice their 
 lives –  although they did that  too –  but also because they were simply too 
conscientious. 
To put this another way, we might say that ethical commitments 
are not all good. In recent years it seems that anthropologists have been 
able to find ethics everywhere (Laidlaw 2013; Lambek 2010; Mattingly 
2014; Venkatesan 2015). The ‘ethics of this’ and the ‘ethics of that’ have 
become familiar refrains, much as in previous decades the ‘politics of this 
and that’ played a similar role. But ethics has its limits, especially when 
understood in the relatively narrow terms of the cultivation of virtuous 
selves, and ethical commitments, except in a very mundane sense, are 
not the only commitments by which people live. Too much ethics of a 
particular  type –  or too much  conscience –  can make for awkward social 
relationships. 
This chapter is based on the letters, diaries and memoirs of consci-
entious objectors, their families and friends. These are a group of people 
who wrote a great deal about their experiences, both at the time and in 
the months and years afterwards. We can see these writings as a form 
of justification and reflection, both to themselves and to others. More 
significantly, perhaps, we can understand the very act of writing about 
conscience as an attempt to give form to an otherwise intangible and 
often inchoate concept. It is in these writings, often shot through with 
doubt, confusion and contradiction, that conscience begins to take on a 
more or less public form.
Liberalism, ethics, conscience
There are many ways of talking about conscience, ranging from a gift 
of God that can be found objectively in sacred texts to an innate but 
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deeply subjective quality found deep within a person. However, British 
conscientious objectors to military service speak directly to a  tradition 
–  rooted in the Protestant Reformation and Nonconformist  Christianity 
–  that sees conscience as being rooted inside people and the ground 
for individual moral autonomy (Andrew 2001; Baylor 1977). During 
the Protestant Reformation, conscience came to represent the inner 
presence of divinity within an individual (Walzer 1970, 12). This was 
also a form of conscience that is potentially radical, as it has no defined 
content beyond the inner scruples of particular persons. The idea of 
conscience was therefore also tightly linked to notions of dissent. And 
this is a tradition that, as Weiss describes in chapter 3, has also played a 
central role in the linked history of liberalism, gaining particular traction 
in relation in opposition to twentieth- century totalitarianism. If liberal 
approaches to dissent stand alongside related terms such as protest, 
resistance, refusal and opposition, they do so in a way that places an 
emphasis on the public opposition of specific morally autonomous and 
conscientious individuals. In doing so, the concept of dissent has accrued 
specific assumptions about the origins, significance and implications of 
personal freedom. 
But conscience within the liberal tradition does, or cannot, simply 
stay within particular people, hidden from view. As Hannah Arendt has 
argued, the key problem for an understanding of conscience as rooted 
deep inside individuals is how to make that conscience public and 
persuasive to others (1972). A conscience that exists solely inside of 
someone would have no social, cultural or political significance. The 
crucial issue here is the process of making conscience public – of making a 
conscience tangible and persuasive to others. The internal conscience is 
therefore at once both personal and public, with its meanings and impli-
cations formed in the midst of social relations. 
We might see conscience as a form of what anthropologists have 
called ‘first person ethics’, but of a very particular kind (Mattingly 2014). 
First person ethics are deeply personal ethical problems, tied up with 
intimate senses of the self and their associated commitments, and as such 
do not have universal or straightforwardly objective responses. But, as 
Veena Das has also pointed out, ‘a first- person statement is not a private 
soliloquy’ – but is addressed to someone – ‘there is a second person 
there’ (2020, see also Walzer 1970, 22). This means avoiding a sense of 
conscience as existing on a transmission belt from intimate self to outer 
public or seeing outward manifestations as merely representations of 
inner states (Fernando 2010; Howe 2013). Claims of conscience take 
shape in the space in between an intimate sense of self and wider publics, 
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and are as such inherently relational. We can therefore understand the 
diaries, letters, memoirs and oral history interviews of pacifists as a form 
through which claims of conscience emerged in mid- twentieth- century 
Britain.
The social life of conscience
Roy Ridgway came from a close- knit family from Liverpool; if his diaries 
are anything to go by, he had a loving if slightly fragile mother, an 
overbearing father and two very close brothers. He would eventually 
register as a conscientious objector, but only after a series of sometimes 
fraught encounters with friends, family, colleagues and others. Roy 
seems to have moved to London to get away from his father, only to be 
followed by the rest of the family as they looked for work. Through the 
late 1930s the threat of war weighed heavily on his mind. As a teenager 
Roy attended a Congregationalist Church in Liverpool, but would later 
describe himself as ‘leaning’ towards the Quakers. He also remembered 
not being able to imagine Christ sitting in a plane and dropping bombs. 
Later Roy would recall that he first realised he might be a pacifist after 
watching the documentary Forgotten Men.2 The film, released in 1933, 
shows veterans discussing their lives in the trenches. One clip of a man 
writhing on the ground after being shot in the stomach would stand out 
in Roy’s mind in later life. 
Although conscription had ended in 1919, it was widely assumed 
throughout the 1930s  that –  if there was another  war –  it would be 
reintroduced. This meant that for many young people growing up in 
the 1920s and 1930s, such as Roy Ridgway, the prospect of war was 
not simply a distant abstraction; it was something that they felt in all 
likelihood they would have to participate in. Roy was anxious that if he 
did become a conscientious objector he would be lined up against a wall 
and shot. His anxieties were not eased when an older pacifist told him 
not to worry, but to think ‘of the effect it would have on the soldiers’ who 
had to carry out the order.3
Books, rather than films, seemed to have played a particularly 
influential role for many pacifists. From the early 1930s there was a 
near flood of writing evoking the horrors of the First World War, and 
of any war to come. These were books such as Erich Maria Remarque’s 
All Quiet on the Western Front (1929), Vera Brittain’s Testament of Youth 
(1933) and Siegfried Sassoon’s memoirs (1928, 1930, 1936) – works 
that, in the words of the critic Valentine Cunningham, dealt ‘obsessively 
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with  violence –  its images, its tone, its horrors, its pleasures’ (1989, 55). 
While not all of these books were pacifist, and some even saw glory in 
the suffering of the trenches, they did provide the raw material through 
which to reflect on the implications of war. And as Doreen Lee and 
Sidharthan Maunaguru both show in chapters 9 and 7 respectively, 
the production, distribution and reading of texts produced not just 
forms of interior reflection; they also created rich forms of sociality and 
relatedness. Literary texts were often both the deeply intimate and public 
grounds upon which acts of dissent were understood.
More broadly, there was often an intense sociality that marked 
the development of a personal opposition to war. Roy would spend 
hours talking with his brothers and attending pacifist meetings and 
discussion groups. Similarly, in later life, George Buttery would recall 
his experiences as a trainee teacher at Goldsmiths’ College in London.4 
Amidst all the clubs, lectures and talks, he became increasingly influenced 
by new anti- war friends. George was also reading widely, particularly the 
mass circulation and broadly liberal News Chronicle, but also the writings 
of Aldous Huxley, Vera Brittain and Mahatma Gandhi. After graduating 
he got a job at a boys’ school in South London and joined the local branch 
of the Peace Pledge Union. Much of his time was taken up with distrib-
uting leaflets and holding public meetings. 
The decision on whether to fight or not was never an easy one, and 
could result in intense discussions with close family and friends. Roy’s 
father often taunted him, seeing his pacifism as naive. One evening, as 
Roy was leaving for a pacifist meeting, his father gave him a mock Nazi 
salute. Roy would write in his diary that ‘Dad has never helped me… 
he has always made things very difficult for me’; he later described his 
father’s attitude to his sons’ pacifism as ‘ambivalent’.5 
Similarly Ken Shaw, a Methodist from south London, faced criticism 
from his father who believed that it was ‘everyone’s duty’ to serve in the 
military at a time of war. Ken’s brother had joined the Royal Air Force and 
his mother was also upset by the whispers she sensed among neighbours 
over her son’s refusal to join up.6 Sydney Greaves, who had a younger 
brother in the Army, recalls that his father was ‘deeply disturbed’ by 
his decision to become a conscientious objector and tried very hard to 
dissuade him from registering.7 Sydney’s parents also mobilised family 
friends to write letters setting out the case against pacifism, begging him 
to stop. Ronald Mallone, a socialist trainee teacher, later recalled being 
treated as a ‘weird animal’ by his relatives when they heard he was going 
to register as a conscientious objector; his aunt even suggested that he 
should have his hard- won college scholarship taken away.8 Tony Parker, 
AMARASURIYA 9781787357792 PRINT.indd   118 30/07/2020   13:31
 DISSEnTInG COnSCIEnCE  119
a pacifist from Manchester, was forced to split from his girlfriend after 
she was told by her father that if he did not renounce his conscientious 
objection, she would not be allowed to see him again.9 Parker refused to 
change his convictions and his girlfriend said she had to do as her father 
said, so the couple split. 
Roy Ridgway first heard of the Peace Pledge Union in the office 
where he worked; he went on to sign a card promising not to fight. It was 
at work that a pacifist stance could also draw most comment, however, as 
it was here that it was most apparent that men at least were not serving in 
the armed forces. A female typist at the bakery where Roy was employed 
passed his desk and on seeing a pacifist badge remarked ‘Are you a 
conscientious objector? Oh no, Mr Ridgway, don’t be one of them’.10 
At Roy’s work Christmas dinner a telephone operator shouted out, so 
that everyone could hear, ‘What is that badge you are wearing?’ When 
he responded that it was from the Peace Pledge Union, the room went 
completely silent. To his relief attention was soon diverted as, elsewhere 
in the room some of his colleagues started a food fight. 
Roy Ridgway was not alone in facing issues at work. John Hunt, 
a clerk in an engineering firm in a small town in western England, 
confronted similar problems. He would later recall that on turning up at 
work after registering as a conscientious objector, he was booed by his 
colleagues.11 Stanley Hilton, a French polisher originally from Glasgow, 
was forced to leave his job after some colleagues, on hearing he was a 
conscientious objector, threatened to strike if he was kept on.12 Leonard 
Bird had worked as a solicitor’s clerk since leaving school at 14.13 When 
war broke out he was in his mid- twenties, on the verge of gaining formal 
qualifications as a paralegal. After registering as a conscientious objector 
he had his desk broken into by his boss, who suspected that he was 
carrying out pacifist activities in the office. 
However, despite the issues that Roy, John, Stanley, Leonard 
and many others faced, the general response to pacifists in the late 
1930s and early 1940s was very different than in the First World War. 
In 1914–18 people who refused to fight were routinely imprisoned, 
shamed, harassed and stigmatised for being ‘disloyal shirkers’ (Bibbings 
2011). By the Second World War, however, the atmosphere had changed 
to one of begrudging tolerance. A survey taken in the spring of 1940, 
for example, showed that only 14 per cent of the British public thought 
it was a bad thing for pacifists to be able to express their opinions in 
public.14 The general position was that while people might not agree 
with the stance that pacifists took, they accepted their right to take it. 
The director of the bakery where Roy Ridgway worked took him to one 
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side and told him that he ‘admired’ him, but did not agree with him.15 
Similarly, during a pacifist march through the centre of London, a First 
World War veteran came up to Roy; he declared that he did not blame 
him, as he knew what war was like.16 
Shortly after the outbreak of the war Roy’s two brothers moved to 
a cottage just outside Abergavenny in South Wales. They had been given 
exemption from military service on the condition that they carried out 
forestry work and had moved west in search of employment. Over the 
summer Roy went stay with his siblings. One afternoon two policemen, 
huffing and puffing from the walk up the hill to the cottage, stopped by 
to ask what the three brothers were doing in the area.17 The atmosphere 
seems to have remained convivial, as over tea and cigarettes, and amid 
much laughter, one of the brothers showed them the short stories he was 
writing. 
There were several reasons for this general shift in attitude from 
that of the First World War. In part the brutality and loss of life in the First 
World War meant that war was no longer associated so straightforwardly 
with heroism (Rose 2003). For much of the late 1920s and early 1930s 
anti- war sentiment held a firm place in the middle ground of British 
politics. Against this background there had also been a marked shift in 
the ‘moral economy of sacrifice’ (Allport 2010). The Blitz, rationing and 
evacuation, as well as the ‘phony war’, all meant that privations on the 
front line were not as heavily privileged over those on the home front. 
Finally the British establishment came to see freedom of conscience as a 
crucial distinction between British liberal democracy and fascist authori-
tarianism. Cosmo Lang, the Archbishop of Canterbury, expressed the 
position well. 
At a time when we are claiming… that freedom of conscience must 
be elsewhere honoured, it is obviously our duty to show that we 
fully support it.
On the eve of the war Roy went to a local pub with his father. In the 
blackout everyone sang ‘Land of Hope and Glory’ well into the night. 
Roy wrote in his diary that he was despairing of the ways in which the 
‘ordinary man’ was resigned to war and did not mind being used as 
‘cannon fodder’.18 The day Germany invaded Poland, he reflected ‘in 
1937 I pledged never to support or sanction another war, and I will not 
go back on my word’.19 He added that he was ‘going to try and stay calm 
and cheerful’, but ‘one cannot help being perturbed by the unimaginable 
horrors we will probably witness in the days to come’.20 At the start 
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of March 1940 Roy applied for exemption. He wrote in his application 
that 
I am firmly convinced that love and not force is the ultimate 
power in the universe… I renounce war and absolutely refuse, 
on moral and religious grounds, to attach myself to any military 
organisation.21
Roy Ridgway’s decision on whether to fight or not had been reached 
through both the support and criticism of family, friends and colleagues. 
His claim of conscience was forged out of the raw material of his intimate 
relations. This was not a commitment that sprung out from inside him 
fully formed, but one that was produced, given shape and meaning 
in the midst of late- night discussions with his brothers, slights from 
people at work and friendly chats with Welsh policemen. As a form 
of dissent, therefore, conscience did not simply separate him off from 
others, even those who signed up to fight. Instead it drew him into 
complex and sometimes contradictory sets of relationships, aspirations 
and evaluations. As many of the other chapters of this book show, 
intimate ties served to create the conditions of possibility for large- scale 
acts of conviction and solidarity, but could also at the same time work 
against them. 
Obligation
Roy Ridgway had initially gone to stay with his brothers on the small-
holding in South Wales. He did not stay there long, however, as he 
began to feel guilty about leaving his mother in London in the midst of 
the Blitz. By November 1940, with German raids a nightly event over 
London, he had returned to live with his parents, eventually persuading 
his mother to go and stay with his brothers in the Welsh mountains. For 
the pacifists of Second World War Britain, claims of conscience were 
seldom made in the name of freedom, but rather, more commonly, in 
relation to obligation. Although conscientious objectors might be seen as 
archetypical exemplars of liberal freedom, for most of them conscience 
was experienced as a duty rather than an exercise of freewill. 
In the first instance this was a sense of obligation to family 
and friends. Reading through the diaries and letters of conscientious 
objectors reveals them to be full of concerns about the potential implica-
tions of any decision for parents, brothers and sisters. The worry about 
AMARASURIYA 9781787357792 PRINT.indd   121 30/07/2020   13:31
122 THE InTIMATE L IFE OF DISSEnT
what neighbours might say, and the impact this would have on their 
parents, was common. This was also particularly the case if relatives 
were serving in the armed forces. Such concern could cut both ways, 
however, as the loss of loved ones in previous wars could create a sense 
that they should not fight. 
There was also a sense that conscience required responding to the 
needs of other people. Roy’s application for exemption was made on 
the basis that he would sign up for some kind of humanitarian work. He 
wrote to the Quaker- inspired Friends Ambulance Unit asking for work 
and claiming that ‘I do not think we should refuse in any way to alleviate 
the suffering in this world’.22 The contrast here was with so- called 
‘absolutists’, who rejected any type of compulsion or cooperation. Roy 
disagreed strongly with a pacifist friend who declared that he would not 
provide first aid in the event of an air raid. The friend argued that any aid 
was merely patching up men to send them back to fight. For absolutists, 
holding firm to principle was important, above all else. It did not matter 
what the consequences were; they had to stick to their personal beliefs. 
This was a form of what Max Weber has famously called an ‘ethics of 
conviction’ (1946). Even if the end result is tragic and painful, standing 
by one’s convictions is all that is important. The integrity of the believer is 
all. In contrast, Roy wrote in his diary that he ‘could not stand aside and 
watch people writhing in agony’.23 
The sense of exactly whose suffering should be eased was at one 
level deeply cosmopolitan, stretching beyond the borders of Britain. 
At another level the sense of obligation was mediated by attachments 
to community and nation. Roy would write in his diary his belief that 
‘the love of one’s country is inherent in everyone’.24 Similarly Clifford 
Simmons, a self- proclaimed Christian anarchist and conscientious objec-
tor, later recalled ‘it is a great social accomplishment that this country has 
written into its laws the right of a man to follow his conscience’ (1965, 
15). In Erica Weiss’s account of Israeli conscientious objectors, a claim 
of conscience is a defiance of the state (2014, see also chapter 3). In 
contrast, British conscientious objectors often saw their arguments as an 
attempt to embrace both the British state and other British  citizens –  by 
demonstrating commitments that they saw, however problematically 
perhaps, as deeply embedded in British history. Conscientious objection 
was thus the space of loyal citizens. 
At whatever level they worked, claims of conscience were widely 
seen by British pacifists as demanding and restricting, rather than a 
source of untrammelled agency. In his written application for exemption, 
the railway worker and Christian pacifist Jesse Hillman wrote that 
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for him ‘conscience was something that was so precious’ that he had 
no choice but to follow wherever it ‘led’ him.25 Similarly Gwendolene 
Knight, a Quaker pacifist who worked as a volunteer in an ambulance 
unit, later argued ‘if it is right then that’s what you’ve got to do’.26 
Alexander Bryan, a trainee teacher, explained that he felt compelled 
to register for exemption by the ‘promptings of conscience’, and that 
as a conscientious objector he had ‘the right to obey the dictates of 
my conscience’.27 Written statement after written statement applying 
for exemption presented conscience as something that did not allow 
a choice. Speaking more broadly, obligation has often been described 
as an ‘insoluble problem’ for liberalism, as it struggles to articulate the 
grounds under which ostensibly free individuals should defer to public 
commitments (Pateman 1985, 1; see also Englund 2006). If we were 
looking for an exemplary case of freedom of conscience, British conscien-
tious objectors in the Second World War would seem to be a good place 
to start. However, when you scratch the surface, for the people most 
concerned with conscience it seems not to be an issue of freedom, but 
rather of duty (see also chapter 5). 
Dissent here is not a form of autonomy, but a commitment both 
to individual conscience and to others, whether near or far. These 
obligations do not neatly stack up in a row, however, nor do they 
fan out in concentric circles; rather they could cross over in different 
directions (Schielke 2015). Obligations to brothers and mothers could 
contradict obligations to colleagues, obligations to friends could clash 
with obligations to country and obligations to the living could rub up 
against obligations to the dead. But equally this is not simply a matter 
of competing loyalties to family or nation, comrades or colleagues, as 
such ties could also cross through one another. To paraphrase Michael 
Walzer, commitments to principle are usually also commitments to other 
people (1970, 5). You could be loyal to your country because of your 
loyalty to your mother. Conscience is given meaning in the awkward 
space in between all of these. 
Doubts 
In the context of all these overlapping obligations, duty never came easy. 
Despite, or even because of the sociality of conscience, it could also be 
associated with intense doubt. The decision to register as a conscien-
tious objector was far from straightforward for the Ridgway brothers; 
it was accompanied by periods of anxiety and uncertainty. Roy’s diaries 
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are also full of worries about what his parents really thought about his 
pacifism. He was relieved when, in late January 1940, his mother finally 
said that she was proud of her children.28 This was the first time she 
had ever voiced any support for her sons. Roy and his siblings discussed 
among themselves what they would do if and when they were called up. 
On the very eve of war, they were still undecided. Two dealt with the 
issue by getting very drunk. At the end of October 1939 Derrick Ridgway, 
Roy’s brother, registered as a conscientious objector at the Hendon 
Employment Exchange.29 He later collapsed in the family home. Roy and 
his parents feared that he had tried to poison himself with a bottle of 
potassium cyanide, only for the doctor to announce that he had simply 
drunk too much beer. 
Roy had doubts over his own convictions, as he noted in his diary. 
Some of the remarks that slip from me in conversation are not the 
words of a pacifist… I find myself saying things I ought not to say. It 
is hard to be an out and out pacifist.30 
He was worried that the general atmosphere in Britain in the first months 
of the war was leading him off the pacifist path. He was still convinced 
that war was wrong and that he could not kill his ‘fellow creatures’, but 
had become less sure what that meant in practice. Roy later recalled, 
looking back on his indecision, that ‘my heart said no and my head said 
yes, I was confused about it’.31 In retrospect, he described himself as a 
‘tentative pacifist’. Such experiences were relatively common. Douglas 
Turner, son of a south London grocer, became a conscientious objector 
and an ambulance driver. He would later recall that ‘No- one, I think, 
ever came back [from the war] … without finding their concept of paci-
fism challenged’.32 Sydney Carter worked during the war as a hospital 
orderly. He similarly recalled that although he had managed to convince 
the tribunal that he was a genuine and sincere conscientious objector, 
he was not so sure that he had ever managed to convince himself. He 
remembered that his objection was so wobbly that the day before the 
tribunal he nearly ‘packed it in’ (Simmons 1965, 28). Vera Brittain, a 
leading peace campaigner throughout the 1930s, also described the dif-
ficulty of making such complex decisions. 
[War] brought succession of sharp anxieties… a series of moral 
dilemmas… it was all too easy to make the wrong choice, and all 
too difficult to accept the consequences of a decision that seemed 
right. (1979, 14) 
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A pacifist conscience was rarely easy. The diaries, letters and memoirs of 
conscientious objectors are full of hesitations and uncertainties. These do 
not just reflect doubts over what conscience is telling them to do, but also 
about how and why they should follow their conscience. Doubts emerge 
here about whether they really were helping further the cause of peace 
or whether they were indirectly contributing to the war effort. There 
were also concerns about whether the forms of alternative service the 
objectors were undertaking were really useful and productive, as well as 
anxieties about what it meant to live a conscientious life at the personal 
and emotional level. 
Personal irritations, fallings out and failure could all create 
uncertainty. If conscience was embedded in intimate relations, those 
same intimate relations were given a particular charge, one to which they 
could not always live up to. Nor did conscience always speak clearly, if it 
spoke at all. It could either speak in many voices or mumble, leading to 
hesitations about what it meant to follow claims of conscience. Finally, 
it could be hard to distinguish conscience from cowardice, self- interest 
or even vanity; many people who objected to war often wondered about 
their own motivations and what they truly meant. The moral autonomy 
of this kind of conscience can also imply the autonomy to be amoral, 
immoral and even mistaken. Conscience was far from transparent, even 
to those to whom it seemed to speak.
Conscience has often been seen historically as the ground of an 
authentic moral personhood. Martin Luther is famously reported to have 
said that ‘Here I stand. I can do no other’. This is an image of conscience 
that is resolute and individual. Later scholars have understood conscience 
as being at the centre of a modern sense of self. For Foucault, for example, 
the subject is ‘tied to his own identity by a conscience’ (1983, 212). For 
British conscientious objectors, however, claims of conscience did not 
simply create a profound and clear sense of themselves, standing against 
the rest of the world. Instead, for those asking for military exemption, 
claims of conscience could produce an experience of estrangement and 
confusion about their own convictions and beliefs. 
More generally, Hannah Arendt famously argued that only a ‘truly 
bad’ person has a ‘good conscience’, as she associated conscience with the 
intense and fraught reflection on your own actions (1972). For Arendt, a 
sense of guilt and remorse is an essential part of doing good in the world 
(see also Jankélévitch 2014). In this sense conscience is always troubled. 
This is a form of conscientious dissent that is not formed from a sense 
that a person cannot do otherwise, but precisely from the sense that they 
could.
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Loneliness
For all their sociality, the lives of conscientious objectors were also 
often marked by loneliness. Before the war, hundreds of people had 
attended Roy’s local pacifist meetings. By October 1939 just 13 people 
were attending. The chair left, announcing that he was going to join a 
community of German Protestant pacifist exiles known as the Bruderhof. 
Roy was becoming to feel increasingly isolated, as he described in his 
diary. 
[I am] a bundle of nerves… I can’t talk to people in a normal way. 
Everyone seems to avoid me. It is my own fault… I can’t interest 
myself in the things that most people are interested in.33
He told his diary that ‘the pacifist plows a lonely furrow’.34 The same day 
he wrote that he could tell what everyone was thinking, even if they did 
not say it: ‘coward, coward, coward…. You’re afraid to fight’.35 He felt 
that women in particular were very critical and lacked sympathy for his 
stance.
Other conscientious objectors did not always provide much solace. 
Corrado Ruffoni, for example, a conscientious objector born in London 
to Italian parents, went to work on a farm and appeared slightly uncom-
fortable in the company of so many other conscientious objectors. He 
described them as all wearing ‘beards and long hair’ and moved out of the 
collective accommodation, finding it hard to live with others.36 Similarly 
the conscientious objector, farmer and playwright Ronald Duncan would 
write in his published journal about the ‘depth of stupid childishness to 
which so many moderately intelligent people are brought’ (1944). Cyril 
Wright, another conscientious objector and socialist, would write at the 
time that living with other conscientious objectors ‘has not lived up to 
expectations’.37 One conscientious objector described his fellow pacifists 
as ‘bloody awkward sods’ and another thought they were ‘difficult to 
relate to… narrow minded’. What all this speaks to is the way in which 
claims of conscience, although created in the midst of social relation-
ships, can also serve to pull people apart. Conscience here risks slipping 
not only into a solipsistic vanity, but also an alienating individualism. 
The moral autonomy of ‘me against the world’ can easily become ‘me 
alone’.
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The anti-social conscience
Although both politicians and the wider British public routinely supported 
the right to conscience, conscientious objectors could still cause unease, 
and not just for themselves. More specifically, alongside their refusal to 
fight fascism, or take up arms alongside everyone else, they were also 
routinely criticised for the intensity of their sense of personal virtue. 
The Marxist critic Christopher Caudwell wrote in 1938 that pacifists 
are ‘so imbued… with bourgeois notions of sin, that it never occurs [to 
them] that a preoccupation with one’s own soul and one’s own salvation 
is selfish’ (1938, 117). Cyril Joad, once a leading light of the pacifist 
movement, criticised it for being ‘aimed at the preservation of individual 
integrity in the face of war, rather than the prevention of that war’ 
(Wallis 1991, 26), while Clifford Allen, former chair of the First World 
War No-Conscription Fellowship, was critical of conscientious objectors 
for being ‘far too often in the spirit of half arrogant pride’ (Wilkinson 
1986, 104). All too often conscientious objectors were perceived as being 
too virtuous for their own good.
The social unease caused by conscientious objectors can be seen 
clearly in Robin Jenkins’ novel A Would-Be Saint (2001 [1978]). Jenkins 
was himself a conscientious objector who spent the Second World 
War with a forestry unit on the West Coast of Scotland, and many of 
the book’s elements mirror his own life story. The novel tells the story 
of Gavin Hamilton, a Scottish conscientious objector who provokes a 
mixture of respect and disdain from both the residents of the small town 
where he grows up and other pacifists. Gavin falls in love, but the rela-
tionship ends after he invites a homeless former prostitute to move in 
with him. When the Second World War is declared, Hamilton registers 
as a conscientious objector and is sent to a forestry unit in Argyll, where 
he lives in a hut with other pacifists. He becomes increasingly concerned 
that he should be forced to compromise on his principles, eventually 
leaving the communal hut and moving further up the mountainside to 
sleep and eat alone. 
Throughout A Would-Be Saint Gavin’s friends and acquaintances 
feel uneasy in his presence. But there is also some residual respect for his 
stance. One of his fellow conscientious objectors, in reference to other 
pacifists, comments that ‘they had long ago put down their idealistic 
protest against the war… they lie awake at night, despising themselves 
for adding to the world’s falseness and hypocrisy. Then they remember 
Gavin and feel instantly absolved’ (2001, 212). In the last chapter of 
the book, as the war ends and the conscientious objectors are allowed 
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to go home, Hamilton goes missing. His fellow pacifists think he may 
have walked out into the wilderness to die, unable to live with others 
according to his deeply felt pacifist principles. They seem slightly disap-
pointed when he eventually walks off the mountain. The critical response 
to Gavin’s character in the book was equally ambivalent. Jenkins himself 
appeared slightly confused by the reaction. 
Somebody in the Times Literary Supplement said of Gavin that he 
was the most obnoxious hero she had read in modern fiction… I 
meant him to be a saint. (Murray 2006, 119)
In the responses to Gavin Hamilton, or the arguments of Caudwell, Joad 
and Allen, conscience is seen as coming close to a form of anti- social 
moral narcissism. Or, as George Orwell put it, ‘it’s probable that some 
who achieve or aspire to sainthood have never felt much temptation 
to be human beings’ (1949). In such a vision, if we were to follow our 
conscience at all times, we would miss much of what makes life with 
other people worth living. 
Conclusion 
To speak of conscience is often to stand apart and  alone –  to stand up 
for what is right despite what everyone around us is doing and saying. 
We often think of conscience as a morally authentic reason for dissent, 
precisely because it causes us to step back from the day to day, the 
ebb and flow of personal loyalty and calculation, in order to stand up 
for what is right. In the popular imagination, acts of conscience are 
associated with the heroic defence of high principle, even when done on 
a small scale. Conscience is a valorised form of dissent, the ultimate form 
of moral autonomy, where people step back from their day- to- day ties 
and concerns and make a judgement about what is ultimately the right 
or wrong course of action. 
However, the opposition between commitments of grand principle 
and the more prosaic and intimate ties of family, friends and colleagues 
can be overplayed. It is only through the seemingly mundane and 
everyday practices of specific relationships that broader commitments 
take effect and play out. It is out of these relationships that claims of 
conscience emerge and gain significance, as claims of conscience are 
entangled in multiple relations to friends, family, colleagues and nation. 
Yet this relationship is never easy. Although intimate relations are always 
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threaded through claims of conscience, acts of conscience can also 
undermine the very relationships from which they are formed. 
The difficulties of living a socially meaningful and conscientious 
life point to the problem of grounding commitments within particular 
individuals. When conscience is understood as internal and autonomous, 
it also risks becoming unknown, unchained and unsocial. Claims of 
conscience therefore seek a mooring in collective life. But when those 
claims of conscience are threaded through social relations, the risk is 
either that the freedom in freedom of conscience becomes shackled or 
that very individualised notion of conscience undermines collective life. 
As claims of conscience are woven through social relations, conscience is 
itself a source of constant anxiety and  unease –  neither entirely apart nor 
inseparable, but always fraying bonds and causing disquiet. 
As Raymond Williams put it, the individual moral ‘search of self- 
fulfillment’ that marks contemporary liberalism can also end in the 
denial of what makes life worth living (1966, 102). Yet at the same 
time it is this commitment to principles and a willingness to dissent in 
the most difficult of circumstances, when it would be easier to keep our 
heads down, that can give our lives both hope and meaning. As Susan 
Sontag wrote, ‘We are moved by it, nourished by it. In the respect we pay 
to such lives, we acknowledge the presence of mystery in the world…’ 
(1963). Such are the difficulties of living a conscientious life with others. 
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Chapter 7
Friends with differences: ethics, 
rivalry and politics among Sri Lankan 
Tamil former political activists
Sidharthan Maunaguru
Ideological divergences and ethnic boundaries can test intimate rela-
tionships. Maintaining friendships despite these hurdles can thus appear 
to be an attempt to live one’s political life in an ethical way.1 The Sri 
Lankan ethnic conflict offers a case in point for such intimate relation-
ships within a highly charged political context. The conflict has a long 
history, dating back to colonial times. However, for many scholars 
(Daniel 1996; Tambiah 1986; Spencer 1990) the crucial tipping point 
appears to be the 1983 ethnic riots, effectively a pogrom against Tamils. 
This took place in the capital, Colombo, igniting the violent ethnic 
conflict that had long simmered between the Tamils and the Sri Lankan 
government. 
Tamil militant/youth movements started emerging in the 1970s to 
fight for Tamil minority rights. Ideological and power struggles subse-
quently resulted in conflicts and killings within and between the Tamil 
militant movements until, in the mid- 1980s, the Liberation Tigers for 
Tamil Eelam or LTTE (one of the militant movements) wiped out the 
other Tamil militant movements. It then claimed to be the sole represent-
ative of the Tamil cause. The intense and brutal civil war is dated from 
approximately 1983 to 2009. During this time the LTTE was eliminated 
by the Sri Lankan state (Thiranagama 2011). 
In this chapter I focus on the period between the early 1970s to the 
mid- 1980s –  a time when Tamil militant movements emerged and major 
debates abounded within and between these youth militant movements. 
Topics such as the armed struggle, Tamils’ rights, rights of the minorities, 
caste issues, independent state and so forth provoked intense debate. 
Young people at that time joined different groups according to their 
diverse ideologies. However, they were also friends, school mates, 
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relatives and comrades, broadly fighting for the same objective and 
coming from the same sociality despite being members of different 
militant movements. Due to the killings and conflicts between and 
within Tamil militant movements, a number of militants refused to take 
part and left. Dissent within Tamil militant movements during this time 
created a dangerous situation both for those in Sri Lanka and for people 
forced to seek refuge in other countries. 
As people described to me how their lives had been marked by such 
dissent, I most often heard the term ‘conscience’ and reference to the 
choices made with the intention of not harming others. My interviewees 
were struggling with and between forms of intimacy (friendships) and 
their ideological positions, forced to consider whether they should 
publicly display their dissent or hold it private and in silence. How do 
they deal with being both a friend and an ideological rival? Why and how 
could political dissidents publicly claim their stand, yet at the same time 
withdraw from the public claim because of the potential harm to their 
intimate others? 
This chapter examines two of the central questions that run through 
this collection. It asks what are the ways in which intimate relations 
work through and against forms of political dissent. In doing so it also 
examines the cultural and social resources on which people draw to 
explain and  understand –  to themselves and  others –  the grounds and 
purpose of their dissent. Thiranagama (2010) argues that the language 
of the traitor had become one of the ways in which people were marked 
and killed during the inter- militant conflict or internal killings within 
militant movements. LTTE used this term to justify such murders: LTTE’s 
own cadres or other Tamils were described as those who had betrayed 
the Tamil cause and Tamil community. In other words, the ‘traitor’ 
comes from within a community, and from the intimate relationship and 
sociality that one has with others. Consequently a ‘traitor is distinct from 
enemies and strangers by virtue of being potentially ourselves, a betrayal 
from within’ (Thiranagama 2010, 128). 
However, in my ethnographic setting and my conversations with 
ex- political activists, a different narrative emerged: that of political 
dissidents who left the movements, refused to kill fellow activists or 
challenged the internal killings. Here we see the flip side, if you like, of 
the same tensions between similarity and difference. Furthermore, such 
activists constantly struggled to maintain their friendships even as they 
opposed the ideological views of their friends or fellow activists. Some of 
them refused to write about the past murders because it might harm their 
friends who were still alive. In liberal political discourse, the intimate 
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and the political are perceived as separate. Political activists are treated 
as individuals and their ideological commitment is separated from their 
social relationships. 
In this chapter, I map out the relationships and struggles of political 
activists who sought to remain a friend to someone with an opposing 
political ideology. I argue that the struggle to maintain friendships 
with those who held dissenting ideological views, or were members of 
different militant movements, can also be a political claim. In Schmitt’s 
famous formulation (2007), friendship marks the boundaries of the 
political, with no alliances or ties crossing the line. In contrast, I contend 
that both politics and friendship can be concerned with maintaining 
relations across boundaries. Politics is not devoid of intimacy and 
friendship, but rather driven by them. In other words, if we were to think 
of friendship as based on ‘emotion’ and ‘reciprocity’, with a possibility 
of rivalry (Pitt- Rivers 2016), I argue that being a friend to people with 
dissenting political ideological views or ex- militants from adverse groups 
is an ethical stance. For my Tamil interlocuters, friendship is not only 
about  care –  although it is about that  too –  but also about politics and 
more importantly, about the ethics of and in politics. 
Ranjan
I met Ranjan in Europe. He comes from Sri Lanka, but has been living 
in a foreign country as a refugee for more than 25 years. Ranjan was 
involved with PLOTE, a Tamil militant movement with a leftist ideology 
that emerged in the mid- 1970s. Deeply fond of reading, he spent most 
of his time in the village library during his childhood and later became 
involved in establishing vasagar vatam (readers’ circles) in his village. He 
was introduced to Marxist ideologies through the books and magazines 
that came to the library. In his village he fought against caste discrimi-
nation. Ranjan decided to join the People’s Liberation Organisation 
of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) when he was approached by them, because 
their ideology was based more on Marxist ideology and class revolution 
along with Tamil nationalistic struggle. He engaged in PLOTE’s political 
activities, taking classes and recruiting other young people to the 
movement. All of them dreamed of what obtaining rights for Tamils 
could achieve in a few years and of liberating the most oppressed class of 
people in Sri Lanka. They held a pasarai event (a political workshop that 
took place once in a while to educate, learn and converse openly about 
their cause and activities), in which members discussed, debated and 
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even undertook a self- criticising exercise. However, an internal power 
struggle emerged that Ranjan ascribed to some members’ desire to gain 
control of the movement. 
Ranjan told me that he always believed in democracy and collective 
decision- making within the group. He joined PLOTE because of its demo-
cratic policy and support for class struggle, believing that the organsia-
tion had a democratic space and that its decisions were taken collectively 
by the central committee. The internal power struggle served to reduce 
the democratic space, despite protests from members, including Ranjan. 
He and other comrades believed that people needed to be educated 
before taking up arms, to ensure this truly was the people’s revolution. 
They believed the national struggle aimed to find a solution to the ethnic 
conflict, but also that the class struggle should continue to include the 
Sinhalese from the South to achieve a revolution countrywide. However, 
he added, differences of opinion led to internal killings, endangering the 
democratic process.
We had a very strong democratic structure within the PLOTE. For 
example, a book was published with the leader’s speech (leader of 
the PLOTE) and his photo on the cover, so we refused to distribute 
it in Sri Lanka because it would create a personal cult. Now, I 
think at that time we were following extreme democracy. But we 
believed in it. When internal killings and problems occurred some 
of us, from Sri Lanka, had a 7 days conference in Jaffna, where we 
decided to have the same conference in India where the leader 
was living. We decided to go to India to hold a conference and 
hand over our resolution to the central committee. But the central 
committee did not support our resolution. We were disappointed 
and wanted to leave PLOTE.
After the internal conflict and killings, some members did leave for Sri 
Lanka or other countries; others joined alternative militant movements 
or remained in India. Some of them had multiple discussions which 
were published in books or magazines or pamphlets, believing that these 
discussions and debates needed to be communicated to the people. 
During the internal rift Ranjan’s outspoken behaviour led to him being 
targeted; he was indeed shot, but survived. During this time he was 
involved in recruiting other young people and ex cadres who wanted 
to form a united front. However, he soon realised that not everyone 
supported a democratic process or was ready to make collaborative 
decisions. So he abandoned his efforts. 
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Rajan did not want to leave India because he could not leave his 
fellow ex- fighters. But in the end he decided to go abroad. With the help 
of friends, he left and ended up in a foreign country, where he works as 
a sweeper and cleaner. Since then Ranjan has been helping his fellow 
ex- fighters to move out of India or with their daily expenses. He sends 
most of the money he earns to his former fellow fighters and friends back 
in India and Sri Lanka. He explained that he felt responsible for their 
situation. 
These people came and joined the movement because of my 
campaigning. So I feel that I have a duty to help them and bring 
them to a position where they can survive after what has happened 
to our movement.
Ranjan remained active, continuing to participate in political activi-
ties even after settling in a foreign country. He explained that he had 
always taken a stand against power (athikaram), from his early 
ques tioning of caste discrimination when he was a young boy in his 
village. Since then Ranjan learned to challenge all forms of power and 
authority. He went on to question his teachers’ authority in school, 
then to question not only LTTE’s power but also that of the Sri Lankan 
state, PLOTE and other movements that used their power to control 
people or their own cadres. Ranjan acknowledged this was a recurring 
trait. 
Most of the people know me as critical about everyone, not just 
LTTE. I have always believed in democracy and raised my voice 
whenever democracy was under threat. 
He repeatedly voiced his conviction that a democratic process is of 
utmost importance in fighting for freedom and minority rights, strongly 
believing that he needed to speak out whenever people were silenced by 
force. Yet Ranjan’s own movement, PLOTE, turned against him when he 
took a stand for a more democratic process. Despite this strong stand for 
democracy and a socialist ideology without compromise, he managed to 
maintain friendships with those who opposed his views. Ranjan is still 
convinced that through conversation, ‘we could realise and acknowledge 
our mistakes and reform the struggle against any power’. 
Some of his friends share his belief: one of them, while being a 
strong supporter of another militant movement opposed to Ranjan’s 
political views, provided him with the money to establish a journal that 
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criticises that same movement. As for Ranjan, he even helped a former 
PLOTE cadre who had tried to carry out the organisation’s order to kill 
him during the internal struggle. The men had been good friends as 
PLOTE members before the friend changed sides and started to follow 
the leaders’ orders. However, on his friend’s arrival in Europe, Ranjan 
helped him to settle down, explaining that he still remains critical about 
his friend’s current political views and activities. 
We all believed in this and joined the movement to fight against 
the Sri Lankan state. He still wants to do something. He believes 
in it and feels that Tamils are suffering. I am critical about how he 
wants to achieve rights for Tamils, but that should not stop me from 
helping him. He was my friend and he still is. We can be friends, but 
at the same time I can be critical about his activities. But you should 
talk to him, he may have a different view on this. 
Ranjan thinks  this –  maintaining your friendship despite holding 
opposite  views –  is what constitutes a democratic process; everyone is 
entitled to his or her own view. Keeping friendship and conversation 
going, while being critical of the opinions expressed, answers to his 
claims of conscience and his belief in supporting a democratic process. 
Ranjan joined PLOTE for that belief, then left it because that democratic 
space was withdrawn. But he exercises such ideological belief in his daily 
life with intimate others. Being a friend and being critical are thus for 
him  interconnected –  a public embodiment of his stand for democratic 
choice. 
I advised Ranjan to write his autobiography, but he rejected the 
idea. He explained that if he were to write his story it would expose 
many people, friends or former friends, as well as former fellow cadres, 
to risk. He does not want to harm them, so prefers to keep silent. In other 
words, the act of keeping silent is a way of managing to hold on to his 
former and current friends, and to avoid harming them in the present. 
The struggle between publicly criticising his political opponents and at 
the same time maintaining their friendship also reaches a limit at these 
moments. Ranjan can publicly criticise, but he is aware that he cannot 
reveal ‘too much’ because it may affect others’ lives. Through this careful 
manoeuvring between acts of silence and acts of speech, he crafts and 
produces what he calls his conscience (manasaatchi) when articulating 
his political views and belief in democracy. 
The notion of friendship here is cultivated not through political 
theorist Carl Schmitt’s ideas of ‘friend and enemy’ as a binary narrative 
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(2007). Nor is it related to the intimate betrayal from which the ‘traitor’ 
emerges (Thiranagama 2010). Rather, it is formed through the very 
struggle and the ambiguity attached to the friendship. In The Concept of 
the Political (2007) Schmitt argues that politics emerges from being able 
to distinguish between friend and enemy. The political enmity is public, 
not personal. Further, for Schmitt, political enmity arises from many 
origins related to different ideologies and identities (class, ethnicity and 
so on). Friends come together, fighting and dying for each other as well 
as killing those who oppose them. Vinx (2019) points out that Schmitt in 
The Concept of the Political, argues that:
Apolitical community exists, then, wherever a group of people are 
willing to engage in political life by distinguishing themselves from 
outsiders through the drawing of a friend- enemy distinction (Vinx 
2019).2 
The political community is based on identifying and belonging to a 
particular identity which relates to the duality of friends versus enemies 
(the latter comprising those who are opposed to that identity or have 
a different identity). Furthermore, for Schmitt any life ‘that does not 
involve the friend–enemy distinction would be shallow, insignificant 
and meaningless’ (Vinx 2019).3 A de- politicisation occurs where the 
enemy and friend distinction is erased. Pitt- Rivers argues in his article 
the ‘Paradox of Friendship’ (2016) that friendship is not opposed to 
kinship- related ideas of reciprocity. It is rather an ‘implicit demand for 
a reciprocal counter- gesture’, one that ‘is more usefully compared to 
Maussian gift’. Pitt- Rivers further argues that friendship is not only about 
choices or emotions or based on love, but is also based on reciprocity and 
responsibility.4 The paradox of the friendship for him resides in not only 
speaking about it, but also acting upon it.
The gesture of friendship demands a reciprocal countergesture 
(more or less immediately depending on the local mores), and if 
this countergesture does not come, it means that the friendship 
is refused and the initiator humiliated such that he will surely 
become an enemy… but it cannot be given expression with the 
aim of provoking the countergesture, nor reciprocated out of mere 
convenience or with an eye to profit… The paradox can be summed 
up thusly: to defend the purity of one’s sentiments one must act in 
(blind or hypocritical) ignorance of the consequences of one’s actions! 
(Pitt- Rivers 2016, 448–9)
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In other words the friendship is not just a reciprocal or instrumental act, 
but also a moral act enacted in daily life. However, for this very reason 
an ambivalence is also attached to friendship like the one attached to the 
idea of a gift, since it relates to ideas of danger and humiliation when it is 
returned. The friendship gesture from a possible friend could also result 
in a challenge or a refusal. In other words, a rival and a friend can coexist 
within the friendship.
The potential enemy hidden under the surface of friendship, like 
the hatred concealed in love’s centre, is in this case exposed for all 
to see, and this inverts everything: there is, of course, exchange, 
but the things exchanged lose their habitual meaning. (Pitt- Rivers 
2016, 450) 
The friendship is not devoid of possible challenge or rivalry, like the blood 
brothers who can challenge each other in the name of honour without 
breaking the brotherhood (Pitt- Rivers 2016). Pitt- Rivers reminds us that 
the paradox is always present, but the friendship is seen in the act rather 
than through the  words –  an act with ambiguity and potential danger. 
This idea of friendship provides a more complex picture of being friends, 
breaking away from the binary notion of friend and enemy. Ranjan’s 
story of struggling to be a friend with people who have opposite political 
views and former militants from different groups is thus an ethical 
struggle placed in politics. He embodies the politics of his belief through 
maintaining the friendship with friends/rivals holding opposite political 
views, beneath which a potential for challenge and danger is always 
present. But, as Pitt- Rivers reminds us, it is the act more than the moral 
ground of words that defines the friendship. Here in Ranjan’s case, the 
act of being a friend with his rivals in political ideology, and of struggling 
with it, is an act in the everyday that defines his ethics, politics and the 
friendship altogether. For him politics is not about defining the enemy, 
but opening the conversation. 
Fighting an ideological battle while maintaining the friendship is 
also an ethical manifestation of the type of politics Ranjan believes in. 
Furthermore, he told me that he cannot write or disclose more about 
certain matters because of the risk that such information might be 
used by the state or power against militants in the Tamil movement. 
In this sense, he refuses to articulate intimate knowledge. According to 
Thiranagama (2010) the term ‘traitor’ became a powerful  category – 
 and at the same time a category to be destroyed because of the intimate 
knowledge and relationship that the person had betrayed. They were 
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thus found to be worse than enemies and consequently deserving of 
punishment and death. Ranjan occupies a space of neither enemy nor 
traitor; it is rather the ambivalent space of friendship, which contains the 
potential to turn into any of these. 
Conscience and ethics in politics and friendship
While we were having multiple conversations, I asked Ranjan one day 
about his views on conscience (manasaatchi). He expressed a close rela-
tionship with conscience, which underlies his act of maintaining friendship 
with political dissenters, through which he practises the ethics of politics. 
According to Ranjan, conscience is formed in two ways. The mainstream 
conscience, a collective conscience, emerges from the people who are in 
power and so becomes the ‘majority conscience’. Ranjan claims that the 
conscience of the majority of the Tamil community reflects an orientation 
towards violence and a hunger for power, which is epitomised by the LTTE. 
He believes that the other conscience emerges from marginalised people 
like himself, declaring that ‘We are very few people and we are crazy 
people; you could call us the manasaatchi (conscience) of the margin-
alised people’. Ranjan further argued that manasaatchi (conscience) is 
both individual and collective, the collective version deriving from power 
and class. However, individual conscience is based on the mana uruthal 
(constant stressful uncertainty of whether one has done right or wrong). 
He said that now he mostly cares about helping the people who have 
suffered from the war and armed struggle than about politics. 
I am helping people because of my mana uruthal. I have kuttra 
unarvu (feelings of guilt). I brought so many people into the 
movement. We believed in the movement at that time, but things 
went wrong. We lost everything and they also lost their lives. I 
feel bad about what I have done. So I help people. I need to help 
the person who is trying to do something for the society because 
I am not doing anything myself. But people also used me. They 
used what I sent them for doing wrong things or lied to me. But I 
still helped them. I do not have any savings because of my kuttra 
unarvu. That is how I appease the claims of my conscience. Many 
people may think that I am stupid and crazy, but I think I have 
always stood for justice and democracy. My critics also agree how 
crazy I could be to have stayed on that path. I think the conscience 
is connected to kuttra unarvu.
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He further claimed that his conscience is also based on, or comes from, 
people who are oppressed.
Before 1985, we went with a belief in social change and revolution. 
I did not join for attraction of arms. I was interested in Marxist 
ideology, that is why I joined PLOTE rather than LTTE because of 
my conscience of the oppressed people. Also, I left PLOTE because 
some people wanted to monopolise the power and it changed into 
leader’s worship. I could not live with my conscience, being thus 
away from the oppressed people’s conscience.
More generally, the concept of conscience has historically shifted. It has 
often been associated with particular traditions, such as Christianity, 
Protestantism and the Enlightenment, but now also encompasses modern 
secular thinkers. These arguments revolve around God, individual inner 
sense, reason, being human and the need to protect human dignity or 
foster moral autonomy (Badiou 2003; Andrew 2001; Maclure and Taylor 
2011). Conscience is about doing or differentiating between bad from 
good in a classical sense. As Kelly argues, conscience can be perceived 
in many ways, from feelings to rational practice based on judgement 
and intuition. It can consequently be located both in the individual and 
social, even in the divine. It may also be seen as a site of doubt (2015). 
What is the relationship between Ranjan’s particular claim of 
conscience and his desire to maintain friendships with people with an 
opposing political ideology? Ranjan learned to live with his ideology: 
he follows his conscience by staying true to it. What he believes to be 
political is shaped by the everyday struggle, failures, limits and his 
relationship with others. By being a friend to someone who possesses 
opposing political views, debating and struggling to maintain the rela-
tionship while strongly articulating his own opinions through silence 
and writing, Ranjan cultivates both his ethics of politics and his belief 
in democracy and freedom. His conscience would not let him kill or 
negate others’ points of view, but instead urged him to debate with them. 
Although Ranjan admits people might disagree with him or call him 
crazy, all of them agree that he never strayed from the path of justice and 
democratic process. The friendships that he struggles to maintain with 
rivals bring a return (reciprocal as we have seen earlier): a recognition 
by these friends/rivals that his beliefs and his practices are for democracy 
and freedom. 
Such recognition enables Ranjan to check and live with his 
conscience, which is attached to mana uruthal (stressful uncertainty of 
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whether one is doing right or wrong). His conscience as a form of ethics 
of doing and acting is translated in the friendship that he maintains with 
someone possessing an opposing political ideology, refusing to denounce 
him or her as an enemy and/or traitor. Thus the recognition Ranjan 
receives from friends/rivals of his stand for democracy, despite their 
different political views, is based on his experience of living his political 
view (of democracy) in practice. Maybe for Ranjan, as for many others 
like him, friendship is not only emotional or instrumental, focused on 
care: it is also political and relates to the ethics of/in politics. 
Let us now turn to Murali’s story to explore how friendship and 
politics play out between two persons from different ethnic groups. 
Murali
Murali came to Europe as a refugee. I met him in the small town where 
he lives with his family and works in a shop. From a young age Murali 
started reading books from the school library, ranging for the stories 
of Jeyakanthan5 to articles about Tamil identity and the god Murugan 
(a Hindu deity). He was a devotee, but his father encouraged him to 
read both religious texts and books about Mao. His father, a teacher, 
received a Marxist newspaper every week which Murali started to read. 
His readings led him to become a rebel, asking questions and being 
critical about power. He was involved in caste issues and spoke out 
against the discrimination practised in his own village. At an early age 
Murali became a supporter of Tamil arasu katchi (a Tamil political party 
that supported the Tamil cause). Later his friends pointed out that this 
political party did not address caste discrimination; they observed that 
not all ‘Sinhala people’ were bad, but maintained that one should fight 
only against the Sinhala state. After the burning of the public library in 
Jaffna,6 Murali decided to leave home to join a political movement. 
Some of us were discussing among ourselves that we should join 
a youth movement that will find a solution for Tamils without 
hurting Sinhala people. And at that time only PLOTE claimed our 
enemy was the Sinhala state, not the people.
Murali thus decided to join PLOTE. In a similar way to Ranjan, however, 
he was concerned by the internal conflict and division within PLOTE 
because he was against internal killings. He always believed that we have 
the right to speak and voice our own opinions in the democratic process 
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of decision- making, and to challenge decisions in a political group. In the 
end he left PLOTE. Since Murali was friends with a member of another 
Tamil movement with left ideology, he joined this movement. During 
this time LTTE banned every other Tamil militant movement. Murali was 
printing a magazine criticising LTTE’s activities when he was arrested 
one day by the LTTE; he was only released after a year. Later, he left 
for the capital, Colombo. Here Murali met a couple of friends and they 
discussed establishing a political paper. Eventually they established a 
Tamil paper with support from a non- profit making organisation. The 
same organisation also released a Sinhala progressive paper, and as a 
result Murali was introduced to Sanjay, a Sinhala human rights activist. 
He claims that they all became very good friends. During Chandrika 
Kumaratunga’s presidency in the mid- 1990s, the paper ran into trouble 
because it published an article that claimed Chandrika’s policies were not 
bringing about any big changes. 
Following this criticism, tension surfaced with colleagues and 
friends attached to the Sinhala paper. This tension escalated one day 
when Sanjay mentioned indirectly that Murali was a Koittiya supporter 
(LTTE supporter). Murali was so upset that he took the matter to the 
organisation’s central committee. After discussion Sanjay was asked 
publicly to apologise, which he did. Murali maintained that after this 
apology they continued their friendship. He believes Sanjay, his Sinhala 
friend, is an honest man who shares the same ideas of fighting for people 
who are oppressed. Murali believes that Sanjay has made mistakes and 
they fought about it, but their friendship still continues. To Murali, 
Sanjay is not his enemy, but rather a friend with a different ideology. 
Many years later Sanjay told Murali one day that only when one 
experiences the pain of the minority can one understand their feelings. 
Sanjay had to travel and claim refugee status in a European country 
as a result of political pressure from the Sri Lankan state; he thus 
experienced life as a second- class citizen, confronting racism, and thus 
appreciated the feelings of Tamils in Sri Lanka. Murali appreciated his 
friend’s honesty in accepting his mistakes. He considers that although 
Sanjay sometimes speaks without thinking, he is basically an honest 
person. 
Ranjan’s story describes the maintenance of friendship with others 
who differ politically but come from the same ethnic group. In contrast, 
Murali’s friendship with Sanjay cuts across different ethnic groups and 
encompasses a different ethnic sociality. Thiranagama (2010) points 
out that there is a difference between the term of ‘traitor’ and the term of 
‘enemy’. A traitor is attached to a betrayal from the  inside –  an intimate 
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betrayal that emerges only within the same ethnic  groups –  whereas the 
concept of an ‘enemy’ is based on the notion of a stranger or someone 
coming from different ethnic groups or a non- familiar space. The social 
location of a person, and the historical struggle that defines the person’s 
social location, are both important in understanding how one learns 
to live with the other (Thiranagama 2018). The ethnic reality and the 
ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka played out in the friendship between Sanjay 
and Murali when he was accused of being a LTTE supporter. Such an 
accusation is a stereotypical generalisation of Tamils whom the majority 
of Sinhalese perceive or suspect to support the LTTE. 
Even though both Sanjay and Murali  were –  and  are –  political 
activists with a left- leaning ideology, the long history of ethnic conflict, 
and ethnic identity formation as majority and minority, played out in 
their struggle to maintain their friendship. Here it seems that maintaining 
the friendship is not about the recognition of one’s political stand for 
democracy, as it is in Ranjan’s case. It is rather about a friendship based 
on recognising the pain and politics of the ethnic other. After Sanjay’s 
accusation against Murali he apologised in public, and recognised 
Murali’s social location when faced with living as a minority in a European 
country himself. Maintaining the friendship becomes possible between 
political activists from different ethnic groups once they understand 
and accept one another’s ethnic and social location and appreciate their 
political history and struggle. A sense of ethnic difference was central 
to the friendship of Murali and Sanjay. The ethics of/in politics in this 
friendship across ethnic lines is not only in maintaining the relation-
ship with rivals or people with different political ideologies, but also in 
recognising and being aware of each other’s ethnic and social location 
and political history. Otherwise, a friend always carries the potential risk 
of turning into an enemy. 
Murali never wanted to leave Sri Lanka or liked any other country, 
but he was forced to go. His name became incorrectly linked with an 
accusation of anti- government activities, at a time where the Sri Lankan 
government targeted anyone who was speaking against the state. One 
day he heard that the police were looking for him. Murali immediately 
called Sanjay, who told him not to worry. He asked Murali to come to 
his office, where he could stay safely until he looked into his case. Sanjay 
then arranged a lawyer to accompany him to a meeting with the police. 
This they duly attended, and Murali said that Sanjay stayed with him and 
took his side against the police. He told the police that he handed over 
Murali to them and that it was now their responsibility to release him 
soon after the inquiry. Eventually he was released from police custody. 
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Murali acknowledges that his friendship with Sanjay is full of 
contradictions, conflicts and ideological differences. Yet such conflict 
neither resorted to violence nor broke the friendship between them. 
Murali believes that it is because Sanjay also has a conscience and is 
essentially an honest person. Sanjay publicly questioned the activities 
of Sinhala political movements even as Murali did when these became 
something less than what he stood for. 
Ethnicity, friendship and political ethics 
For Murali, conscience is a form of ethics that is inseparable from politics. 
When we discussed what conscience means to him, Murali explained:
Conscience is connected with ethics/arum. All the rights that you 
have apply to other persons as well. That is an equality which is 
based on arum. Otherwise there is a problem. I think every human 
is a political being, so arum is ethical as well as political. Politics is 
based on  equality –  everyone has equal rights and has the right to 
claim those rights when those are not given. Equality is a form of 
dharma/arum. The conscience is to make sure that you and others 
practise that equality.
The story of Sanjay and Murali tells us how, even though they have 
taken different stands and ideologies at different times of their lived 
experience, they maintained their friendship, seeking to understand 
each other within the political history of the ethnic conflict despite 
coming from different ethnic backgrounds. Especially in a period of crisis 
and under threat to their own lives, they tried to be there for the other 
when he needed it. On the other hand, however, they continually fought 
on ideological grounds. Murali’s claim that the ethics of one’s action is 
political is an important part in his relationship with Sanjay. Despite the 
conflicts and Sanjay branding him a LTTE supporter, Murali recognised 
Sanjay as an ethical person and with correct politics: a politics of equality. 
For Murali, Sanjay’s public apology shows that the latter’s ethics are right 
even though he was wrong in making such an accusation against Murali. 
Murali appreciates Sanjay’s ethics and politics not only because Sanjay 
apologised in public, but also because he recognised the pain of being 
a minority and the politics surrounding this. Murali’s understanding of 
what is ethical and political are interwoven with his subjectivity and 
enacted in performance. Claiming he will not ask anyone to do what he 
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cannot perform or do (which would go against his conscience) is a nexus 
where his ethics, politics and conscience converge. 
Murali’s conscience also stands for equality in rights and speech. 
Thus Sanjay has the right to express his views, but also he has the ethics 
in politics publicly to acknowledge his mistakes in accusing Murali and 
to respect his friend’s freedom, and equality in expressing his opinions 
and politics. The mutual understanding, learning and correcting are the 
ethics of/in politics that both men enact, despite their ethnic differences. 
Being there for his friend and constantly struggling to maintain their 
friendship, even while opposing and challenging his ideology, is part of 
each living according to his conscience. 
Murali also said that he will fight for the right of a person to say what 
he or she wants to say, even though he completely disagrees with that 
person. Yet that does not necessarily mean that he compromises with his 
beliefs and political ideology. He turns to Sanjay when his life comes under 
threat by the police, even though Sanjay is Sinhala. This decision is made 
possible by Sanjay’s ethics and politics, on which their friendship is based 
and which makes Sanjay more trustworthy than others. Maybe learning 
to be friends with Sanjay, struggling to understand him, continuing 
his friendship over many years, is Murali’s way of calming his claims of 
conscience based on democracy and equal rights. The ambivalent nature 
of any friendship has the potential danger for the friend to turn into an 
enemy or a rival. In this case, however, the everyday act of being a friend 
and the reciprocal gesture make the friendship endure. 
Here the recognition is perhaps about correcting oneself in relation 
to  another –  recognising one’s privilege, its limits and the ethnic historical 
and political struggle of the other. In so doing they establish a politics 
that each relates to: an ethical politics. The intimacy between Sanjay and 
Murali is also a political and ethical act of politics, learned through their 
many years of friendship. Murali’s claims of conscience lead him not only 
to preach or write about democracy and equality, but also to embody it, 
and to demonstrate it in his everyday life with others, his friends. 
Conclusion 
The stories of Murali and Ranjan and their articulations of the concept 
of conscience, friendship, politics and ethics are not delimited by neat 
boundaries or clearly defined concepts. They are lived experiences, 
articulated through being intimate with others in their daily lives. 
The constant struggle of learning and relearning to live with intimate 
AMARASURIYA 9781787357792 PRINT.indd   146 30/07/2020   13:31
 FrIEnDS wITH DIFFErEnCES  147
others with opposite political ideologies while continuing to stand for 
one’s ideology is where the lived experiences of conscience are made, 
unmade and remade. Many political dissidents may appear as extraor-
dinary people who left their home, family and work for revolution or 
social change and engaged in extraordinary activities. Now they live in 
many parts of the world and work as cleaners, dishwashers, taxi drivers 
and shopkeepers. However, in between the extraordinary and ordinary 
moments of their lives, these dissidents learned to embody and perform 
what they believe is their political ideology. In their intimate relation-
ships with others, when confronted with conflicting ideologies, they 
did not frame them as betrayers or enemies; rather, they struggled to 
maintain the relationship because the claims of their conscience fostered 
the right of others to speak and think differently. Struggling and working 
to hold onto their friendships is lived through not writing about those 
who opposed their ideology or silencing themselves about them in public. 
Such acts also point to the fact that these political activists are concerned 
about the harm they could bring to others’ lives. Holding, struggling and 
living with intimate others, friends, without breaking away or harming 
them is a form of living according to their  conscience –  a conscience as 
form of ethics and politics. 
The concepts of politics, ethics and conscience are embedded 
in everyday life. As Das argues, ‘if the concept has vitality this must 
be drawn from the life they participate in and not from their desire 
for abstract reasoning alone’ (Das 2015, 8). In other words, for Das 
ideologies or concepts do not transcend the everyday, but emerge 
as parts and particles of the everyday and ordinary activities, words 
and performances. Das argues that ethics emerges from the ordinary 
everyday life of world making and world unmaking (2015). Ethics is 
not pre- given; it is rather an ‘ethical affordance’ (Keane 2016, 31) that is 
constantly evolving. Scholars have sometimes placed ethics outside ‘dirty 
politics’ as a moral ground for criticism and reflection (Scheper- Hughes 
1995; Farmer 1999). But as Mattingly and Throop (2018) show in their 
very recent article, in recent years a number of anthropological works 
have emerged to rethink politics and political subjects through the lens 
of ethics: political agency and ethics in Mahmood’s work (2005), politics 
of care and humanitarianism in Fassin’s work (2011). 
Recent studies on politics and ethics also help us to think ‘through 
how the ethical may yet still exceed its specific political emplacement’ 
(Mattingly and Throop 2018, 485; Pandian 2009). Politics and ethics 
at times come together and at other times remain separate (Dave 2012; 
Stevenson 2014; Zigon 2017; Throop 2014). These works provide new 
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lenses to rethink politics and ethics. In my ethnographic setting of 
political dissidents and their struggles in maintaining friendship with 
their political rivals or people with opposing political ideologies, there is 
an ethical stance in the forms of relationality they practise with others. 
Friendship provides a way to think about ethics and vice versa, 
and particular forms of ‘moral experience’ (Throop 2014; Zigon and 
Throop 2014). I argue in this chapter that friendship, and its formation 
and struggle, is entangled not only with ethics, but also with politics and 
ethics in/of politics. In Murali’s and Ranjan’s stories, friendship is at the 
core of their practice of politics and becomes a ‘form of life’ (Das 2007) – 
an ethical life they embody. The friendship is not only about choices, but 
also a reciprocal gesture through which the friendship endures. 
However, friendship is ambiguous; a friend always has the potential 
to turn into a category of enemy, traitor or a rival. Struggling, maintaining 
and learning to be a friend with another person with opposing political 
views involves practising, cultivating and embodying the ethics in/of 
politics. In this sense the friendship with a person holding an opposite 
political view is both intimate and public. The struggle to maintain the 
friendship without referring to it through the terms of ‘traitor’ or ‘enemy’ 
is the work of a new politics that Ranjan and Murali are trying to achieve. 
It is not about right or wrong in following and practising political 
ideologies, but it is about learning and living political ideology through 
their intimate interaction. Through careful and deliberate silencing, 
writing and voicing their political stands with intimate others possessing 
opposing political views, the ethics in/of politics emerges. 
However, the friendship and ethics of/in politics plays out differ-
ently based on where the friendship is coming from and its ethnic, social 
and historical context. In Ranjan’s case, the friendship with political 
dissenters is a struggle in which he cross- checks with his conscience his 
practice of politics, a politics of democracy and freedom of speech. In 
Murali’s case, and his friendship with Sanjay, the ethnic other, it is not 
about maintaining the friendship with political dissenters. It is rather 
about identifying and connecting with another person with opposing 
political views who nevertheless has same ethics in/of politics. The 
friendship and ethics are not divorced from ethnic, social and historical 
realities. The friendship with the ethnic other, who has different political 
ideological views, is a different kind of ethics of/in politics that confers 
an asymmetrical relationship. Such friendship becomes possible by iden-
tifying, recognising and knowing the shared ethics in/of politics of each 
other. However, in both cases the friendship holds the danger of either 
becoming a traitor or an enemy. 
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The ethics and politics that people such as Murali and Ranjan hold 
on to and struggle to keep in their everyday lives is to maintain and 
practise friendship with political dissenters to keep their friendship from 
reaching its limits. In other words, politics and ethics mutually shape 
and absorb one another through the concept of friendship. Politics and 
ethics emerge only in relation to others, as rivals or friends within the 
social historical process, not as an abstract individual ideological stand. 
However, the friendship also has its limits. When one of the friends’ 
political ideologies and practices become unrecognisable or exceed the 
other’s fundamental political ideologies, then the friendship does reach 
its limits. One of my interlocutors told me that when he heard about 
the domestic violence committed by his long- term friend, with whom 
he politically disagreed, he broke off the friendship. In other words, the 
struggle to maintain a friendship with a person with an opposed political 
ideology is overpowered when the bases of the ethics of/in politics on 
which this friendship is maintained come into question. 
The conscience that both Murali and Ranjan claim in their politics 
and in their friendship is both political and ethical. The testimonies of 
Murali and Ranjan evoke how they live with, and learn to live with, mana 
uruthal (stressful uncertainty of whether one is doing right or wrong) 
and kuttra unarvu (feelings of guilt) which are related to manasaatchi 
(conscience). The manasaatchi is located not only within the individual, 
or in the abstract concept or ideology he or she embodies, but also the 
stance he or she takes in the everyday act of living with their intimate 
others while being critical about their activities and ideological beliefs. 
The living and learning to live congruent with one’s ideology and ideas 
while maintaining their intimacy with others brings the concepts of 
politics, ethics and conscience to life. 
Notes
1 The writing of this chapter was made possible through the support of an ERC Horizon 2020 
Consolidator Grant (648477 AnCon ERC- 2014- CoG).
2 As cited in https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schmitt/. Accessed 29 December 2018. 
3 As cited in https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schmitt/. Accessed 29 December 2018. 
4 ‘Rather than exploring successful friendships in different societies, we ought to examine 
friendships gone wrong to assess the effect of different ideas of friendship’ (Pitt- Rivers 2016, 
447).
5 A famous Indian Tamil writer about social issues.
6 This major event took place in the early 1980s. The public library of Jaffna, which contained 
many rare books, was burned down. This fire was to prove a decisive factor in many young 
Tamils’ decision to join the armed struggle against the Sinhala state. 
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Chapter 8
The intimacy of details:  
a Tibetan diary of dissent
Carole McGranahan
The dissenter is a political figure that people think they know. Yet, if 
the public nature of political dissent can generate widespread external 
knowledge, what exactly is it that is known? The topic of dissent or the 
 dissenter –  or both? In each case, claims to truth are key. People make 
claims to the what and why of dissent, as well as to the character of the 
dissenter. Some make claims as unqualified truths; others qualify their 
statements as being things that they have heard, but have not been able 
to confirm. Rumour and gossip about dissent and dissenters dwell in the 
elastic realm of plausible evidence that connects qualified and unqualified 
truth claims (White 1994, 2000). Central to such claims and their repercus-
sions are details (Lutz 2006). Details are crucial to storytelling, to making 
an argument, to building evidence for or against something. If dissent is a 
challenge to the status quo, detail is often an important part of supporting 
or rejecting that challenge. Details are not neutral, but can instead enable 
action. They are part of an interpretative politics of knowledge. Used 
skilfully in the right (or wrong) hands, details can be devastating. 
Public political dissent can connote a false sense of intimacy. 
Public personas are not necessarily the same as private ones, yet the two 
may be very strongly entwined. The private informs the public and vice 
versa. But who is privy to knowledge of the intimate? Intimate  relations 
–  whether of family, friends, lovers or  enemies –  are not always part of 
the story of public dissent or dissenters. Yet this is where the details of 
dissent flourish: those that do matter and those that are made to matter. 
In their positioning as evidence in a story, details carve out a narrative. 
Is this a story of resistance or refusal, a cause that was justified or not, 
with an outcome that was successful, tragic or forgotten? Dissent is not 
a self- evident aspect of any act. Instead it is relational and embedded 
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in contextual forms of interpretation. The same act can be perceived 
in different ways depending on political context. What for some is a 
mundane or unimportant act may for others be rich with significance. 
Details can shape stories and interpretations in meaningful ways. It is 
often in the details of everyday life, including those of intimate relation-
ships, that we can find components of dissent.
In a review of the scholarship on political dissent, anthropologist 
Tobias Kelly suggests that intimate domains such as family have been 
mostly overlooked in favor of the liberal subject and attendant notions 
of personhood, agency and individual freedom (2019). Consideration 
of the intimate, of the relations and commitments of both kinship and 
friendship, require analysis that precedes and exceeds a liberal (or any 
other sort) of individual. Instead, in some instances it is more resonant 
with now longstanding anthropological thinking of the ‘dividual’, fol-
lowing Marilyn Strathern’s 1988 articulation of a self who is created and 
situated in a network of intimate kin relations. In taking the ‘dividual’ as 
a possible, and even primary, self of political dissent, we enter the world 
of familial relations, of obligations and connections to family that are 
manifest and acknowledged in society. For a figure of public political 
dissent, tracking familial and other intimate relations can be a matter 
of surveillance, speculation and strategy. If intimacy is a relationship of 
proximity and an intense form of knowing, then acts of dissent might 
both find shape in and reverberate through our most intimate of rela-
tionships. Individuals may be dissenting with or against family, lovers 
or friends, and thus the details of these social relations may themselves 
challenge societal expectations as well as political projects. 
Situating the dissenter socially involves understanding political 
dissent within ‘the thick social and cultural relations out of which they 
emerge and take effect’ (Amarasuriya et al. chapter 1). Dissent takes 
place within societal frameworks, even as it may challenge them, and is 
thus positioned against a normative belief, form or practice. There must 
be a hegemonic or authoritative condition against which dissent unfolds. 
Beyond this, dissent may take a range of forms. It is not singular nor 
even constant within or across cases. Conditions of possibility for dissent 
shape form and content. In the period of early to mid- twentieth- century 
Tibet, prior to and following Chinese communist invasion and colonisa-
tion, conditions for political dissent were highly circumscribed by a range 
of factors: region, class, education, religious sect and more. Family was 
sometimes also on the list of indicators for dissent.
Only some families in historical Tibet had names and were known 
beyond their own immediate region. The Pangdatsang family was one 
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of them. In the span of one generation, this family rose from being 
important traders in the eastern Tibetan region of Kham to one of the 
country’s wealthiest and most powerful families. Dissent is an important 
part of their story, but not always in a straightforward way. Theirs is a 
family history of challenge to the socio- economic status  quo –  challenges 
that were sometimes polite and sometimes brash, as well as of classic 
political dissent. It is a story of how forms of dissent are positioned in 
relation to both public and intimate domains, and how dissent may at 
times be a politics of submission rather than refusal. As submission, 
dissent is subtle and strategic: a form of consent with ulterior motives 
(Simpson 2016). As refusal, dissent is bold and public: a rejection of the 
probable in favour of the possible (McGranahan 2016a). 
The Pangdatsang family’s ability to manoeuvre within aristocratic 
Lhasa society, for example, rested on their willingness to consent to 
Buddhist logics of patronage, including support of the Dalai Lama and 
his family. This entrance into society, and their efforts to maintain and 
even to amplify their new position and power, were paired with various 
forms of subversion and dissent, ranging from economic monopolies 
to armed rebellions to political organising. As provincial outsiders, 
the Pangdatsangs gained access to power in the Tibetan capital of 
Lhasa. Over the decades, both as a family and as individuals, they 
effectively subverted the system from within and without. While one 
family member was challenging the political status quo, another might 
have been directly involved in reproducing it. At such times, dissent can 
hide in plain sight. While these were not necessarily coordinated actions, 
nor even complementary ones, they all relied on familial connection 
and status. Considering both submission and refusal as forms of dissent 
requires attention to the details of intimate relations.
What do details tell us about intimacy and dissent? What might 
they reveal that broad strokes do not? The intimate was a major, if 
overlooked, focus of European colonial governments. In Asia colonial 
officials intervened in the intimate relations of both colonised and 
 coloniser –  the details of lovers, parents, nursemaids, of who could have 
sexual relations with whom, who could touch whom or who could care 
for  whom –  in efforts to produce certain types of people: essentially those 
who would conform or dissent, or otherwise be problematic (Stoler 
1995; 2001; 2002). As Ann Laura Stoler has so long argued:
It was in the gendered and racialized intimacies of the everyday 
that women, men, and children were turned into subjects of 
particular kinds, as domination was routinized and rerouted in 
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intimacies that the state sought to know but could never completely 
master or work out. (Stoler 2001, 864)
Beyond sexuality, everyday intimacies of kinship and friendship can be a 
form of care and also a means of grounding ourselves in the world. This 
works at multiple scales and on multiple levels. The Pangdatsang family, 
for example, were individual and collective dissidents. Telling their 
story is to move between the scale of family and individual to that of the 
family in Tibetan society and the world, as well as of individual personal 
relationships. It is to join in the broader project of considering ‘intimate 
relationships, intense commitments, and political action in the same 
analytical frame’ (Kelly 2019), rather than separating the political and 
the intimate into public and private domains. Intimacy is, at least in part, 
about knowing and relating to another. There are many ways in which 
the ‘tense and tender ties’ (Stoler 2001) of both kinship and friendship 
inform and are impacted by political dissent.
Dissent: the Pangdatsang family of Tibet
Can consenting to social norms be a form of dissent? In the early twentieth 
century Tibetan social politics favoured the hereditary Central Tibetan 
aristocracy based in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. People from other regions 
of the country were always positioned lower on national social hierarchies. 
Against this socio- political landscape, the Pangdatsang family’s ascent 
to power was extraordinary. They gained national power by simultane-
ously breaking the rules and playing by them. Especially important for 
the family’s rise to power were Tibetan practices of religious and political 
patronage. The family had the wealth to serve as a financial guarantor for, 
and make substantial donations to, the most important monasteries. In 
Tibet these were not just religious institutions, but also governmental ones. 
Paired with this patronage, the family also built a relationship with 
the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama was not only the religious and political 
leader of Tibet, but also a bodhisattva in whom many Tibetans, including 
the Pangdatsang family, had deep faith or depa (dad pa). To be close 
to the Dalai Lama and a patron of monasteries were not just politically 
strategic actions; they also comprised a form of Buddhist religious 
devotion and merit- making. In regard to its social and economic gains, 
the family’s success was widely seen as an example of stereotypical 
Khampa (eastern Tibetan) insolence. It was viewed as an example of 
insistence, that is of refusal rather than resistance.
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To refuse is to insist on another way. It is to redirect rather than 
to resist, and to do so in a landscape of claimed equality rather than of 
subordination (McGranahan 2016a; 2016b; Simpson 2007; 2014; 2016; 
Sobo 2016; Weiss 2016). As powerfully theorised by anthropologist 
Audra Simpson, refusal is a social and political practice generative of 
affiliations, of sovereignty and of change based on notions of exchange 
and equivalence (2014; 2016). Not all Pangdatsang family actions were 
refusals, however. Instead some were strategic, as well as genuine acts 
of culturally structured submission. For example, equality in a Tibetan 
sense could never be achieved in relationship to the Dalai Lama. One 
could achieve only the highest form of service and devotion to him and, 
importantly, to his family. 
It is here that the Pangdatsang family entered into a relationship 
of intimacy crucial to their socio- political ascent and later to their fall. 
The Dalai Lama’s family is referred to as the yabshi (yab gzhis) family, 
and the Pangdatsangs built their relationship with the 13th Dalai Lama 
and then, following his death in 1933, became a primary patron for the 
family of the 14th Dalai Lama. The Pangdatsang family’s very presence 
in Lhasa and meteoric rise in both society and government was a form 
of dissent. It was enabled, however, through masterful forms of acqui-
escence to norms. While each member of the family has their own story 
of submission and refusal, their overall story of dissent led to their public 
downfall, that is, to social death. The conditions for their dissent are 
more than just the classic ‘cracks in hegemony’ political model, but are 
rather a refusal of certain aspects of hierarchy in favour of a claimed 
equality. The possibilities for dissent as refusal are an unpredictable 
combination of luck, savvy and, as Tibetans would argue, karma. As a 
result the possibilities are not only unpredictable: they are also infinite.
When people talk about the Pangdatsang family they often use 
the term ‘the three brothers’. There were other siblings, sisters as well 
as a half- brother, but for over half a century the family has been known 
as ‘the three brothers’. The eldest brother was Yamphel, born in 1900. 
He followed in his father’s footsteps by both leading the family trading 
business and by growing family power in two important new ways: 
entering the aristocracy and holding key government positions. Yamphel 
became governor of the Dromo border region between Tibet and India, 
thus controlling almost all movement of goods and people between 
the two countries. This was not his sole domain of government power, 
however. Yamphel was also the first Trade Minister for the whole of 
Tibet, from which position he controlled all trade in and out of the 
country. 
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The middle brother of the Pangdatsang family was Rapga. Born 
in 1902, he was a rebel intellectual and is still remembered today as 
a figure of political dissent. Persona non grata to both the Tibetan 
and British colonial governments, the details of Rapga’s dissent have 
long been controversial. This is due, in part, to the very systems he 
strove to replace: British colonialism/imperialism and Tibet’s conserva-
tive monastic government. The youngest brother, Tobgyal, was born 
in 1904. He remained in the eastern Tibetan region of Kham in charge 
of the family estates and holding various economic, political and social 
responsibilities. In 1934 Tobgyal and Rapga led a revolt against Tibetan 
government troops in eastern Tibet in protest against conservative, 
centralised Lhasa politics. Their revolt was put down and their brother 
Yamphel in Lhasa made to pay for the damage they had done. The family 
then split geographically: Rapga went into exile in Kalimpong, India, 
while Tobgyal remained at home in Kham and Yamphel resided in Lhasa 
and Dromo. 
All three  brothers –  Yamphel, Rapga and  Tobgyal –  paired 
submission with refusal. Refusal to play by all the rules of the cultural 
game, even if they strategically played by many of them. The Pangdatsang 
were one of the very few ordinary families to enter Tibetan aristocracy. 
Against many odds, Yamphel became the wealthiest man in Tibet. 
Rapga founded the first Tibetan political party. Along with other Tibetan 
leaders, Tobgyal tried but failed to maintain Tibetan political autonomy 
under the People’s Republic of China. Two decades after the colonisation 
of Tibet by the People’s Republic of China, the youngest brother Tobgyal 
was officially and publicly ‘struggled against’ – verbal and physically 
 abused –  as part of the Cultural Revolution. The Communist government 
forced the eldest brother Yamphel to witness the abuse of his brother; 
both men died soon after. 
Such is the story of the three Pangdatsang brothers: powerful 
traders, regional leaders and devotees of the Dalai Lama. While each 
brother had a distinct public persona and place in Tibetan society, as 
individuals they were also understood in the context of family name, 
power and obligation. Their story of dissent is thus individual and 
collective, both intimate and brazenly public.
Family: dissent and the limits of imperial speculation 
How and for whom does the intimacy of family matter in political 
dissent? Consider this sentence written by a British colonial officer in 
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1946: ‘He was accompanied on one or more occasions by a son of about 
12 years of age, dressed in English style, and speaking English’. The ‘He’ 
of the sentence refers to the middle Pangdatsang brother Rapga, at that 
time living in exile in Kalimpong. 
Rapga was an advocate of modern democracy as an alternative to 
Tibet’s conservative, inward- focused government. The political party 
he founded needed application forms and membership cards, and so 
Ragpa, together with his son, travelled to Calcutta to have these printed. 
However, his order aroused the suspicion of employees at the British 
printing shop. They contacted the police who agreed Rapga’s order 
was of concern and placed him under surveillance. In a ‘TOP SECRET’ 
report on his political activities, W.A.B. Gardner, Additional Deputy 
Commissioner of the Police, Security Control, Calcutta wrote the above 
sentence describing Rapga and his son. Both observation and potential 
accusation, this sentence is part of a document that set in motion Rapga 
Pangdatsang’s eventual deportation from India for being an enemy of 
empire. In determining Rapga to be a dangerous political figure, Gardner 
also observed him to be a family man. But what work did British officials 
hope for from this particular ethnographic detail? 
Son, brother, husband, father, friend, rebel intellectual: Rapga 
Pangdatsang was all of these things. His political activism unfolded 
in the context of community, but not only that of his fellow exiles and 
dissidents. Who he was and what he politically desired were shaped, in 
part, by family. Thus while Rapga’s political party was his own endeavour 
in partnership with like- minded intellectuals, his family status always 
formed part of the context for his political actions. Yet in this case of 
Tibetan dissidents in British India, the significance of Tibetan family 
relations was not necessarily understood by imperial officials.
Tibet was not colonised by the British, and so Tibetans’ experiences 
with British empire were imperial but not colonial. If colonial empire 
was ethnographic (Cohn 1987; Dirks 2002), then imperial empire was 
speculative (McGranahan 2017). That is, the ethnographic effort to 
know colonial subjects in order to rule them effectively was in the case 
of imperial subjects merely speculative. In both contexts, the conceit of 
empire enabled claims to knowledge even when this was not actually 
held. As imperial subjects in British India, Tibetans’ political subjec-
tivity was also reckoned along an additional axis: were they pro- or 
anti- British? Rapga was neither. His political activities revolved around 
neither England nor empire, but focused instead on political possibility 
for Tibet. For British officers in India, this indifference to empire in one’s 
political view of Tibet was unthinkable (Trouillot 1995).
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It is no surprise that governments use family ties in efforts to 
know and maintain surveillance on dissidents, as well as to punish 
them. Details about the Pangdatsang brothers are sprinkled liberally 
throughout documents in the British imperial archives in London. The 
focus is narrowly on the brothers; other family members do not make 
appearances. This is one reason why the detail about Rapga’s son has 
always stood out for me. In my reading and re- reading of related files, 
he never appears again. Yet his political education in the hands of his 
dissident father would shape his life. Sonam Dorji, the archival English- 
speaking son, went on to be a beloved history teacher at a prestigious 
school in Kalimpong. Teacher to a multiethnic Himalayan student body, 
he was assigned to teach Indian history. Instead he taught Tibetan 
 history –  within which, as more than one of his students fondly recalled, 
all of his historical examples were from Kham, the eastern Tibetan region 
that was home to the Pangdatsang family. ‘We called him ‘Mr. In- Kham,’ 
explained a former student. ‘All of his examples in class began with “In 
Kham….”’ Other students recalled that he was a happy, nice man who 
liked telling  jokes –  a ‘jolly good fellow’, according to one of his former 
 students –  and who was passionate about Tibet. Rapga’s granddaughters 
recalled similar stories about their father, smiling and laughing at the 
memory.
If students didn’t know the answers on exams, they would write 
‘East or West, Tibet is best’ at the end of their exams and hope he 
would give them points. 
Imperial speculation about the condition, form and audience of Rapga’s 
dissent paled in comparison to his actual project; in other words, the 
British got much wrong (McGranahan 2005, 2017). But in the hierar-
chical operations of empire, lack of substantative knowledge was not 
an insurmountable obstacle for imperial officials. In its absence, ethno-
graphic detail was deployed as actionable truth. Rapga was proclaimed 
guilty via speculation. Ann Laura Stoler (2020) argues that the force of 
details in colonial writings serve to mark difference as meaningful and 
even explanatory.
It’s not just that details matter, but rather their placement and 
timing as evidentiary claims. 
Placed in his file as evidence against Rapga, the detail about his son 
misses as much as it tells. For if Sonam’s appearance in British imperial 
AMARASURIYA 9781787357792 PRINT.indd   158 30/07/2020   13:31
 THE InTIMACy OF DETAILS  159
archives is only fleeting, he nonetheless features strongly in Rapga’s own 
personal  archives –  his diary, newspaper clippings and family stories. 
When he was deported from India, Rapga took Sonam with him on the 
long journey through China back to Tibet. Eventually they returned to an 
India that was no longer under British rule, where father and son lived 
until their respective deaths. 
Diary: a record of family, everyday life and politics
Not all details are imperial. If details in imperial archives are crafted and 
used as evidence, then what of details elsewhere? What of details written 
for oneself, with no intention of others reading or using one’s words? A 
diary provides just such a counter- archive to British files. Rapga’s diary 
from the period following his deportation from India to China provides 
a counter- narrative to British political claims about him (McGranahan 
2017), but it does much more than that. 
If a diary is generally understood to be the record of an individual’s 
days and thoughts, that of Rapga fits this description. In reading his 
diary from this period, when he was in Shanghai and Nanjing in China, 
and then travelling overland to and in Tibet, his entries are noteworthy 
not so much for form as for content. They portray the thoughts of a 
Tibetan dissident returning to his homeland after over a decade in exile, 
doing so as a civil war raged in China, to be followed by the victory of 
Mao’s Communist Party. His writings reveal an individual’s response 
to vast political change, firstly in China and eventually in Tibet as the 
Communist People’s Republic of China took control. Amidst Rapga’s 
accounts of his travels, daily activities, moods, thoughts and reports on 
politics are constant references to his family.
Sonam’s first appearance occurs in the diary’s third entry on 
Saturday 21 August 1948, which notes that ‘Sonam and Dashen went to 
a movie’. This sentence appears in the middle of his entry. 
Read and wrote in the morning as usual. Then did application notes 
for India. Sonam and Dashen went to a movie. Went to Tangshen to 
see Lingthang la. The mail carrier arrived. In the  evening…  played 
mahjong.
Rapga’s entire diary is mostly in this style, a recording of his days with 
plentiful references to family throughout. Three other examples follow 
this consistent pattern.
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Monday 30 August 1948: Read and wrote after getting up. Cost for 
food 14 GY. Went to market. Paid 3 GY for cleaning lens of 
camera. Paid 20 GY for underpants and shirts for Sonam and 
wife.
Wednesday 15 September 1948: Paid for medicine, ‘sprin’ [aspirin], 
1.5 GY. Both wife and I are not feeling well from something 
like flu. In evening sent telegraph to younger brother Tobgyal 
in Dardo. Went to see trangshi [performance].
27 November 1948: Received telegraph from younger brother 
Tobgyal. Sent letter to wife. Made new boxes. Gave 4 GY to 
Dahrang’s servant. In the evening washed body and went to 
bed at 10.
His  family –  his wife, his son, his brother – are a consistent and ordinary 
but loving presence in the diary.
Such minutiae of everyday life matter. They provide ground and 
structure, tethering us to routine and relationships. Throughout this one 
diary, written during his time in China as well as in Tibet, Rapga tracks 
just such minutiae. Consider these entries from his time in Shanghai: 
‘Bought a fan. The temperature is high’, followed by ‘Went to have Indian 
curry for dinner’ on 3 September 1948, followed by ‘Bought envelopes 
for letters to America’ and ‘The monsoon starts’ on 5 September 1948. 
After Rapga’s return to Nanjing on 11 September 1948, the entries 
become increasingly political and reflective of the situation around him. 
This example is from 19 September 1948. 
Got up early and went to buy books on Chinese scholars who 
travelled the world, and read. 
Three days later, on 22 September 1948, he was working again. 
After I got up in the morning, I read travel guide. … In the evening 
I studied important English words until late. 
Rapga also kept word lists in his diary. He clearly read with a dictionary 
alongside him, as his books are full of underlined English words with 
Tibetan definitions written neatly in the margins. Some of the words on 
his word list give a sense of Rapga’s political interests at the time. They 
are written in his diary in the following order. 
bland temerity
religious zeal
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This is the vocabulary of a man seeking political change. Such aspira-
tional learning, monitoring politics, reading and writing were all parts of 
Rapga’s everyday life.
Let us return to the colonial officer who in 1946 described Rapga’s 
son Sonam as ‘about 12 years of age, dressed in English style and 
speaking English’. These and other archival details were used by British 
officials to build a case against Rapga in which they claimed that he 
was not a Tibetan political dissident, but a dangerous and duplicitous 
Chinese political operative. The officials’ dishonest accounting of details 
and politics was used to deport Rapga to China. For them it mattered less 
who Rapga was and more who they needed him to be. Thus the imperial 
portrait of the  dissident –  as an individual whose political aspirations 
for Tibetan democracy and modernisation directly challenged Britain’s 
desire for Tibet to remain a buffer state between India and  China –  did 
not so much sketch the man himself as present a misleading caricature. 
Rapga’s brand of Anglophilia was anti- imperial, schooled in Asian 
ideas of nationalism and modernism inspired by Sun Yat- sen, leader of 
the Chinese Kuomintang Party. He was thus not the ‘mimic man’ memori-
alised in literary scholar Homi Bhabha’s writings (1984) as an individual 
who strove to become, say, English (or Chinese, for that matter) in a 
rejection of their colonised identity. Instead Ragpa was proud to be 
Tibetan; he was someone who attempted to use an international set of 
linguistic and ideological tools to improve his own country, Tibet. These 
desires extended to Sonam. In China Rapga set about securing a Tibetan 
language tutor for his son and enrolling him in an English language 
school. This time, however, his orientation was to the Americans rather 
than to the British. 
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On Saturday 18 September 1948 Rapga went to the US Embassy 
in Nanjing to inquire about enrolling Sonam in the American school. His 
efforts were successful, as he recorded two days later in his diary.
Monday 20 September 1948. Had breakfast at 8. Called for a car 
and went to the American Embassy. The driver lost the way 
and we were late. When we arrived, we were treated with 
respect by the staff. Met [name unclear], the ambassador’s 
personal receptionist. … We were given the letter for Sonam 
to go to school, which was written by the ambassador himself. 
Then we met someone who is going to the school. We asked if 
Sonam would stay with the younger kids. Wrote Sonam’s age 
as 14 years, his birthday on 15 January and his nationality 
Tibetan. … The school fee was said to be US 15 dollars per 
month.
Sonam started school one week later, on 27 September. At this point the 
political situation in China had become more one- sided as Mao Zedong’s 
Communist Party gained important ground in their civil war with Chiang 
Kai- shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) government. Rapga tracked the unfolding 
events in his diary.
Sunday 7 November 1948. Worried after hearing about serious 
problems from the Communists.
Monday 8 November 1948. There is nothing in the market in the 
town. The Communists are said to be very dangerous. … The 
price of everything is raised. The price of rice is raised up to 
1,200.
Tuesday 9 November 1948. The condition of the [KMT] military is 
bad and the price of gold is raised up by 3,000 and rice up by 
900. I went to the Indian Embassy.
On Wednesday 10 November the KMT government imposed martial law 
in Nanjing following public uproar over prices of food and other goods. 
The same day Americans began evacuating the city.
Wednesday 10 November 1948. Couldn’t get anything in the market. 
The American school was closed. The whole day we  could 
hear the sound of airplanes taking [away] American families. 
On that day I was anxious, but couldn’t do anything.
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Rapga collected Sonam from his school and attempted to get the family 
out of Nanjing by boat or aeroplane. The costs of both had doubled or 
were rising sharply. Two days later he described the situation.
Everyone, rich or poor, is continuing to leave [Nanjing]. There are 
too many empty houses around where we live, as everyone has 
escaped, and this is making me feel anxious. Since I haven’t slept 
for a few days, I went to bed at 7 pm. 
Eventually he was able to get Sonam safely out of the city, and then 
departed himself. The family was reunited a few months later in the city 
of Chengdu, close to the Tibetan border; it was en route to the home that 
Rapga had left 15 years earlier following the revolt mounted by him and 
his younger brother Tobgyal. Rapga’s journey home to Tibet in 1949 
unfolded alongside the increasing victories of Mao’s Communist army.
Friends: the details of connection and commitment
As the situation in China deteriorated, politics took over Rapga’s diary. 
Each day’s entry was a record of some combination of the following: 
meetings with various political leaders, thoughts about the situation, books 
he was reading to try to find responses to the situation and, as ever, notes 
on family and now, increasingly, on friends. After his long exile Rapga 
returned to Tibet, arriving by donkey in the border town of Dartsedo on 15 
June 1949. He described his return in his diary entry for that day. 
All the Khampa Tibetans welcomed me. They gave a reception at 
Pum. Permanent residents of Dartsedo also came. In the evening 
someone named Keshab Sodor presented me with khata [kha btags, 
a Tibetan religious scarf] and meat. 
Two days later he noted further meetings. 
Got up early in the morning and went to see Sadhu[tsang], two 
Shikhang Li Auyon, the chieftains of Derge, Chatreng, Lithang, 
and the fourteen families of Trehor and Go- Dag- Mar- gsum [Gojo, 
Dagyab, and Markham]. 
These details are crucial in preserving indelibly the Tibetan socio- politics 
and hierarchies of the day. However, the meaning of these details is not 
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evident without context. Where some scholars will stop and see cause for 
revelation, or even revolution, others will keep reading, unaware that 
something of importance has just been shared. Context is needed for 
shaping narratives beyond the limits of political expediency.
As Rapga travelled throughout Kham, he was received with respect 
and honours. In each location he was offered gifts such as khata, leopard 
skins, meat, barley and sheepskins; in turn he offered gifts such as 
Chinese and Indian cloth, salt, sweets and fruit. Many of the people he 
encountered were old friends and acquaintances; if not individuals he 
knew personally, they were friends of his younger brother Tobgyal or 
admirers of, or competitors with, his elder brother Yamphel. Rapga was 
not just any political dissident returning home. He was a Pangdatsang. 
As a member of such an important political family, he was bound to 
individuals and communities through that kinship as well as through his 
own personal friendships.
An anthropology of friendship is not always part of our stories 
of political dissent. Yet  friendship –  including but not only that of 
political  comrades –  can be an important source of strength for dissidents 
(Maunaguru 2019). On 22 October 1949, in the middle of a caravan 
journey lasting several months, undertaken on foot and horseback 
through Kham, to discuss the political situation with other Tibetans, 
Rapga recorded the following news. 
Left at 9. Arrived at the bottom of a mountain peak. There is good 
grass and water. Heard Geshe [Gendun] Chopel was released 
[from prison in Lhasa] and that he is well. I felt happy. 
Gendun Chopel is possibly the most famous Tibetan religious and 
political dissident- intellectual of the early to mid- twentieth century 
(Lopez 2006). He and Rapga had been close colleagues in Kalimpong, 
where they developed a friendship built around politics and the idea 
that change was needed in highly conservative Tibet. Just as Rapga 
was deported from India on trumped- up charges of being a Chinese 
Kuomintang spy, Gendun Chopel had been imprisoned in Lhasa on 
similarly contrived charges. He was accused of being not only a KMT spy, 
but possibly also a Communist one. 
The connection between Rapga and Gendun Chopel was cause for 
government suspicion. Friendship as evidence of guilt is another way in 
which details of intimate relations may be used (Hakyemez 2019). There 
are forms of intimacy that come from living together in shared  spaces 
–  dormitories, army camps,  prisons –  or from intense work together 
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on common causes, be they political, social, environmental, religious 
or other. On other occasions intimacy may follow rather than precede 
friendship. One such form of connection found in many societies are 
sworn friendships.
In 1934, the year of Rapga and Tobgyal Pangdatsang’s rebellion 
against the Tibetan government, Rapga became shagpo (shag po), or 
sworn friends, with two brothers. On 28 October 1949, after 15 years of 
separation, these sworn friends were reunited. Rapga records the moment 
in his diary.
Arrived in Golog Gyatso village. In the village, Lithang dButhub 
dPon Achu and his youngest brother came to see me as we took 
nagen (mna’ gan) in 1934. 
To take nagen means to swear to be friends for life. It is a lifelong promise 
to be faithful friends, to share things such as property and to die for one 
another; to break this promise was considered a sin. Along with the 
verbal commitment, taking nagen includes making some sort of physical 
connection. For example, individuals becoming shagpo may lock fingers 
together, take snuff from each other’s fingers or prick fingertips and 
exchange blood to seal their oath. Rapga stayed longer in this village 
than in his other stops, and then continued on his way toward the Pangda 
family home in Bathang [commonly referred to as ‘Ba’] where his brother 
Tobgyal was waiting for him. Also expecting him in Ba was a small group 
of American and British Christian missionaries, including one who was to 
become part of Rapga’s close circle of kin and friends.
‘Went to Western man Pakerson’s birthday.’ ‘Pakerson’ refers 
to George Patterson, a renegade, anti- imperial Scottish Presbytarian 
missionary, journalist and political advocate for Tibet. On 23 May 2000 I 
read this diary entry for 9 August 1949 and promptly picked up the phone 
and called George Patterson (with whom I had already done several 
interviews). I read the entry out loud to him. He laughed and said that his 
birthday is 19 August (1920) and so he must have had his birthday party 
early that year. He remembered that he had invited Rapga, his brother 
Tobgyal, Gara Lama and ‘the French girl’ with whom they all thought 
Patterson should have an affair. Being a Christian, he implied, he did 
not pursue that. Turning back to Rapga, he reflected on that period from 
June to October 1949 when they were all together in Dartsedo.
Rapga was constantly writing, translating Sun Yat- sen, Marx’s 
Das Kapital, and he had an international law book. He was always 
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drafting policy. Rapga was the brains behind Tobgyal. Tobgyal was 
the charismatic one, the horseman, the Braveheart. He was a gem.
Patterson would go on to write numerous books about Tibet, all of which 
featured the Pangdatsang family in some way. Many of these books were 
in Rapga’s library in Kalimpong, in the home he returned to as the Chinese 
communists came to Tibet and where he lived out the rest of his life. 
Rapga was someone who read with a pen and ruler at his side. The books 
in his library were all dog- eared with numerous sentences underlined 
and copious notes written in the margins. One book, however, had 
just one sentence underlined in it. The book was God’s Fool by George 
Patterson, published in 1956. The sentence underlined read: ‘Rapga sat 
silent and inscrutable’.
Conclusion
Details disrupt. They challenge the confidence of historical and political 
claims we make about others. They provide a counter- narrative to 
accepted versions of not only who people are or were, but also of the 
histories that they lived and made. Details can also distract or seduce, 
turning our attention to tangents or implications or beliefs in service 
to other projects. In the case of political dissidents, and in the use of 
details as evidence, both disruption and seduction are often in play. 
Even as Rapga’s own life and archives provide details of the intimacy 
of dissent, for example, other sources such as British imperial archives 
turn the same details of family into self- evident accusations of guilt. 
Once imperial officials determined that Rapga’s political dissent against 
the Tibetan government did not advance British interests, they decided 
that accumulated details could be converted into evidence against him. 
Details were made to matter to facilitate a certain outcome. The irony is 
that these details were important in ways not apparent to agents of the 
British empire. As descendants of the Pangdatsang brothers consider 
the family’s complicated and controversial place in twentieth- century 
Tibetan history, the details of dissent and its repercussions are still 
important today.
This story of dissent took place in a period of great societal and 
global change. The efforts made by the Pangdatsang family to challenge 
the Tibetan status quo and political system were both situated within 
the system and positioned against it. Their story, like so many others, 
is full of contradictions. Tracking their connection to the Dalai Lama 
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illustrates this. The patriarch of the family, Pangda Nyigyal, father of 
‘the three brothers’, is the one who cultivated the family’s relationship 
with the 13th Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama gave trade concessions to the 
family. After the murder of Pangda Nyigyal in 1921 he gave the family 
even more economic opportunities, as well as entrance into the Lhasa 
aristocracy (McGranahan 2002). The period of chaos following the death 
of the 13th Dalai Lama in 1933 saw the revolt of Tobgyal and Rapga 
against the interim Tibetan  government –  in part for its treatment of 
individuals close to the late Dalai Lama and regression on his modernisa-
tion programmes for Tibet. 
After the 14th Dalai Lama was discovered in 1937, he and his 
family were brought to Lhasa. Here the Pangdatsang family became 
patrons for his  family –  a cultural position of social prestige and spiritual 
merit as well as of economic investment. To be a patron or sponsor, 
a jindak (sbyin bdag), was to contribute to the family’s expenses, to 
offer them shelter when travelling and to take care of them as needed. 
Yamphel would send gifts to the young Dalai  Lama –  apples, puppies and 
other wonderful  things –  and reserved the best room in his Kalimpong 
home for the Dalai Lama’s mother. 
Being a patron in a traditional sense is not necessarily a progressive 
undertaking. Patronage in this sense is not  dissent –  or is it? For a family 
from the provinces, rather than the civilised capital of the country, said to 
have entered the aristocracy through the ‘back door’, it might indeed be 
an example of how submission, or playing by the rules, can be a form of 
social challenge. This is an example of what Audra Simpson (2016) calls 
‘consent’s revenge’. Revenge has its own series of complications. At the 
same time that the family sponsored the Dalai Lama’s family, Rapga was 
writing and organising against various institutional aspects of Buddhism 
as anti- modern. He proposed reforms for Tibet that included secular 
education rather than only monastic education and pondered out loud 
the viability of the Buddhist reincarnation system, especially in relation 
to political governance. He did this alongside taking the Dalai Lama as 
his spiritual guide and treasuring a personal visit from him in his last 
years. Ragpa also dissented while simultaneously participating in the 
Pangdatsang family’s sponsorship of the Dalai Lama’s family. While he 
was in China, the Dalai Lama’s elder brother Gyalo Thondup was also 
there; he was aged just 20, while Ragpa was 46. Rapga recorded all of 
their interactions in his diary, using the formal title yabshi seyku (yab 
gzhis sras kyu) (‘respected son of the Dalai’s family’) or various shortened 
forms of the title to refer to Gyalo Thondup. Here his entries are given in 
their entirety:
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26 October 1948: Yab gzhis sras kyu arrived.
11 December 1948: Yab gzhis sras kyu arrived.
12 December 1948: Rented a residence for yab gzhis sras and 
received the bill for it.
15 December 1948: Yab gzhis sras arrived.
16 December 1948: In the evening yab gzhis sras kyu left.
6 January 1949: Received letter from yab gzhis sras.
11 January 1949: Sent a telegram to yab sras.
13 January 1949: Received salary and wages from [the KMT] Tibet 
Office.
14 January 1949: Yab gzhis sras came for money.
17 January 1949: Went to the Pakistan Embassy with yab gzhis sras.
19 January 1949: Sras kyu arrived and said that he was leaving for 
Shanghai.
26 January 1949: Yab sras arrived … Yab sras stayed at my place 
for the night.
30 January 1949: In the morning, yab gzhsi sras asked me to find 
out the price of gold.
Dissent is often entangled in webs of obligations and relations, just as life 
is. Such obligations and relations give us family and friends with whom to 
take a  stance –  and/or family and friends against whom to take a stance. 
Taking a stand against existing political systems is a bold step, often not 
well received. Challenge to existing systems is discouraged, with Tibetan 
sayings such as ‘The nail that sticks up gets hammered down’ providing a 
cultural background to this.
Taking action in the world is something we do in community, even 
when we act alone. In many situations, responsibility for the actions of 
an individual is communal. You may be representing your family or your 
employer or your country, for example. However, there is a difference 
between political responsibility and symbolic representation. The actions 
of a dissident may be either. Yamphel Pangdatsang was held financially 
responsible for his two brothers’ revolt against the Tibetan government. 
In contemporary Tibet, under the rule of the People’s Republic of China, 
families of Tibetans who self- immolate in protest at Chinese oppression 
have been arrested, simply for being family members of the self- immolator. 
Intimate relations thus both matter and can be made to matter in 
specific ways to political dissent. Relationships make people. Individuals 
are produced through being in relation with others (Strathern 2020). 
Details of kinship and friendship reveal intimate ties between knowing 
and being, including the multiple facets of an individual. There is the 
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person who is the dissident, who has their own individual and communal 
ways of being in the world. Yet there is also the person whose subjec-
tivity is governed through external, sometimes imperial management of 
intimate relations. These are not discrete individuals, but may often be 
one and the same. Details matter to both, and learning how to read them 
and discover how they are used can provide insight into the dissident as 
a social, not just a public, person.
However, detail is not ‘thick description’. In anthropology, ‘thick 
description’ means to describe  something –  be it a practice, a person, an 
interaction, a  belief –  in the necessary cultural, political and historical 
context (Geertz 1973). It relies on participant observation and is a 
hallmark of contemporary anthropological scholarship. Thick description 
might use details in arriving at thickness, but it is a different project than 
mere attentiveness to detail. Instead, analytical attention to detail brings 
us in close to the relational aspects of selfhood, of being. If, as Tobias 
Kelly argues (chapter 6), scholarship on dissent has mostly presumed a 
liberal subject, then details of kin and friend relations can dislodge this 
misleading presumption. They can direct us instead to other ways of 
configuring and understanding how and when people take a stand for, 
or against, something. 
Details about Rapga gathered from his family, his friends and 
from his own diary provide testimony to the person he really was. They 
bear out the truths of the person, the political dissident, the intellectual, 
the family man that he presented in public. They do not confirm the 
suspicions of British officials, who accused Rapga of being a duplicitous 
Chinese spy. Instead, through words spoken and written over the decades 
in (at least) two languages, these tell the story of a dissident as his family 
and his friends, including his fellow dissidents, knew him. 
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In this text, Tibetan words are transliterated and presented two 
ways. Upon first mention, I provide a pronounceable rendering of the 
word followed by an official transliteration using Wylie style, as follows: 
jindak (sbyin bdag). In subsequent uses of the word only the pronounce-
able version of the word is presented.
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Chapter 9
Dissident writing and the intimacy of 
the archive in authoritarian Indonesia 
Doreen Lee 
Dissident texts harbour a strange temporality. Their ideas burn in the 
present, but their authors intend them for future generations. Often they 
are written in isolation or exile. Papers are voluntarily thrown away and 
books banned. Yet their impact cannot be measured by the size of their 
readership or their contents alone. For whom are these works written? 
Why are they written and how are they made? The ephemerality of 
dissident texts forces us to think about political work encapsulated by 
texts in other  ways –  not through the successful popularisation of radical 
ideas, nor by the veneration of texts as sacred source material for political 
movements, but as surviving evidence of activist creativity and activist 
relations in hostile political environments. 
In this chapter, I focus on the production of activist archives and 
dissident papers in the final authoritarian decade of New Order Indonesia 
(1988–98) to explore issues of circulation, intimacy and dissent. Why 
was writing such an important dissident tool for young student activists 
and political prisoners? How did dissident papers transform social 
relations? These questions locate the intimacy of dissent in the crafting 
of activist propaganda, in the small moments where illicit materials 
were handmade or reproduced and in the ways activist relations were 
remade and implicated by imprisonment (this is especially apt in political 
contexts where ideologically tainted citizens are shunned). Intimacy, in 
this case, is a term that captures the emotive and relational qualities of 
shared political work, including the technological aspects of such work 
(Shokooh Valle 2018). I deploy the concept of the ‘intimacy of dissent’ 
alongside the other authors in this volume to highlight how Indonesian 
activists produce socio- political objects and relationships that challenge 
the interwoven forms of state citizenship and family belonging. 
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In her ethnography Young Heroes, anthropologist Saya Shiraishi 
reveals how the safety and security of everyday life for middle- class 
families in New Order Indonesia are in fact political templates for 
state power: children are unable to make their own choices and family 
harmony can only be maintained in alignment with the Father’s (read: 
the dictator Suharto’s) benevolent authority (Shiraishi 1997). Dissidents 
do not appear in this family portrait at all. My chapter uncovers the flip 
side of that official portrait, where an assemblage of misfit and disavowed 
individuals gather against alignment. On this flip side strangers are 
vital, mothers are trusted couriers, sisters become comrades and fellow 
prisoners act as mentors. In doing so, this chapter examines two themes 
at the heart of this edited collection: how intimate relations produce and 
are informed by the conditions of dissent, and the historically, politically 
and culturally specific ways in which dissent is performed, mediated 
and interpreted. It does this by foregrounding the production and 
circulation of particular textual forms, showing how the acts of writing, 
copying, circulation and reading form a chain of dissent that is unevenly 
embedded in intimate experiences and in newly emerging publics. 
Anti-communism as political weapon 
Anti- communism was a prevailing feature of New Order governance; 
its myths and narratives outlasted the Cold War to remain an effective 
political weapon against New Order dissidents. The political ‘crime’ of 
communism was therefore the most severe political charge that the New 
Order regime (1966–98) could level against its dissidents. Its political 
and social consequences were vast. The criminalisation of communism is 
rooted in the aftermath of an attempted coup by left- wing army officers 
that occurred on 30 September 1965. The coup lasted less than a day, 
but the violent military response it provoked took over one million lives 
in a massive crackdown on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and 
its alleged sympathisers, including artists, farmers, teachers and ethnic 
Chinese. Once Suharto’s New Order regime came into power, it outlawed 
all Marxist- Leninist ideas, and sought to displace the populist rhetoric 
of Indonesia’s founding fathers with its own state- building tenets. Even 
after the killings were over, the New Order took care to suppress signs of 
resistance by calling for society’s constant vigilance against bahaya laten 
(latent dangers) – a term that specifically referred to a conspiracy theory 
about an underground communist resurgence. Over time all forms of 
activism acquired the lethal possibility of being labelled communist. 
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In its final decade of power (1988–98), the New Order regime 
in Indonesia pursued left- wing university student activists, accusing 
them of disturbing society, insulting the state and of being communists. 
Activist youth, many from relatively comfortable urban backgrounds, 
became national figures as a result of extensive press coverage. The 
evidence for their ‘subversion’ often consisted of activist papers. In 
1988 three students, Bambang Isti Nugroho, Bambang Subono and 
Bonar Tigor Naipospos, were arrested for possessing and distributing 
illicit anti- regime literature, including student publications, banned 
‘communist’ books, and the novels of the political prisoner and writer 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer. Most of these materials were no doubt 
home- made underground copies bearing the classic tell of mimeo-
graphed  pages –  the letters with holes (a, o, p ,b, q and d) were dark with 
ink and the texture of the paper was thin and rough (kertas buram, lit. 
blurry paper). 
In 1989 a student activist named Bambang Bithor Suryadi was 
arrested in Jakarta for the crime of passing out ‘dark leaflets’ (selebaran 
gelap). He was caught with 2000 political leaflets that were critical of 
the regime, put on a show trial in 1990 and jailed (Lee 2016, 25–9). 
The year 1996 was particularly bad for dissident students, many of 
whom were caught up in the Suharto regime’s violent efforts to suppress 
then- opposition leader Megawati Soekarnoputri’s political party, the 
Indonesian Democratic Party, and its supporters. The nation’s attention 
turned to several young activists in the PRD (People’s Democratic Party) 
who were captured in a multi- city hunt by police and military for pro- 
democracy activists. They were put on trial and jailed; their papers and 
leftist books were seized and catalogued by the state. 
PRD activists were among the most radical and erudite of student 
groups to emerge in the New Order. This chapter highlights their literary 
production for those reasons. Their prolific writing culture followed 
an autodidactic tradition similar to other leftist student groups; they 
translated important theoretical texts from other languages, wrote and 
distributed political essays, printed their organisation’s magazines and 
pamphlets for workers, students and the general public and wrote letters 
and other political writings in prison. These young intellectuals were 
released in 1998 after nearly three years of incarceration, following 
Indonesia’s transition to democracy. Reformasi (Reform), as Indonesia’s 
democratisation movement was called, inaugurated a new period of 
media freedom, digital innovation and popular protest. 
The political constraints set by the New Order regime and the New 
Order prison allowed student activism to flourish in unexpected ways. 
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In this chapter I analyse how two different modes of activist writing, 
one produced surreptitiously but freely ‘outside’ and the other produced 
inside the prison under the all- seeing censor’s gaze, are vested with 
meaning, intimacy and sensuous affect. Under what conditions, and by 
what technologies, is activist writing made? What social relations and 
different publics do they call into being? How and what do imprisoned 
activists write in their letters? How is a photocopied piece of paper from 
a defunct organisation significant? How do their paths of circulation 
reflect the meaning- making and contingencies of political work in New 
Order Indonesia? 
These questions speak to a political economy of paper that dissolves 
the hierarchical distinctions between different genres of writing and, 
indeed, different grades of paper. Faced with the dispersed matter of 
student activist archives, the ethnographic and historical project has 
less to do with assembling a collected whole for analysis (i.e. form and 
content united; an orderly collection that fulfils the definition of an 
archive and forces the texts to ‘speak for themselves’) and more to do 
with the examination of a cluster of affects and memories associated 
with making and assembling such scraps in the first place. Indonesian 
pro- democracy activists were constrained by a high level of political 
repression and surveillance; they had to combat powerful state institu-
tions that included the Ministry of Information, the Attorney General’s 
office, the army and police, as well as their own campus authorities. 
In this climate of repression, activists produced, shared and attempted 
to control information through print materials. The paper economy of 
the Left suggests an informal and yet accessible print economy through 
which dissident ideas and materials circulated. 
In the first half of this chapter, I analyse how activist material 
culture in the 1980s and 1990s was dependent on a small range of 
printing technologies, such that activists became familiar with the sight 
and smell of mimeograph machines and photocopy toner. Pamphlets, 
leaflets and other documents were often crafted or laid out by hand, 
laboured over by a few dedicated writers and printed in small batches 
that reflected the limited financial means of students and the narrowed 
arena of print itself. Photocopies and mimeographed material were a 
significant yet unremarkable part of activist culture. I pay attention to the 
materiality of these photocopies and print materials, how their constitu-
tion of a shadow archive reveals what Ann Stoler has called the ‘epistemic 
unease’ of New Order power and authority (Stoler 2009). Photocopying 
shops, printing shops and mimeograph machines became unstable but 
necessary nodes of production within Suharto- era radical politics, while 
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students became consumers and borrowers of reproductive technologies 
that they did not control. 
The second mode of activist writing reflects a much longer 
tradition of writing from the New Order’s jails, what former prisoner 
Hersri Setiawan calls ‘an Indonesian art of exile within Indonesia itself’ 
(Setiawan 1995). Prison writing is a creative, defiant practice of artistic 
survival that crosses generations of dissidents in colonial and postcolo-
nial Indonesia, most famously represented by Pramoedya’s collection 
of writings from the penal colony of Buru Island. Over 14 years Pram 
wrote and researched, even as his work was repeatedly confiscated and 
destroyed. Prison writing often represents the essence of individual 
suffering and political subjectivity,  yet –  being born of extremely 
politicised and oppressive  conditions –  it is never properly private. It is 
instead sociological writing that contains the seeds of its future forms.1 
Wilson, the PRD activist who gave me a copy of his prison writings, 
practised this view. For him the prison was also a university. Wilson 
was an observer of everyday life in Cipinang prison and he was an avid 
historian. He met other political prisoners whose experiences he helped 
to record and distribute in his letters. The monotony of prison life led 
him to spend his days writing letters, compiling an important record 
of networks and connections forged between generations and between 
a culture of incarceration and a culture of knowledge. I view prison 
writing as an underground technology of  dissent –  a necessary continua-
tion of political work that began outside, but was not fenced in by prison 
walls. Literature from New Order prisons reached a wide international 
audience of supporters who became part of the Indonesian struggle for 
freedom and human rights (Missbach 2014). 
Taken together, these modes of writing trace the endurance and 
adaptation of dissident methods in a climate of authoritarian repression. 
Their continuous exclusion from the public sphere reflects conventions 
in media practice and political hegemony; dissident political papers 
are fragile, in part due to their anachronistic analog character in the 
digital age (‘it’s only paper!’), and partly to do with their undeniably 
left- wing critiques and hence illegitimacy (‘it’s written by communists!’). 
Between the outside world and the ‘world behind bars’ (Wilson 2005), 
activist writing shifted shape and proliferated even under surveillance. 
Writing got them imprisoned, but imprisonment produced more writing! 
Again, what made activist writing possible? How do we understand its 
textuality, its archives? 
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Paper flows
This chapter originated from my observations of the commonplace act 
of photocopying print materials among Indonesian activists engaged 
in political resistance and activist dispositions toward such acts of 
replication and the copies themselves. These observations concern the 
material outcomes of ‘technological reproducibility’ (Benjamin 2006) 
and arose from my study of the vibrant material culture of the Reformasi 
(Reform) movement after the fall of Suharto in 1998. From 2003 to the 
present I carried out fieldwork in Jakarta and various cities with activists 
of leftist and populist persuasions. 
It was obvious that the Reform movement generation of pro- 
democracy activists who had fought the dictatorship were adept at DIY 
culture. Their paper productivity combined an expertise in bureaucratic 
practices of documentation and organisational flow with more creative 
expressions of activist labour. Activists made their own propaganda 
fliers, books, posters, T- shirts, banners, graffiti, commemorative mugs, 
grant proposals, political analyses, demonstration strategy blueprints, 
websites and so on. On top of crafting the objects and ideas of political 
resistance, activists had more routine paperwork to deal with, such as 
budgets, press releases, petitions, applications, form letters, meeting 
notes, organisational reports and reading materials for seminars. 
My reflections on these forms deepened when it became evident 
that replicating documents was an embedded practice that escaped 
political discourse and yet formed an infrastructural guide to how activ-
ists responded to political work and ideas, both within themselves and 
between each other. Benedict Anderson’s famous argument about print 
capitalism’s role in shaping nationalist and globalist imaginations reso-
nates here (Anderson 2016 [1983]). Print capitalism conditioned an 
individual’s experience of ‘imagined community’. It also shaped the 
expectations of a reading public for the dissemination of information, in 
particular of political information. At the same time the friendships and 
alignments that constituted activist community could be traced in the 
production, tactility and trajectory of its print material. 
It would be easy at this point to rely on the analytical purchase of 
the concept of mediation to argue that activist papers and reproductive 
technologies mediated or produced activist sociality. Faye Ginsburg, 
Lila Abu- Lughod and Brian Larkin have described how anthropologists 
of activist media tend to focus on the dissident intentions of activists 
in making such media and on their often unintended effects or contra-
dictions. In this framework, mediation becomes the process by which 
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control over receptivity and perception is lost and agency given over to 
technological  factors –  or, as I prefer to think, mediation is the point at 
which the context of media ecology is realised (Ginsburg et al. 2002, 
9–10). 
Equally natural is the idea that some forms of writing hold their 
intimate register in a more stable way than others: are, indeed, always 
more intimate than others. Letters or personal diaries for example, 
are more intimate than human rights reports or manifestos. Dissident 
papers, however, by their temporal evolution (in particular their 
strange turns and complex routes of travel), trouble such classifica-
tions about what is properly private or public. They invite a careful 
examination  of when things are private and when things are public, 
and by what historicising or politicised affects or even scholarly inter-
ventions. The examples below are taken from my fieldnotes. They 
sparked my thinking in this regard, with more examples to follow when 
I discuss the space of the prison. For now, a chance encounter captured 
in my research notes from more than a decade ago conveys the generic 
efficacies of activist paperwork for instilling and recalling embodied 
political practice. 
15 March 2005
A visited me to borrow Ed Aspinall’s dissertation on the Indonesian 
student movement which I had read earlier and thought would be 
useful for him. [I lived in Benhil, a neighbourhood lined with large 
and small photocopying shops, so it would be easy for A to make his 
own copy.] He surprised me because the first thing he said was ‘I 
ran into B on the street. He was in Benhil, making photocopies of 
selebaran (fliers), and he asked me to help him pass them out, so 
that’s what I did. He gave me a big stack, and I passed them out 
along the way here.’ The small, palm- sized flier was titled in all 
caps: RAKYAT BERSATU TAK PERNAH DIKALAHKAN (THE PEOPLE 
UNITED WILL NEVER BE DEFEATED). 
 A had not been in touch for many years with his former comrade- 
turned- enemy B. They had started City Forum together, the largest 
student alliance during Reformasi, but one by one activists left the 
alliance to start their own organisations, often under a cloud of 
antagonism and conflict. A had been one of the first to denounce 
B. But the passage of time had resulted in a friendly encounter 
on the street, doing familiar things that they used to do together, 
making copies and passing out fliers to passersby in advance of the 
demonstration.
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In the spirit of exchange between ethnographer and activist, I had lent 
a copy of an academic work in English to be copied. The exchange 
necessitated a face- to- face encounter. These were still the days before 
digitised texts circulated freely by email or PDF, and for both pre- digital 
and precautionary reasons would pass from hand to hand. Just prior to 
meeting me, A had his coincidental and yet not unexpected run- in with B 
on a street full of photocopying shops. A’s account of his encounter with 
his former adversary B was strangely pleasant. Even though the two men 
had not spoken for years, each had treated the other in a friendly manner. 
Both knew what to do with a giant stack of leaflets. Passing out leaflets 
was advance work, a way of broadcasting activist media and announcing 
the details of a coming demonstration directly to the people. A naturally 
accepted the task from B. In sharing the labour for B’s planned demon-
stration, the two connected as potential comrades once again, falling into 
habits forged during the tumultuous mass demonstrations of 1998. 
This example from my fieldnotes emphasises my earlier point about 
how photocopies are a taken- for- granted part of the infrastructure of 
 dissent –  recognised by activists themselves as necessary political work, 
but not as uniquely valuable work. The demonstration remains the main 
event. The scholarly bias in the literature on recent social movements is 
similarly slanted, focusing on the rallies and speeches of direct action, 
instead of the labour behind the scenes, the small- scale routine practices 
that lead to such performances of direct action.2 As David Graeber writes 
in his withering analysis of bureaucracy, anthropologists do not like to 
talk about the ‘socially efficacious’ aspects of paperwork, for ‘paperwork 
is boring’ (Graeber 2012). 
An anthropology of archives 
In the last decade there has been growing theoretical interest in the 
contingencies of the  archive –  from revisitations of Jim Scott’s canonical 
contribution to studies of subaltern resistance in Weapons of the Weak, 
which urges us to read against the grain and between the lines of 
dominant epistemologies for hidden transcripts, to Ann Stoler’s attention 
to the epistemic instabilities inherent in the colonial archive; from the 
insight of Matt Hull and Veena Das into the graphic ideologies embedded 
in bureacratic paper forms to Katherine Verdery’s reflection on the 
similarity between ethnographic methods and spycraft (Scott 1985; 
Stoler 2009; Hull 2012; Das 2007; Verdery 2014). These approaches 
point to an emerging consensus about the historical, cultural and 
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political importance of content and form contained within paper and 
documentary  practices –  an epistemic, relational and analytic signifi-
cance that proliferates our ethnographic reserves. 
The archive idea is especially apt for describing the sense of 
discovery and urgency linked to potential resources or repositories for 
unofficial histories. My interests in activist practices of using and making 
print propaganda introduce a more technical slant on the production and 
circulation of paper. As I have written elsewhere, paper must be thought 
of in terms of what Heidegger pronounces techne, a craft or practice that 
brings forth revealing forms (Lee 2016, 30). From this perspective it is 
evident that it is not enough to study activist propaganda for its contro-
versial ideas, but rather as a specific experience of paper. 
Between 2003 to 2005 I built my own archive through fieldwork, 
picking up leaflets from the street and buying T- shirts supporting the 
pro- democracy movement, as well as copying the personal papers of 
individuals. In subsequent years (2008–2015) I made copies of numer-
ous prison letters, demonstration diaries and other artefacts that remain 
unpublished. Indonesian activist material culture was flush with differ-
ent kinds of paper, yet the prodigious production of paper materials has 
still to find a stable home within Indonesia. I became aware of a post-
Reformasi shift in attitude among activists, who now saw themselves as 
historical agents of change and therefore gained a new appreciation of 
the value of papers from the past. 
Everyone I talked to, it seemed, was hoarding something of 
documentary value. Powerful and personally meaningful papers in 
activists’ possession might include a copy of an important speech, a rare 
out of print text, a real (asli), uncensored investigative report that was 
never released to the public, a secret document related to the destroyed 
Indonesian Communist Party and, most often cited, copies of the works 
of the dissident and imprisoned writer Pramoedya. Almost all were 
photocopies instead of originals. Some of these texts have found their 
way as copies or originals to archives abroad, notably in the Netherlands 
and the US, but in Indonesia itself there are no official archives for 
Generation 1998 and the Reformasi-era student movement. Papers 
remain scattered in private hands, and as such are susceptible to loss, 
loan or sale. Student materials were not designed as a secure archive, 
yet photocopies have gained an afterlife as historians and archivists turn 
copies of found material back into ‘authentic’ documents of the student 
movement (Lee 2016, 55–6).
In general, Indonesian activists did not view photocopies, especially 
contemporary papers in everyday use, as artefacts of importance, until 
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over time they became part of the historical record. From live matter 
to freeze- dried memento. Once photocopies moved into the realm of 
documentation (dokumentasi), they acquired a value that made them 
authentic (asli) artefacts of the student movement. Certain documents 
were more valuable than others, especially based on notions of rarity 
and radical content. I received offers to buy Reformasi-era papers or 
commemorative volumes of activist publications for a tidy sum, often a 
few hundred dollars, by activists who needed funds and were willing to 
relinquish these papers. 
Scholarship too is tied to class and civilisational distinctions about 
the value of particular kinds of pasts. Gastón Gordillo makes the point that 
our sentiments are formed by institutional and educational ideologies 
that are tested by the conceptual chasm between ‘ruins’ and ‘rubble’ 
(Gordillo 2014). The bourgeois world- view sees ruins as monumental, 
romantic and resonant landscapes, as remnants that survive and create 
the appropriate class attachments to tradition, heritage and historical 
meaning. Ruins are ‘a favored view of a vanished past’ to be preserved 
for the future (Stoler 2016, 347), whereas rubble denotes nothing more 
than bare form, as in the phrase ‘reduced to rubble’. Gordillo’s insight 
into rubble as nothingness and his own cultural attachment to ruins is 
similar to the contrast between the archivist’s ruinology (the notion that 
artefacts, photographs and documents are precious residues of the past) 
and the Indonesian activist’s necessarily practical view of paper. 
My interviews with activists, and my fieldwork observations of 
how activists interacted with  paper –  when they expected or disregarded 
the appearance of paper and propaganda, as well as the relations that 
paper  facilitated –  provide ethnographic insights into copying technol-
ogy’s political salience. On the one hand the ubiquity of photocopy ing 
technology reflected broader changes to institutional and political 
behaviours in urban Indonesia, signalling the entrenchment of bureau-
cratic paper flows and downstream technological access. On the other 
hand, however, activist technologies did not automatically proceed 
from analog to digital (mimeographs to photocopies to emails and text 
messages to online platforms) according to an evolutionary scale of 
speed, scale and efficiency. The next two sections of this chapter draw 
on archival material as well as on interviews with activists and archivists 
who made and collected copies from the analog activist era to examine 
activist strategies during the era of expanding copying possibilities. 
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An endless supply of paper: the photocopy revolution
The modern bureaucracy of the twentieth century is defined by the sheer 
magnitude of paper, film and photographs that individual and organi-
sational activities generated. Copying technologies such as microfiche, 
photostats and mimeographs were introduced to libraries and other 
institutions in the US as early as the 1940s. The 1950s saw the introduc-
tion of photocopiers for commercial use. By the 1960s the photocopying 
revolution had forced archivists to reckon with the massification of 
copies by developing new guidelines for documentation, incorporating 
new types of data beyond the traditional forms of paper, photograph and 
film (Hinding 1993). As Hillel Schwartz put it, copying technologies fed 
‘the illusion that to copy was to comprehend’ (Schwartz 1998, 235). 
In the 1980s and 1990s Indonesian copy shops were common in 
small towns and large cities alike. They often doubled up with photostu-
dios that provided yet another service of technological reproduction: film 
development. The combination of photostudio- copy shop served ordinary 
people’s needs on a daily basis. For each bureaucratic transaction, 
including enrolling in school, applying for jobs or getting married, citizens 
had to comply with the New Order rule that a copy of their KTP (Kartu 
Tanda Penduduk, identity card) be submitted. As photocopiers became 
more affordable to buy or rent, photocopy shops opened in dedicated 
streets and lanes surrounding business districts and universities. More 
prosperous offices operated their own machines, where the ‘office boy’ 
made photocopies in addition to tea or coffee. NGOs also embraced such 
trends, providing dependable copiers, internet service, desktop computers 
and fax machines for financially challenged activists to borrow. 
In an essay on the role of new media in the democratisation of 
post- socialist Hungary, Dányi reveals the limits of the technological 
determinism that inspired the philanthropist George Soros to flood 
Hungary with cheap photocopiers in the 1980s (Dányi 2006). Soros 
aimed to help the pro- democracy movement discreetly and in indirect 
ways to realise his vision of a democratic ‘open society’ of critical debate 
and free speech. His foundation purchased nearly 1000 Xerox copiers 
and sold them cheaply in exchange for Hungarian forint, which the 
foundation then used for scholarship monies, thus hitting two dissident 
goals with one stone. However, the machines became a new locus for 
state surveillance; few Hungarian dissidents were able to go undetected 
in using the new copying technology. 
Such anxieties also existed in 1990s Indonesia. Activists had to 
learn and discern which copy shops were safe for producing dissident 
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texts. Khori, an activist who had gone to university in Salatiga, East Java, 
described the caution that had to be employed. 
Salatiga was a military town. So copies only took place in selected 
shops. It was scary but the spirit of resistance was everywhere. If 
you used the word ‘regime’ [to refer to the New Order], it was a 
sign that already made you stand out. Your plans would wither on 
the stem (layu sebelum berkembang, lit. wither before blooming). 
Khori’s description of Salatiga as a place simmering with resistance 
beneath the surface stands in contrast to its domination by the military. 
As he notes, simply writing the word ‘regime’, let alone stating what kind 
of regime the New Order was, risked setting in motion a chain of conse-
quences ending in arrest. Recall the ‘dark leaflets’ made by university 
students in the 1980s that became evidence of subversion. 
Technological choices necessarily involved economic calculations. 
As Jafar, another activist involved in the student movement in Salatiga, 
East Java, put it, there were limits to each technology. 
The limits were that propaganda always meant a lot of copies. If we 
needed to print one ream (500 copies), it was cheaper on the mesin 
stensil (mimeograph machine). If we were only printing 100 copies, 
then why exhaust ourselves typing it out [on stencil paper] only to 
print 100 copies; it would be easier to photocopy. 
Another activist surmised the relative advantage of stencils versus 
photocopies. 
Stencils are cheap and yield large quantities, but are time- 
consuming. Photocopies on the other hand are expensive, can yield 
small quantities, but are fast. 
These technological limitations, and the considerations of speed and 
efficiency versus cost, show the practical decisions student activists made 
that informed the ‘traditions’ and look of activist material culture. 
Intimate memories of the mesin stensil
When I asked individuals to recount who made propaganda and how, 
activists emphasised the sensuous and material qualities of paper and 
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various reproductive technologies, varying from photocopies to the 
manual mimeograph machine (mesin stensil). They mimicked the sounds 
so that my interviews were punctuated by the jedeng-jedeng-jedeng 
mechanical thud of the mimeograph machine and the whine of the 
fax machine and, in one humorous instance, the extended whirr of the 
old- fashioned dial- up modem. Activists remembered the techniques of 
making documents vividly and it was during these descriptions of how 
things were reproduced, assembled and disseminated that we see both 
craft and expertise as activist sites, as well as the embeddedness of an 
involuntary  memory –  a technological habitus that had become a part of 
bodily experience. People would get excited in remembering how they 
made propaganda, how they figured out daily routines of dissidence 
(which shops, what time to send email, which office facilities to borrow). 
In short, they remembered the creative labour rather than the objects 
themselves. Gunawan said to Hengky: 
What was the name of our publication? [LAPAR, i.e. hunger] I 
wrote all of them. The acronym meant something [but he couldn’t 
remember what].
Talking about paper, copies and propaganda triggered a classifica-
tory response in activists, who situated the role of paper within the 
economic and material decisions and opportunities they faced. ‘Before’ 
or ‘in the past’ [i.e. before Reformasi in 1998] activists had no money 
to make more sophisticated propaganda nor to pay for mass amounts 
of photocopies, After the fall of Suharto, however, they received paper 
donations (bantuan kertas) from the public, among other logistical gifts. 
In the scarce economy of the New Order years and in the boom economy 
of the Reformasi years, activists had to manage the costs as well as the 
risks of producing anti- regime propaganda. They knew exactly how 
much it cost to print rather than photocopy large numbers of propaganda 
fliers and what grade of paper they could afford to use. Specifically for 
the small selebaran (flier), they always used a cheap yellowish newsprint 
on the mesin stensil, but to duplicate reading materials they would 
always use photocopiers, so that they did not have to create a master 
stencil, which was very time consuming. In the Reformasi years activists 
budgeted more consistently for paper and photocopying services for 
their training materials or for their office support needs. They would 
include a budget line for paper supplies and photocopies in their funding 
proposals to donor agencies, providing snapshots of these costs in that 
given year. 
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The stencil duplicator, more commonly known as the mimeograph 
machine, was the copying technology that evoked the most sensuous 
memories for activists. In Indonesia people called this the mesin stensil 
(stencil machine). Even non- expert practitioners of the craft recalled 
the machine in minute detail. They described it through the sensory 
pleasures of memory, mimicked its overwhelming loud noise when 
the stencil went through the barrel (‘jedeng jedeng jedeng’) or recalled 
its distinct smell. ‘An odd thing,’ Yunus, a former activist, commented, 
‘you’ll notice that stencil machines were always hidden in a corner, 
whether in an office or elsewhere.’ At first he implied that there might 
be a relationship between the illicit materials being replicated and the 
concealment of machines in the dark  shadows –  but then he broke into a 
laugh and explained the real reason. 
It stank! The ink was black and thick as toothpaste, its grease 
inevitably got on all your clothes and its smell pierced your senses 
(baunya menyengat).
The time and emotional investment in creating the stencil was neces-
sitated by the fact that the process left no room for mistakes. It was a 
one- off print run. If you made an error in the inking and printing, activists 
intoned, ‘habis lah’ (it’s over) or ‘mati lah’ – you’re dead. Round letters 
were especially impacted by the degradation of the master stencil. The 
letters would be filled with ink, with the result that the letters A, O, P and 
B bore the obvious signature of the mimeograph machine. The ‘midline’ 
sag from the pressure caused by the ink drum in the print process would 
cause the front end of the stencil to break. Another problem might be the 
imperfect transfer from the Daito brand wax paper (a plasticised microcel-
lulose), which left a permanent squeezed line on the page or mashed lines 
together. The legibility of the document testified to the skill of the printer. 
Although it was obviously associated with anti- establishment prop-
aganda usage, activists justified their preference for the mimeograph 
machine as a matter of scale and economy. They claimed that the tech-
nology did not discriminate in terms of content and ideological leanings. 
Indeed the word stensilan (stencilled material) is still used as a genre 
name, implying racy, sexual or pornographic material. Three activists I 
spoke to named the types of materials most likely to be mimeographed 
during the New Order: Pramoedya’s books, dime store novels and 
pornography, and the Bible. This list appears as an eclectic assortment 
of sacred and profane texts, but in fact it catalogues the popular and 
transgressive genres of underground stensilan (non- Islamic religious 
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texts, ‘decadent’ and low- brow material and left- inspired social realism) 
that circulated in opposition to Suharto’s Java- centric state culture and 
the increasing literary poverty in New Order schools. It is Pramoedya’s 
presence on that list that most explicitly stands for the growing political 
consciousness of youth at the end of the New Order. 
Letters after Pramoedya
There are those dissident intellectuals who survive state violence in 
various forms, much like Pramoedya, who withstand their terrors to 
live and make new ways of knowing, remembering and creating. Hersri 
Setiawan, another Buru captive, tells us that the arts survived on Buru by 
commission from the military command and through acts of individual 
bravery. Musicians formed orchestras and wayang (shadow puppet) 
troupes, storytellers broke the rules to visit other camps after dark and 
writers ‘were able to “play with two books”’, writing one set of works for 
the authorities and another for themselves (Setiawan, 19). 
Between 1965 and 1979 Indonesia’s best- known author oscillated 
between severe punishment for having a pencil in his cell to the daily use 
of a typewriter. Pramoedya was granted permission by the Buru prison 
authorities to carry out writing work full time in 1973. He later wrote 
that he had to teach himself how to think again. His writing discipline 
and ability had been undone by the hard labour forced on all prisoners on 
the undeveloped island of Buru. Like other prisoners Pramoedya cleared 
jungles, built roads and buildings and planted rice with his bare hands. 
Forcing prisoners to build their own prisons and to labour to feed the 
guards was particularly cruel. 
Compared to the political exiles sentenced by the colonial 
government in the 1920s, Pramoedya’s generation of political prisoners 
was far worse off. Indonesia’s first vice president Mohammad Hatta, 
for example, famously sailed for the prison island of Boven Digoel 
accompanied by his entire library. Pram’s literary world in prison was 
self- made and fragile. He was never sure what would survive inspection. 
Many times in his life he watched his work be confiscated, destroyed and 
burned; he was even forced to destroy it himself. His writing conditions 
not only on Buru, but even after his release in 1979, reflected the 
arbitrary and zealous punishments of the New Order state. 
Had these materials fallen into unwanted hands, they no doubt 
would have been the reason for yet another interrogation. Thus the 
AMARASURIYA 9781787357792 PRINT.indd   186 30/07/2020   13:31
 DISSIDEnT wrIT InG  187
opportunities I found to write very much depended on my intuition 
for safety. (Pramoedya Toer, The Mute’s Soliloquy, ix)
Pramoedya’s notes from Buru were first published in Indonesian in two 
volumes in 1984. They were later translated and edited into a single 
English- language volume, entitled The Mute’s Soliloquy, in 1988. The 
book is a collection of letters to the author’s adult children, written in 
the knowledge that they would not receive them. Certain things might 
be able to enter the prison after a difficult sea passage and tricky naviga-
tion through official channels (occasionally Pram received a rare parcel 
from his family, for instance), but it was impossible to imagine smug-
gling things out. In a reply to his daughter Astuti’s precious letter, Pram 
describes the collective emotions prompted by a letter from the outside.
A letter is such a personal thing, but here, on Buru, it’s a public 
possession, to be read and perused by anyone curious about a 
fellow prisoner’s family. Letters circulate from hand to hand, from 
one barracks to another, forever producing a flood of tears in their 
readers. (The Mute’s Soliloquy, 216) 
Pram’s letters are full of history. They tell alternate accounts that have 
been vanquished by the New Order state; they witness death and 
humanity in exile. The appendix contains a list of 315 prisoners who died 
on Buru, a documentary project that Pramoedya was forced to abandon 
when it came to the attention of the military. It detailed the myriad 
ways in which Buru was lethal; prisoners were routinely beaten and 
brutalised, and death might come from ordinary infections, toothache or 
drowning (The Mute’s Soliloquy, 344–64).
The young PRD activists adored Pramoedya. They read his work 
underground, called themselves ‘Minke’ after the main character of the 
Buru Quartet3 and, of course, reproduced his books for their libraries. 
Pram himself became an honorary member of the PRD and received 
a PRD award in  1996 –  a proud moment for the youthful activists and 
for Pram himself. He became a living icon in his final years, visited by 
admirers and ardent leftists from a small, liberal circle. 
Writing from behind bars
The intergenerational contact between Reformasi-era activists and 
different generations of political dissidents strengthened both groups at 
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the end of the New Order. The Reformasi generation was heavily involved 
in transitional justice advocacy and historical accountability campaigns 
on behalf of the large number of survivors of state violence. Dissident 
writing across generations can appear disconnected by the specificity of 
each individual’s cause and coming- of- age story, for the elderly appear to 
us through memoirs while the young continue to agitate; yet they share 
the condition of being marked by the state as that against which society 
must be defended. Ann Stoler reminds us that the populating of prisons, 
camps and (penal) colonies shares a ‘filiation’ despite their different 
forms, borders and locations. Only the inhabitants of these spaces change 
according to who and what the state designates a risk (Stoler 2016, 
chapter 3). Together the different holding patterns enact a ‘carceral 
archipelago’ that hides its common  purpose –  a spatialised matrix for 
displacing dissenting  bodies –  to create exiles, criminals or, as the New 
Order liked to encourage, ‘transmigration’ to the outer islands. 
The carceral archipelago is a state- driven experiment with different 
containment strategies; from the prisoners’ perspective, the carceral 
archipelago created pockets of concentrated knowledge and artistry. 
Both perspectives express the experience of political modernity. Rudolf 
Mrázek’s joint examination of the Nazi concentration camp of Terezin 
and the Netherlands East Indies penal colony of Boven Digoel reveals 
the historical (and natural?) outcome of concentrating so many socialists 
in one place. The outcome of political exile was not despair, but the 
realisation of a futuristic and experimental refashioning of everyday 
camp life. The Terezin camp lectures were exemplary, as was the 
orchestral music. The Boven Digoel socialists established communes and 
practised voting (Mrázek 2016, 135). The urbane and cultured Jewish 
population in Terezin had all carried books into camp; so had the Dutch 
language- educated nationalists in Boven Digoel. The New Order prison 
had the potential to be similarly concentrated. Prison sociality produced 
bursts of activity. Wilson, the PRD activist who was jailed in 1994 and 
then again from 1996 to 1998 in Cipinang, Jakarta, wrote a letter with 
various requests for more materials. ‘Jakobus [PRD activist and Wilson’s 
cellmate] requests a German dictionary because he is learning German.’4 
‘Please bring me music cassettes. The selection here is poor.’ 
To read Wilson’s letters is to overhear Pram’s influence on the 
younger generation (Mrázek 2015). Like Pram, Wilson had a historian’s 
mind and eye. Joesoef Ishak (Pram’s longtime publisher and a former 
prisoner himself) wrote with rhetorical flip in the foreword to Wilson’s 
book Dunia di balik jeruji (World Behind Bars): ‘How lucky Wilson was 
imprisoned’ (Wilson 2005, viii). By this he meant that no one else could 
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have captured the details and textures of life in Cipinang prison so 
well. Wilson reserved the more mundane aspects of prison life and his 
personal thoughts for his family’s letters. He could watch some television, 
listen to the radio and play football when it did not rain. He could even 
speak to other political prisoners occasionally, including members of 
the 1965 generation (political prisoners labelled as communists) and 
even Xanana Gusmao, the famous East Timorese revolutionary who was 
under constant guard in a separate cell block. 
The elders of the 1965 generation reached out to the PRD activists 
first. Knowledge of the young activists’ sentences had circulated and, not 
long after they arrived in Cipinang, Colonel Latief introduced himself to 
Wilson. Colonel Latief was by that time the only surviving actor of the 
coup that occurred on 30 September 1965. Following that first encounter, 
Wilson would receive a summons to visit from Colonel Latief’s cell- mate 
–  although these visits were often hampered by the older man’s poor 
health. Seeing Xanana took more bureaucratic effort. Wilson persisted 
with the burdensome paperwork needed to establish a prison football 
league led by Xanana and co- directed by himself (personal communi-
cation, Jakarta, August 2018). Armed with an official letterhead that 
bore the requisite signatures and stamps from the warden, Wilson 
gained regular access to Xanana Gusmao. One can only admire his apt 
calculation that, in football- mad Indonesia, the desire for sport would 
generate its own priorities for prisoner  welfare –  to the extent that a 
recently convicted political prisoner could visit a high- ranking political 
prisoner under heavy surveillance in another block. 
These interactions and encounters with prior generations of political 
prisoners prompted Wilson to write. He wrote essays about Xanana for 
publication in alternative media. He even lent his ears and hands to piece 
together the autobiography of Colonel Latief. The colonel had suffered a 
stroke in prison and his poor health made the work difficult. True to his 
military background and colonial- era education, the colonel had strong 
beliefs about the importance of history- as- chronology. His life story had 
to begin with his birth and work its way to the present. The process began 
with his giving Wilson sheets of handwritten paper that, because of his 
stroke, were covered with nearly illegible writing. Wilson would type this 
up and hand it back to the colonel to read and correct. The following day 
the colonel would resume his story from exactly the end point of those 
typed notes. Wilson described the process in one of his letters. 
Speaking with him is like speaking to a person from another planet. 
Sometimes he has to repeat himself many times to be clear. Finally I 
AMARASURIYA 9781787357792 PRINT.indd   189 30/07/2020   13:31
190 THE InTIMATE L IFE OF DISSEnT
asked him to type. I gave him the typewriter and ribbon. His writing 
is no longer chronological.5 
After a few days fuelled by his own enthusiasm for the work, the colonel 
fell ill from his exertions. Colonel Latief’s limited ability to share his story 
reflects the broader public health issues and social isolation faced by 
former 1965 prisoners outside. Vannessa Hearman’s research into the 
disappearing memories of the survivors of the 1965 genocide in Indonesia 
draws attention to the extreme fragmentation of oral histories inflected by 
trauma (Hearman 2013). Hearman argues that neglected histories suffer 
when the regime’s narratives are strong, resulting in a ‘poor sociality’ for 
dissident memory. Ironically it is only in prison, and close to the end of his 
life, that the deteriorating memories of Colonel Latief find a new anchor. 
When the elderly prisoner could no longer continue, Wilson stepped in to 
organise the pages they had produced together. To his regret, the project 
ended in the biographical year 1946, leaving out crucial reflections on 
Indonesia’s post- Independence years and, importantly, one man’s truth 
about the 1965–6 anti- communist purge. 
The prison writings of Pramoedya and Wilson show the extent to 
which left- inspired solidarities could carry on in a right- wing climate, 
even with the state’s paranoid intrusions into daily life.6 Pram’s fellow 
prisoners became his family through their bodily sacrifice for one another. 
Wilson and the other PRD activists lived together in Cipinang prison with 
dissident farmers, union organisers and East Timorese activists fighting 
for independence, as well as the political prisoners of 1965 who had 
been condemned to die. In Cipinang prison Wilson wrote copiously, for 
himself and on behalf of others. Letters to his family end with poems 
that he composed, many featuring sad stanzas about the passing of the 
seasons in the outside world. 
Wilson also maintained a lengthy correspondence with supporters 
abroad, notably Carmel Budiarjo in London and Max Lane (addressed 
affectionately as ‘Bung’ or ‘Brother Cokro’) in Sydney.7 These letters 
contained much more political information, a decision driven by Wilson’s 
awareness that he had to risk becoming the secret source for interna-
tional advocacy groups’ human rights reports on political prisoners in 
Indonesia. In a letter to Carmel Budiarjo, dated 3 June 1997, Wilson 
shared a comprehensive list of the 39 political prisoners housed in 
Cipinang prison, from the death- row inmates of the 1965 generation, 
accused of being communists, to imprisoned journalists and opposition 
politicians from various political parties. He included an account of their 
health; all had some ailment or the other and, perhaps expectedly, the 
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PRD activists were afflicted by failing eyesight. This letter concludes with 
the recent arrests and prison transfers of his comrades. Several of the 
young PRD activists were denied visits and were confined in isolation. 
Please, he wrote, publicise this information widely without mentioning 
where it came from, as it might put me and my comrades in danger. 
I end with another of Wilson’s letters, addressed to his ally Max 
Lane in Australia and dated 18 November 1997. Still another seven 
months to go until the New Order fell and nine months to pass before 
he received amnesty. Wilson’s tone in this letter is both determined and 
melancholy. He and his comrades are trying to be political activists as 
best as they can inside the prison. It is increasingly evident that letters 
are his lifeline. 
Our visitors are decreasing. This means that we are getting less 
news about the outside world. We only receive news of the national 
situation through newspapers and magazines that enter the prison. 
I’m getting more concerned that we are becoming stupider in here, 
just as the rulers intended with our imprisonment. The information 
we have gotten is very fragmented, in pieces and at times not believ-
able. People do give us books, but the majority [of books we have 
here] are theory books and history books that I brought from home 
(via my mother). The contents are boring, unlike reading Links 
or Greenleft. Alternative publications such as Suara Independent 
[Independent Voice] are also no longer making it in because of the 
tight surveillance in Cipinang. We are still holding our small discus-
sion sessions. Anom organizes them. I focus more on the search 
for logistics. I write letters to many people about many things, and 
receive few replies. (So this is our fate in prison, brother) So please 
brother, you or whoever in Australia should write letters to me. 
Send them to my house in Depok (I’ll give you the address at the end 
of this letter). If it is hard to send a letter, send a postcard. [Letter 
continues on to the next page.] 
 One thing the regime wants psychologically from us is for 
us to feel alienated from the outside world. I try to resolve this 
by diligently writing letters to various people or institutions. I 
even wrote to the political attachés in the American and Swedish 
embassies. Only the American embassy responded by sending me a 
state department publication about human rights in Indonesia and 
other countries. If Bung Cokro cannot write me a letter or postcard, 
then surely people from ASIET or other Resistance [sic] can write 
to my address. My mother will be the one to smuggle them into 
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prison. She’s become an expert at this. Write things that don’t have 
to be ‘always political’. Letters from outside prison, quoting the 
words of Nelson Mandela, ‘are like garden flowers in a desert’. I will 
reply to every letter that comes in. There’s plenty of time for it all. 
[Translation mine]
We begin to see here the strenuous effort required to maintain the links 
to an outside world. Whether due to dwindling public interest or the 
regime’s attempts to isolate its dissidents further, the exchange rate 
between inside and outside is climbing ever higher: one densely packed 
six- page letter in exchange for a postcard; meagre scraps of low- quality 
news circulating within the prison; the value of a non- political, personal 
word is as a flower in the desert. At the same time dissident connections 
to their intended publics cannot be completely cut off, even as the 
political situation becomes volatile. The steady stream of prison writing 
makes its way through personal links as mothers, fathers and friends 
join the cause as couriers. In hindsight the letter became one of the few 
dissident techniques that survived the tests of time and prison life itself. 
Letter- writing preserved the knowledge generated by political imprison-
ment and distributed news to international human rights groups and 
advocates abroad. These then recirculated the news in their publications 
to sympathetic audiences in Western democracies. It is, as Wilson himself 
indicates above, the start of a logistical chain of relationality, of redistri-
bution and connectivity between dissidents and their supporters. 
Wilson’s letters were a small fraction of what the PRD activists 
actually produced. Without fail, with revolutionary discipline, with 
the anticipation that their movement legacy could be read by future 
generations of activists as a blueprint for resistance, the PRD activists had 
held weekly discussion sessions that they then recorded as typed notes. 
Wilson funnelled some of these political notes through his letters, sent 
out through trustworthy family and known persons. When the political 
situation worsened outside, the activists made a difficult decision to pulp 
thousands of pages they had written. Like Pram, Wilson sacrificed his 
work in response to a political intuition that prison surveillance would 
get worse. 
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Conclusion
This chapter reads two modes of activist writing, the propaganda flier 
and the prison letter, as interconnected methods of dissidence in authori-
tarian Indonesia. They are, I argue, exemplary genres of activist writing 
that reflect the evolution of ordinary things such as photocopies and 
letters into media for subterfuge, testimony and resistance. They are 
locations for certain vivid memories, intimate, radical and otherwise. 
Importantly, the ordinary nature of a copy and the dispersed and 
intimate quality of personal letters have normalised such technologies 
and techniques of dissidence so as to render them forgettable reposito-
ries of sentiment and labour. 
In this chapter I have tried to situate activist copying practices 
within a broader frame of technological influence and historical legacies 
in political resistance movements. The production, circulation and 
consumptions of texts produces novel forms of dissent, alongside new 
forms of solidarity and emerging publics. In a political context enframed 
by action- oriented narratives of social movement, the unremarkable 
nature of paper is noteworthy. It forces us to rethink the historical and 
social reconstruction of such movements through scripts other than 
ideological propulsion or the overwhelming force of protest. Finally, 
I draw attention to the ways that intergenerational and international 
friendships and solidarities are forged through the work of writing and 
making papers. The last argument I wish to repeat is this: the space of 
the page is a space of endurance. The activist archive has survived the 
strengths and weaknesses of state power and individual and collective 
resistance. It is the fruition of only one of a variety of futures that activists 
imagined; in many cases it has yet to come together. 
Epilogue
Activists may also withhold their papers from circulation if it renders 
their communities vulnerable. Two decades after Reformasi, many 
Indonesians continue to believe New Order narratives about PKI threats 
to the nation. At the time of writing (January 2019), new cases of anti- 
communist rhetoric have emerged. An environmental activist named 
Budi Pego has been sentenced to four years in prison, allegedly for 
brandishing a banner featuring the hammer and sickle image at an 
anti- mining protest, and police have seized ‘communist books’ from 
independent bookstores in Kediri, Java. The attorney general, a political 
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appointee, has endorsed the unconstitutional action of banning all books 
thought to contain communist ideas. The public response encapsulates 
the indeterminacy of leftist, progressive and liberal futures in Indonesia, 
muffled and amplified as they are by indifference, avoidance, support for 
the state authorities’ decisions, hardliners’ call for more anti- communist 
vigilance and NGO- led protest. 
Notes
1 Antonio Gramsci’s prison notebooks, Nelson Mandela’s autobiography and Ahmed Kathrada’s 
letters from Robben island, Ethel Rosenberg’s letters and the burgeoning number of memoirs 
by Indonesian political prisoners from the 1965 generation who were victims of arbitrary state 
detention and violence come to mind. 
2 An exception can be found in critical and feminist strands of the digital humanities, which pay 
attention to the intersectional (raced, classed, gendered) aspects of new media platforms. 
3 The Buru Quartet takes place during the dawn of Indonesian nationalism in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. The character of Minke is a Dutch- educated Javanese aristocrat 
who gains a nationalist consciousness over the course of the novels. By the end of the third 
novel, Footsteps, Minke is arrested and prepares to go into exile. 
4 Two decades earlier Pram too was teaching himself German in Buru and making little headway. 
The character Minke in the Buru novels also speaks a broken German. 
5 Wilson’s letter dated 24 February 1998. Author’s collection and translation. 
6 Former political prisoners, especially those accused of communism, were forever marked by 
their status. They carried ID cards with a special designation for eks-tapol (former political 
detainee) and were required to report routinely to the local military installation. The 
families of eks-tapol were similarly stigmatised and had difficulty obtaining work, housing or 
education.  
7 Carmel Budiarjo is a British woman who runs a London- based organisation called Tapol 
(tahanan politik, political prisoner) that advocates for Indonesian political prisoners. Max 
Lane is an Australian former diplomat and a scholar- activist who at the time of Wilson’s 
incarceration was involved in ASIET (Action in Solidarity with Indonesia and East Timor). He 
is the translator of Pramoedya’s Buru Quartet. 
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